The problem of social freedom is one of the most central yet also one of the most contested themes in modern political thought. Within the Marxist tradition in particular, freedom has largely been associated with the transformation of relations of production and the abolition of class domination. While this approach has provided a powerful theoretical framework for exposing the structural functioning of capitalist exploitation, historical experience has shown that freedom does not automatically emerge solely through the transformation of economic relations.
The fact that relations of domination can be reproduced in different forms even under conditions where class power has changed demonstrates that the question of freedom requires a deeper theoretical interrogation.
It is therefore clear that social freedom must be examined together with the relationship established with being and the way society understands itself. In other words, freedom is not a political gain to be achieved at a later stage; it is a process shaped within ontological assumptions, social relations, and forms of practical action. When the human being and society are treated as fixed essences, freedom is inevitably constrained. By contrast, approaches that conceive being as relational, processual, and historical expand the material and social conditions of freedom.
In this context, Abdullah Öcalan’s approach to socialism as communalism should not be read as a rejection of classical dialectical materialism. On the contrary, it should be discussed as an attempt to update it in order to overcome the limits revealed through historical experience. Öcalan’s treatment of ontology, sociology, and socialism as interwoven necessities makes it possible to rethink freedom as a problem of social existence that is not confined to a change in power.
The question can therefore be formulated as follows: Can social freedom be established solely through the transformation of relations of production, or is an understanding of being and social ontology a constitutive component of this process? Framed around this question, it becomes possible to acknowledge the strengths of the classical Marxist conception of freedom while also making visible the theoretical and practical impasses created by the neglect of the ontological dimension.
In this direction, the article will first examine the approach of classical dialectical materialism to the problem of freedom and the limits that emerged in historical practice. It will then discuss the relationship between ontology and freedom, analyzing the determining effect of the modes of existence of the human being and society on political practice.
In the following sections, the necessity of expanding class-centered analyses will be addressed within a sociological framework, and Abdullah Öcalan’s communalist conception of socialism will be positioned at the intersection of these theoretical debates. The study will conclude by discussing how dialectical materialism can be carried toward a more historical and inclusive framework through the incorporation of ontological and social dimensions.
Classical dialectical materialism and the problem of freedom
Dialectical materialism constitutes one of the most powerful theoretical frameworks of modern social critique. With Marx and Engels, history came to be understood on the basis of material relations of production, and social transformation was defined as being driven by class struggle. This approach removed freedom from the realm of moral or legal abstraction and reframed it as a historical problem tied to the transformation of material conditions. In particular, the labor-exploiting structure of the capitalist mode of production occupies a central place in explaining why freedom is systematically constrained.
Within the classical Marxist framework, freedom is treated as a historical outcome that becomes possible through the abolition of private ownership of the means of production and the end of class domination. In this context, the state is defined as an instrument of oppression of the ruling class and is assumed to wither away with the disappearance of classes. Freedom is thus positioned as a social condition that will emerge after the seizure of political power and the transformation of relations of production.
Although this approach appears theoretically coherent, historical experience has revealed certain limitations. Socialist experiments across different geographies throughout the twentieth century have shown that freedom was not automatically established despite profound transformations in relations of production. Rather than disappearing, the state apparatus in many cases became more centralized and interventionist, while domination over social life was reproduced in different forms. This experience suggests that freedom cannot be reduced solely to the transformation of the economic base.
At this point, the conception of freedom within dialectical materialism encounters two fundamental problems. First, freedom is often postponed to the future, becoming a deferred objective. Existing authoritarian practices are legitimized as temporary necessities, and freedom is relegated to a post-revolutionary stage.
Second, the human subject is largely defined by class position, while everyday practices, cultural relations, gender regimes, and the micro-level functioning of power are treated as secondary fields. This makes it difficult to grasp how domination penetrates the entire social fabric.
What must be emphasized here is that these limitations are not inevitable outcomes of Marx’s theory itself. The concept of praxis that emerges in Marx’s early writings demonstrates that human beings are not merely products of material conditions; in transforming these conditions, they also transform themselves. However, within much of the Marxist tradition, this ontological dimension receded into the background in the face of an emphasis on historical determination. Dialectics was often confined to the sphere of production, and freedom was not addressed as a problem encompassing the totality of social existence.
Therefore, the impasse of classical dialectical materialism regarding the problem of freedom does not stem from neglecting the material foundation, but from defining the material within an overly narrow framework. Relations of production remain decisive; yet when the ways in which these relations are reproduced through human conceptions of being, social bonds, and everyday practices are not sufficiently explained, the question of freedom remains incomplete. This assessment makes it necessary to expand dialectical materialism through ontological and social dimensions.
Ontology: The conception of being and the question of freedom
Approaching the problem of freedom solely on political or economic grounds constitutes one of the fundamental limitations of modern social theory. Classical dialectical materialism offers a powerful historical analysis by placing relations of production at its center; however, it often leaves in the background the deeper bonds through which human beings relate to the world. At this point, ontology, that is, the question of being, emerges as a decisive field for understanding the ground upon which freedom becomes possible.
