Mehmet Emin Ekmen, an MP and deputy chair of the Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA Party), as well as a member of the parliamentary commission, spoke to ANF about party reports prepared in parliament on resolving the Kurdish issue, contacts held within the scope of commission work, the political framework of the process, the role of parliament, expectations for the post-disarmament period, and demands for law, justice, and democracy.
All parties represented in parliament submitted reports on resolving the Kurdish issue. When these reports are read together, do you think a common perspective for a solution has emerged in parliament, or have parties mainly reinforced their own political positions?
Taken together, the parties’ reports show that overall support for the process has continued. However, it is also clear that there are marked differences on issues likely to come to the fore at the end of the process, particularly in the fields of law, justice, and freedoms. This situation is not new. Considering political traditions that span more than half a century, neither the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), nor the Justice and Development Party (AKP), nor the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) can be expected to abandon their political claims simply because such a process has begun. This path does not invite any actor to give up their political position, nor should political positions themselves turn the path into a subject of dispute.
On the contrary, this process calls on everyone to produce value based on law, politics, and democracy by leaving weapons aside, overcoming fears of division, and moving away from the anxieties of the past. To return to your question, parties have indeed proceeded through their own political positions and placed those positions on record. Moreover, such official documents and positions tend to prioritize their own constituencies. In many instances, the flexibility shown during negotiations has outweighed the rigidity reflected in the texts.
Despite differences in approach and tone among the parties, a general confirmation and a shared ground have emerged regarding the need for new legal arrangements for the process, as well as the understanding that a new period will begin in the post-disarmament phase in the areas of law, justice, democracy, and structural reforms. In this respect, we are at a better point than we were yesterday.
During commission work, serious differences can be seen between security-focused approaches and solution proposals centered on law and democracy. In your view, how can a balance be established between these two approaches?
Public communication around the process shows a clear emphasis from the state and alliance parties that “this is not a bargaining process.” From Abdullah Öcalan’s perspective, however, the emphasis is not on a process that resolves political problems through a comprehensive solution package, but rather on preserving a political claim while abandoning armed struggle and integrating into a democratic political ground.
This makes it possible to describe the initiative not as a process that resolves 102 years of problems or introduces a broad democratization package, but as one that enables a methodological and structural transformation of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). From this angle, the preference not to address issues of law, justice, democracy, and freedoms within the framework of the process can be understood.
Our view is that all steps required for Turkey’s democratization, not only those related to the Kurdish question, should be taken through recognition and acceptance, without being held hostage to this or similar processes. At the same time, we have sought to avoid turning this political stance into a subject of debate that would weaken our support for the process or place additional strain on it.
Once the return home is completed, I hope that steps will be taken in the fields of law, justice, and democracy, particularly those that have not been taken due to fears of division frequently referenced by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Devlet Bahçeli, and many other actors.
How have the contacts carried out, and information-gathering mechanisms established within the scope of the process shaped the perspective of the commission’s work? How do you assess the way these contacts were reflected in solution debates in parliament?
Presentations were delivered by ministers and by the head of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT). In addition, the commission benefited from the knowledge shared by individuals working in various civil society organizations, research centers, and academia.
In total, 58 sessions were held across 19 meetings, resulting in 86 hours of discussions, during which 135 people were heard, and 4,139 pages of minutes were recorded. There is no doubt that all this work made a significant contribution to the commission’s efforts. Hearings involving civil society actors were highly productive and offered a broad perspective. The briefings provided by the head of the National Intelligence Organization were also sincere and satisfactory.
One of the main criticisms of the previous resolution process was the failure to place it on legal and institutional footing. At the current stage, do you think parliament has the capacity to provide such a guarantee?
We have consistently pointed to parliament as the proper address for establishing a legal framework. This has also been the point where we have diverged most sharply from our alliance partners. We do not agree with the view held by alliance partners that legal regulations should only be introduced after a verification mechanism related to dissolution and liquidation.
From our perspective, what needed to be established was the will of Öcalan and the organization. That will be clearly expressed on 27 February and 12 May. For this reason, a legal regulation should have been enacted, and organization members should have been invited into a new legal status. However, this was avoided.
We are aware that some steps have been delayed. We hope that in the period ahead, parliament will become the main focal point of the process.
How well do the reports prepared and the commission’s work reflect the expectations of Kurdish society? Do you observe the distance between what is discussed in parliament and the demands on the ground?
It must be acknowledged that what Kurdish society expects from this process is a resolution to the Kurdish issue. Yet the process being carried out by the parties is, in the words of the late Sırrı Süreyya Önder, “not a solution, but a peace process.” In other words, the armed struggle will come to an end, and the struggle will continue within the democratic political sphere. The state, as in many other areas, will also take steps regarding the Kurdish issue.
Rather than questioning the will of the parties, I personally believe that what is needed is a structural and institutional end to the armed struggle as soon as possible, followed immediately by a transition to a strong ground for discussions on law, justice, democracy, and freedoms.
Those who are dissatisfied with this mechanism and its functioning may also consider the following: in just the past decade, since the breakdown of the 2015 resolution process, ten thousand people have lost their lives. Overall, the death toll exceeds fifty thousand. It is not easy to say, ten thousand deaths in ten years, more than fifty thousand in fifty years. A political struggle in which there is neither killing nor dying would, in any case, be a major gain for our society.
Based on the current picture, how strong is the likelihood that this process can produce a lasting outcome for Turkey? What is the most critical threshold determining success or failure?
A lasting solution or lasting peace does not mean the same thing to everyone. I believe Kurdish expectations need to be kept at a more realistic level. After all, a 102-year-old Republic has not been sufficiently democratic even for Turks, or for those citizens deemed acceptable within the framework of that Republic. Even these “acceptable” citizens are neither fully free nor fully satisfied.
Expecting a problem postponed for 102 years to be resolved in a three- or six-month package would be unrealistic. What truly matters is focusing on political and democratic struggles. Kurds must be prepared for a long-term struggle not only for their own issues, but also for all the country’s democratization problems, for all disadvantaged groups, the oppressed, and the marginalized.
No one should assume that concessions or generosity will be easily granted. But as I said earlier, a struggle in which there is neither dying nor killing is the greatest gain. Kurds should trust in their energy, their accumulated strength, and their determination to struggle.