Journalist and writer Mehmet Ali Çelebi, known for his studies on Syria and who recently published the book Rojava: Middle East Renaissance, spoke to ANF.
The first part of this interview can be read here.
There are many factions, and movement between them is very frequent
Çelebi said these groups are highly fluid, with dozens of organizations and factions operating on the ground and described how movement between them has become commonplace: “These groups are extremely permeable; there are dozens of organizations and factions. Just as there are defections from SNA to HTS, there are also transfers from HTS back into SNA. When countries such as Turkey, France, and the United States launched train-and-equip programs, it was seen that the first groups they deployed to the field joined HTS, that is, Al-Nusra. This was because it was the most dominant, the strongest, and the most dynamic structure at the time.”
He said a similar fluidity exists with ISIS: “There is also a very easy transition to and from ISIS. Reports on this have surfaced frequently. The aftershocks of this reality were previously seen in the form of attacks in different countries. Massacres took place in Moscow; similar attacks occurred in Paris, London, and Brussels.”
Çelebi pointed to the latest attack as an illustration of ongoing risks: “When we look at the attack on 13 December 2025 in the Palmyra area, we see that this is a strategic zone capable of controlling both the south and the north. At the same time, the T-4 Air Base, where Turkey has been attempting to establish dominance, is located in this region. Indeed, Israel bombed the area in order to prevent Turkey from entrenching itself there.”
He said the attack had broader geopolitical implications: “In that attack, two United States soldiers and one interpreter were killed, while the United States and Syrian soldiers were wounded. This happened at a time when the United States and Syria had begun joint patrols. This development took place within the framework of Donald Trump’s policy of using HTS.
Trump wants to use jihadist structures such as HTS as a striking force against China and Russia, in order to counter their efforts to weave hegemonic networks. At the same time, he seeks to eliminate radical jihadist elements that he does not embrace by using these forces against one another.”
Çelebi said the broader objective remains control over regional dynamics: “The United Kingdom wants developments in the Middle East to flow in a direction it prefers, and it is trying to achieve this through Turkey, a member of the NATO. This is because it does not want Russia to establish itself in the region. There is a historical background to this position, rooted in opposition to Russia controlling trade routes in the Mediterranean and around the Suez region.”
In the future, we may see jihadist mercenaries becoming mafia-like in Turkey
Çelebi said jihadist structures are trained in Turkey under train-and-equip agreements and sent to Syria, warning that this could pose serious dangers for countries in the long term. He said: “Overall, just as they have organized very serious attacks in Pakistan, they have also carried out attacks in Iran at different times, and they have organized attacks in Europe. We may see these groups becoming mafia-like in Turkey as well. In the future, we could see them turning into different gang structures and drug mafias. Significant resources are therefore being transferred to these formations.”
He pointed to a concrete example from 2025: “For example, on 13 August 2025 in Ankara, a train-and-equip agreement was formally signed between the Syrian Interim Administration’s Ministry of Defense and Turkey’s Ministry of Defense. These individuals are trained and sent into the field; however, as we mentioned earlier, when they move into different factions, or as in the attack in the Palmyra area, they can reappear before us again. It later emerged that the person who carried out the Palmyra attack was an ISIS member embedded within the army.”
Çelebi said the implications extend beyond security concerns: “When all of this is taken into account, there is a serious threat potential for opposition trade unions and unionists in Turkey, as well as for educational institutions and everyone active in the fields of art and politics. This represents an open and grave danger for the peoples of Turkey.”
One of Trump’s goals is to broker an agreement between Israel and HTS
Çelebi said Al-Jolani has complied with all demands from the United States and Israel and continued: “The United States ambassador to Ankara, who also serves as Thomas Barrack, Trump’s Special Envoy for Syria, made a striking statement in December 2025. He said: ‘Whatever we ask Sharaa to do regarding Israel, he does it.’ For this purpose, meetings were held by the Al-Jolani administration in Baku, meetings were held in Paris, and further meetings took place in other capitals as well. A certain degree of progress was achieved. One of Trump’s objectives is to bring Israel and HTS into an agreement.”
Çelebi said Turkey’s position later shifted as realities on the ground changed: “What is interesting now is this: at the beginning, Turkey opposed HTS reaching an agreement with Israel. But later, a picture emerged in which Israel seized a very large portion of Syria. Turkey had expected something else, that HTS would dominate Syria, suppress all peoples, and produce a Syrian model aligned with Turkey’s wishes. When we look at the situation today, Turkey is one of the largest military powers in Syria. Turkish troops are present on the ground. Israeli forces, meanwhile, have taken control of Mount Hermon, which is very close to Damascus.”
The war in Syria is also a war over water, energy, and food
Çelebi said the war in Syria cannot be reduced to a struggle over political power alone, stressing that energy routes, water resources, and food security are central to the conflict. Çelebi said: “Syria’s geography is also the site of a war over energy equations. It is a struggle to dominate the energy balance in the Eastern Mediterranean and to control the corridors that would carry that energy to Europe. Another dimension is this: the fact that the Syrian civil war has dragged on for fourteen years is, in reality, a water war and a food war. This is a war about the future, because a significant portion of water resources is located in areas where Kurds live, and a large share of agricultural land is also in Kurdish regions.”
Çelebi said Turkey has not fully achieved its objectives within this equation, but that HTS and Al-Jolani have aligned themselves with Ankara’s expectations: “Turkey has not been able to realize exactly what it wanted within this equation. However, HTS and Al-Jolani have reached the position Turkey desires. Almost every two days, Turkey’s foreign minister travels to Damascus, and almost every week Syria’s foreign minister comes to Ankara. Hakan Fidan is effectively acting as if he were a co-chair alongside Al-Jolani or Syria’s foreign minister.”
