Journalist Aykan Sever assessed the rapidly shifting dynamics in recent weeks across Syria, Israel, Turkey, and the United States, underlining both the fragile relationships regional powers are forging with one another and the structural limits of actors on the ground. Speaking across a broad framework, from why the equation Washington is attempting to build through Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has failed to function, to how tensions along the Israel–Turkey axis are reflected in the Syrian arena; from threats directed at Rojava to the potential consequences of easing the Caesar sanctions, Sever said all these developments are deepening uncertainty across the region.
They see Syria as clay that can be shaped
Aykan Sever explained why Syria has become a strategic arena of struggle subjected to simultaneous intervention by numerous international and regional actors, stressing that the country’s geopolitical importance, from the Eastern Mediterranean to the reshaping of the Middle East, turns every development on the ground into a multi-layered power contest. Sever said:
“They see Syria as clay that can be shaped, and there are many forces doing this at the same time. Among them are the United Nations, the European Union, as well as Russia, the United States, Arab countries, Turkey, Israel, and France. All of these actors are involved in the process because Syria occupies an extremely strategic position. It is decisive both in terms of the Eastern Mediterranean and in terms of the reshaping of the Middle East. Syria is not just Syria; in fact, unfortunately, no problem in any region exists in isolation.
For this reason, we are facing a process in which many forces intervene simultaneously and from multiple directions. All of these actors are trying to entrench their own influence on the ground. Most recently, the European Union sent certain officials in order to steer Syria in line with its own interests, and the United Nations similarly appointed new representatives to monitor the process. Russia, meanwhile, can be said to be trying to reach agreements with the administration of HTS to preserve its own position. And of course, the country of critical importance here is the United States.”
Trump wants to reshape the entire world on his own terms
Sever said Donald Trump is seeking to restructure the world around an America-centred order and explained how this strategy intersects with hegemonic ambitions in Europe and the Middle East. He said: “Trump is trying to shape the entire world, on his own terms, under the leadership of the United States, in a way where America is at the centre. The strategic document published as the ‘new Monroe Doctrine’ envisions a hegemonic position across the globe. Let’s say it is framed around Western Europe and the European Union continent; this is actually the main area where he wants to establish hegemony. But in practice, there are situations you cannot opt out of, whether you want to or not. If you want to be hegemonic over Europe, you inevitably have to focus on the Middle East as well. How this is pursued is what matters. As we saw again after the Palmyra attack, Trump’s statements and his way of thinking are as follows: we are not dealing with some complex grand strategy. For example, in Syria, Ahmed Al-Sharaa (Al-Jolani), who holds power there and Trump both argue that after Palmyra, it has nothing to do with him; he tries to close the matter by saying ‘ISIS and so on.’ Erdoğan likewise holds power, Netanyahu holds power, Prince Salman holds power… Trump wants to use all of them as his proxy forces.”
A kind of Middle East NATO is being planned
Aykan Sever explained how the search for military and political blocs shaped around the Abraham Accords has turned into a project of hegemony in the Middle East, and why this project fails to align with regional realities. Sever said: “Within or behind the framework of the Abraham Accords, there is not only an attempt to form a political bloc, but also a search for creating a military bloc. Therefore, we can think that Israel is envisioning a kind of ‘Middle East NATO’ with itself at the centre of the region. But these things do not work; that is a separate issue. Still, let us say that such a design exists. Because one of the points particularly emphasised in the Monroe Doctrine regarding the Middle East is the control of energy routes and supply lines. First, the route that is supposed to extend from India to Europe has not yet materialised; we do not know when or how it will. But let us assume that, in a framework that also includes this route, places such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are strategic for them. That is why establishing control over Yemen, and at the same time pushing Iran back in the Strait of Hormuz, that is, securing control in that area, is important.
But there is a situation in the Middle East like this: if you cannot establish control over the whole, you cannot establish control anywhere. Therefore, the American administration is ultimately constructing a Middle East of its own imagination. Can it do this? We see, at least in the example of Syria, that it cannot. Because they are making mechanical calculations. In the end, it is not the case that imperialists make sophisticated calculations, know everything, and control everything; rather, they are unable to do so.”