Ontology asks how the human being exists in the world. The human being is not merely an entity that produces, provides labor power, or is defined by class position. At the same time, human existence is characterized by meaning-making, relationality, and the interpretation of both self and environment. In this sense, ontology shows that social relations are not composed solely of external structures; human beings internalize and reproduce these structures in lived practice. Without a transformation in the conception of being, claims to lasting social freedom become difficult to sustain.
The fundamental critiques directed at modern philosophy by Martin Heidegger are illuminating here. According to Heidegger, modern thought reduces being to an object, privileging what is measurable, calculable, and controllable. This approach compresses the human relationship with the world into a technical and instrumental register. Being ceases to be a lived and shared process and instead becomes a domain to be managed and regulated. Such a conception normalizes domination, turning it from an exceptional condition into an ordinary one.
This ontological narrowing is not unique to capitalism. A similar problem can be observed in state-centered socialist experiences. Even where the means of production have been nationalized, human existence continues to be defined through mechanisms of central planning, representation, and discipline. Freedom shifts from a relation continuously produced within social practice to a goal administered from above. This creates a new field of tension between emancipation and power.
At this point, the approach of Abdullah Öcalan brings ontology to the center of political theory. For him, the problem is not limited to property relations or class contradictions; the more fundamental issue lies in how human beings conceive of themselves and society. When being is understood as a constantly evolving web of relations, freedom also ceases to be a static condition and becomes a practice that is constructed, disrupted, and reconstructed in everyday life. Within this perspective, freedom is transformed from a promise deferred to the future into a responsibility of the present.
This ontological framework also maintains a critical distance from identity-based or nationalist modes of existence. Fixed identities, immutable essences, and singular historical narratives treat “being” as a frozen structure. By contrast, a relational conception of being requires individuals to define themselves through the bonds they form with others. This makes it possible to conceive freedom not as individual or collective property, but as a process continuously reconstituted within shared life.
From this vantage point, there is no hierarchical relationship between ontology, sociology, and socialism. Ontology provides the ground for sociological analysis. Sociology reveals the social manifestations of ontological assumptions. Socialism, in turn, offers a practical orientation aimed at transforming both in the direction of freedom. When the ontological dimension is neglected, socialism is inevitably reduced to an administrative model. Abdullah Öcalan’s intervention is directed precisely against this reduction.
Sociology: The limits of class and the plural forms of social domination
Classical Marxist sociology analyzes society primarily through relations between classes. The bond established with the means of production determines an individual’s social position, while politics, law, culture, and ideology take shape upon this material foundation. This approach is highly effective in exposing the structural inequalities of capitalist society. Over time, however, it has proven insufficient for explaining all forms of social domination.
Even though it has lost its homogeneity, class and class analysis remain indispensable for understanding the functioning of modern capitalism. Yet when examined on historical and anthropological grounds, class alone does not provide an explanation encompassing society as a whole. It is well known that hierarchies, gender-based inequalities, and religious and cultural forms of domination existed in pre-state or semi-state societies. This suggests that domination did not begin solely with class relations, but is connected to older and deeper forms of social organization.
It is precisely at this point that Abdullah Öcalan’s sociological intervention gains significance. For Öcalan, class is an important form of social domination, but not its first or constitutive form. The rupture experienced by society with the advent of state civilization was not merely an economic transformation; it was also a mental, cultural, and organizational break. Male domination, hierarchical authority, relations of representation, and centralization took shape prior to class formation and deepened alongside it.
This perspective moves sociology beyond a narrowly economic field of analysis. Society is approached both as a product of relations of production and as a living structure constituted through values, norms, habits, and everyday practices. Domination cannot be observed solely in the factory or in property relations, because it is reproduced within the family, language, education, and political representation. This renders an understanding of the struggle for freedom as merely a class conflict inadequate.
Within the Marxist tradition, attempts have been made to address this gap in different ways. Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, Louis Althusser’s analysis of ideological apparatuses, and later currents of cultural Marxism represented important steps toward overcoming class reductionism. Yet these contributions often remained limited in questioning the centralized state and party model. Social transformation continued to be conceived as a process organized from above.
Öcalan’s sociological framework, by contrast, recenters society itself. Society is not a passive mass; it is a subject with the capacity for self-organization. Communes, assemblies, and local forms of organization are therefore not merely administrative units, but constitutive spaces of social emancipation. Here, sociology does not confine itself to analyzing relations between classes; it becomes a field of knowledge that reveals society’s potential for self-governance.
At this point, class is not rejected, but it ceases to be the sole determining axis. Class struggle, gender struggle, ecological struggle, and the pursuit of cultural freedom are addressed as intertwined processes. This approach acknowledges that social domination is not monocentric and carries the struggle for freedom onto a plural terrain.
In conclusion, this sociological expansion does not contradict the core insights of Marxism; rather, it deepens them historically and socially. Class analysis is preserved, but repositioned within the holistic structure of society. Öcalan’s contribution lies in transforming sociology from a merely explanatory discipline into an integral part of the practice of freedom.