Çelebi referred to information from sources on the ground and added: “Sources we spoke to said that during the first-year celebrations, slogans such as ‘Be patient, Cizre, Muhammad’s army is coming’ were chanted. This, too, amounts to an open threat directed at the region.”
Turkey’s policies are pushing Syria toward division
Çelebi said Turkey’s demand for “one army, one administration” in Syria contradicts its own policies, arguing that Ankara’s vision of a single authority is, in practice, centered on HTS. He said:
“Officially, Turkey puts forward the following argument: Syria should not be divided, it should remain unified, there should not be two armies in Syria, there should be a single administration. But when you look at the reality, the Turkish Armed Forces have not withdrawn from Syria; there are thousands of Turkish soldiers there. So how is Syria’s territorial integrity supposed to be ensured? They say there should not be two armies, yet people ask: if there are two armies in Cyprus, why should there not be two armies in Syria? When a federation or confederation exists, such a situation inevitably emerges. In Cyprus, Turkey imposes two administrations, and numerous United Nations resolutions say Turkey must withdraw from Cyprus and pull back its troops, yet Turkey does not leave. At the same time, it imposes ‘one administration, one army’ on Syria. These are contradictions in themselves.”
Çelebi said Ankara’s approach is deepening divisions rather than preventing them: “Turkey’s policies are, in fact, pushing Syria toward division. When you do not condemn attacks against peoples and instead support HTS and the Al-Jolani administration, you inevitably distance those peoples and destroy the bridges of trust. You are the one severing ties of friendship and solidarity. In reality, Turkey is currently pursuing a policy in Syria that deepens dark fault lines. Turkey is in a position that could trigger future seismic ruptures there. In fact, Turkey needs to find a way out of this path.”
Turkey wants no Kurdish force to remain as a carrier of freedom
Çelebi said Turkey’s current position has a direct impact on Rojava, arguing that Ankara does not want Kurds to gain any form of political status. He said Turkey’s stance inevitably shapes developments in North and East Syria, while developments in Rojava also influence Turkey’s policies. Çelebi continued: “Turkey’s position inevitably affects North and East Syria, and Rojava’s position also affects Turkey’s policies. Turkey’s fundamental strategy is based on keeping Kurds in the region without status. It wants Kurds to remain stateless, Kurdish to gain no constitutional recognition among the peoples, and for no Kurd to remain as a carrier of history or a carrier of freedom. It does not want a single Kurd to remain as a bearer of the Kurdish language. Its entire strategy has been focused on this.”
Çelebi said Turkey has mobilized all its resources to prevent Kurds from obtaining constitutional status in Syria’s future, but that the regional and international context no longer allows this: “Turkey has put everything on the table to prevent Kurds from gaining constitutional status in Syria’s future. However, the current conjuncture does not allow this. The political climate is moving in a different direction. As a result, with other countries being forced to step in, the 10 March 2025 agreement was signed in Damascus between Mazloum Abdi, the General Commander of the SDF, and Al-Jolani, the head of the interim administration.”
He said the agreement promised equality and freedom not only for Kurds, but for all peoples: “This agreement stated that the equality and freedom of all peoples, not only Kurds, would be recognized and that these rights would be placed under constitutional guarantee. It also envisaged the establishment of committees by the end of 2025 to regulate how border regions, economic areas, agricultural lands, and oil and energy resources would be coordinated.”
Çelebi underlined that the SDF are not exclusively Kurdish:“SDF is not composed only of Kurds; Armenians, Arabs, and Syriacs are also part of it. In North and East Syria, there are not only Kurdish councils; Armenians and Syriacs also have their own civilian and military councils. Communes have emerged.”
He contrasted this model with the reality under HTS: “On one side, there is a structure that has carried out massacres against Alawites and Druze, that does not accept them or their religious way of life. There have also been attacks and massacres against Christians. On the other side, there exists the social contract of North and East Syria, which includes Armenians, Assyrians, Syriacs, Circassians, Nusayris, and Sunni Arabs. This model has produced a system in which all languages and cultures can express themselves, governed through a co-chair system, and where elected officials can be recalled.”
Çelebi said HTS represents a radically different and exclusionary mindset: “Opposed to this stands an HTS mentality that seeks to restructure Syria through a sectarian, fascistic, and monolithic understanding, one that cuts peoples down by the sword, is disturbed by women’s voices like the Taliban, opposes women’s employment, and tries to segregate women’s workspaces, while entrenching an Ikhwan–Salafi worldview.”
He said this mentality seeks to force Kurds into individual integration: “In this framework, Kurds are being pressured to join the army individually and to integrate as individuals. Yet Kurds have a significant experience of self-defense. So why does HTS not integrate into the forces of North and East Syria instead? How can you join, or accept, a force that carries out massacres?”
Çelebi said this remains one of the core points of crisis in the triangle between Rojava, Damascus, and Turkey: “The administration of North and East Syria says integration must take place at the divisional level and insists that the women’s structure, the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), must be preserved. Otherwise, there is an understanding that grants women no rights and assigns them only a second-class status. For this reason, today all peoples are looking to the Kurds and to the Kurdish dynamic.”
Çelebi concluded by saying the course of history cannot be contained: “Turkey, the Al-Jolani administration, and the other countries supporting it need to see this: you cannot imprison the flow of history, or its winds, within palace walls. You cannot confine a rising ocean to jars. If peoples have risen for freedom, are striving for it, and see its guarantee in structures such as the SDF in North and East Syria, then you cannot stop this flow.
From now on, Syria will either become a federation or a confederation, this is inevitable. Turkey will also be forced to accept this, because history is now flowing in that direction.”