Sever added: “Quite simply, any observer in any field can see that HTS is structurally problematic. By structural problems, I mean the capacity to control Syria and to be inclusive. I am not talking about being democratic, because there is no sign whatsoever that Trump has any expectation of democracy. That is not the issue. But in terms of inclusiveness, for example, if you position yourself within a Sunni Arab orientation and adopt this as a guiding principle, this from the outset prevents one thing: including other minorities such as Alawites, Druze, Kurds, and Armenians. From the very beginning, you take a discriminatory stance. That is why you cannot include them.
Most recently, Alawites held a meeting with Al-Jolani; however, statements made by Alawites after the meeting indicate that it was merely symbolic and that it neither recognised their right to life nor their right to exist. The situation of the Druze and the Kurds is clear; they remain in positions open to attack. In fact, they are not suitable for the kind of integration that the United States is trying to design. Ultimately, the mindset operates according to an understanding we might describe as Islamist or jihadist, which it has long embraced, and it seeks to shape a country accordingly. Therefore, it expects those it confronts to conform to this or tries to force them to do so. For this reason, the authority that Trump seeks to construct will most likely never be established.”
What the US seeks to build clashes with HTS’s structure
Sever explained why the 10 March agreement is viewed as problematic from Damascus’s perspective and how the messages sent by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to Washington after the Palmyra attack affected balances on the ground. Assessing Israel’s red lines, the structural problems of HTS, and the conditions that nourish ISIS’s social base. Sever said: “It is clear that, Damascus does not really want to comply with the 10 March agreement that was previously signed under American pressure, because they feel this agreement would take many things out of their hands. After the Palmyra attack, the SDF took a more explicit position. In short, they delivered two messages. First, they reminded the United States that they are a reliable ally, and in return, assessments questioning HTS’s position more strongly began to appear in the American press. Second, they said they could fight ISIS across Syria as a whole. This was, of course, a move to strengthen their own political position. Despite this, statements coming from the American administration show that investment in HTS will continue and that expectations remain HTS-centred. Nearly all of the forces I listed at the outset are already pursuing an approach that places HTS at the centre.
Israel, however, has a different position here. Israel has certain red lines. If we look at what Israel wants: first, it does not want Al-Jolani to be Turkey’s proxy. It also does not want Turkey to position itself along the border or approach areas under its control. Second, Israel wants to continue using the Druze as a buffer force; for this reason, it believes the Druze should not be touched and should remain in a special position. Third, Israel does not want a Sharia-based administration to emerge in Syria; it sees this as a risk to its own security. The chanting of slogans against Israel during recent demonstrations also ran counter to its expectations. In the past, when Hezbollah leaders were killed, HTS supporters had celebrated. Now the picture has shifted somewhat. This is normal, because HTS is already a highly fragmented structure and almost all of it has an ideological connection to ISIS in the past.”
Sever also said: “More importantly, the political approach of Western countries has not ideologically defeated ISIS, nor does there appear to be the capacity to do so. This is because they do not pursue policies that address why ISIS exists or the social conditions from which it draws strength; instead, there is a superficial approach aimed merely at control. That does not eliminate ISIS. Even if military measures are taken under the banner of counter-terrorism, as long as there is an ideological and social base, these methods will not bring it to an end. This has been seen many times in the world.
Because capitalism fails to produce solutions to the problems people face, ideas similar to ISIS spread and gain influence, especially in Africa and comparable regions, in places with dense Muslim populations. There is a certain rationale behind this: economic collapse, young people’s sense of having no future, and the inability to see another way out. As a result, joining the nearest ‘solution’, a gang, becomes the only option. This is not the responsibility of a single actor; it is the responsibility of the entire world. Yet it is clear that what is happening is neither properly understood nor genuinely transformed. They believe problems can be solved through superficial approaches and day-to-day politics, but this is not possible; this is a very clear reality.”
Turkey’s genocide threat has not disappeared
Sever said efforts to ease tensions along the Israel–Turkey axis have stalled over Gaza, that this strain is directly reflected on the Syrian arena, and that Turkey’s threats against Rojava are heightening regional risks. He said: “Tom Barrack met with Hakan Fidan after meeting with Netanyahu. There is a general search for easing relations between Israel and Turkey; they are trying this. However, especially the Palestine–Gaza issue and Turkey’s possibility of sending troops to Gaza have blocked this process. Not only there, but most concretely there. There was a meeting in Doha; many countries attended, yet Turkey was not invited. The Turkish side tries to brush this off as ‘not important,’ but it is clear that Israel does not want Turkey there. It is also evident that Israel harbours concerns that if Turkish troops enter Gaza, they will not leave.
In general terms, unless there is alignment between Israel and Turkey, the continuation of opposing positions in Syria is inevitable and that is precisely the case now. Turkey continues to threaten Rojava persistently, especially due to the process it is currently in. From the perspective of the Turkish state, one of the main motivations that initiated this process was to prevent Kurds from obtaining any status in Rojava, or rather in Syria, to disarm them and force their submission.
Unfortunately, there is a serious risk here. The people in Rojava have a certain organised resistance, as well as political and military presence; however, Turkey’s genocide threat has not disappeared. There is a constant atmosphere of threat, felt indirectly. Whether this will happen or not is unknown, but the existence of such a risk is clear. Both Turkey’s internal process and, more broadly, the Turkish state’s position in the Middle East feed these negative risks.
This is why there is a situation that truly requires caution. We have seen how slippery international powers have been in Palestine. Expectations like ‘if there is an attack, the United States will stop it, this country will stop it, Israel will act’ have a very low likelihood of materialising. Unfortunately, that is today’s reality. They may later produce policies or issue statements, but I can say with confidence that they will not take concrete steps to prevent an attack.”
Conditions apply to the lifting of Caesar sanctions
Aykan Sever explained what the United States’ move to ease the Caesar sanctions on Syria entails, its implications for Israel, the SDF, and Al-Jolani, and why the need for a democratic order in Syria remains decisive. Sever said: “Last week, the United States took a step toward fully lifting the Caesar sanctions; it has not yet been signed by the president, but the process is moving in that direction. However, there are certain conditions. If I remember correctly, every 180 days the Department of the Interior is required to prepare a report on Syria and submit it to the House of Representatives. Based on that report, a new decision will be made on whether the sanctions should continue. The essence of the Caesar sanctions is this: is the administration in Syria moving toward the line the United States wants, or not? The assessment is made on the basis of these criteria.
The Israeli dimension is also important here. Even if it is not stated openly, Israel’s expectations include issues such as whether Syria will sign the Abraham Accords or a security agreement, and whether the integration of the SDF will be ensured. Therefore, Al-Jolani is not in a comfortable position in any sense. Moreover, he cannot fully control his own team, which is already nearly impossible. Today, all field commanders come from ISIS-origin or similar structures. It is not possible for a person to change their habits and way of thinking simply by changing uniforms. Those who imagine otherwise are mistaken; the United States received its answer to this in its very first patrol.”
Sever said: “For this reason, the task facing Al-Jolani’s administration is not easy, and its future is highly uncertain. Too many forces are trying to pull it in different directions; there is a weak structure being tugged from all sides. Others may seek to exploit this weakness. Al-Jolani wants to be dominant in the region and does not want to be anyone’s proxy. However, if neither the United States nor other actors are convinced by him, the future of both Al-Jolani and the central structure he is trying to build becomes uncertain.
From our perspective, what is truly critical is the establishment of a genuinely democratic order in which peoples can live together. For this, we have to seek pathways at both the intellectual and political levels. Because society in Turkey is struggling with its own problems, it cannot focus sufficiently on developments in Syria; but if we do not engage with the problems in Syria, those problems will come to engage with us. For an atmosphere in which peace and democracy prevail in Turkey, we have to do everything we can. One cannot move forward by relying on racism or a patronising discourse; unfortunately, such grounds exist, but they do not produce solutions.”