One year has passed since Ahmed al-Sharaa (Al-Jolani) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) seized power in Syria. Over the course of this year, HTS and affiliated mercenaries, both within and outside its ranks, carried out massacres targeting Alawites and Druze communities.
Claims that the war in Syria has ended have been exposed as false by recent developments. While internal turmoil continues across the country, the HTS administration is persistently seeking to avoid implementing the 10 March Agreement it signed with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Particularly due to interventions by the Turkish state, the HTS leadership continues to insist on policies that exclude Kurds and other peoples from any political future in Syria.
Assessing one year of HTS rule in Syria and the developments unfolding across the country, journalist and writer Mehmet Ali Çelebi, known for his studies on Syria and who recently published the book Rojava: Middle East Renaissance, spoke to ANF.
Al- Jolani is a successor of the Islamic State in Iraq
Çelebi noted that Al-Jolani was initially held in United States prisons and went on to explain how Hayat Tahrir al-Sham emerged: “HTS and Al-Jolani are known worldwide to be successors of the ISIS. ISIS itself was a derivative of Al-Qaeda, which emerged as a successor to the Taliban administration in Afghanistan. In that sense, this structure was incubated in Iraq, in Baghdad in particular, with Fallujah and Baghdad at its core. Ahmed Al-Sharaa was imprisoned for a period by the United States in that region because he played a role at the time in attacks targeting Shiites and Shiite mosques.”
Çelebi referred to the early days of the uprising in Syria and said the developments that followed marked a major turning point: “After the uprising began in Syria on 15 March 2011, what happened along the Daraa and Sweida (Suwayda) line, areas that Israel has today declared a buffer zone, created a profound rupture. In Daraa, horrifying photographs spread after children were tortured and killed for writing the slogan ‘Your turn is next, doctor’ on school walls. In the aftermath of these events, a process unfolded that eventually led to ISIS entering Syria. However, even during that entry, a clear split emerged. This split was essentially over power and spheres of influence.”
Çelebi said the rupture between ISIS and Al-Jolani stemmed from differing strategic visions: “ISIS envisioned a global religious form based on the idea of the ummah and a caliphate. Al-Jolani, on the other hand, tried to act more pragmatically. He argued that the jihadist system he sought to establish did not have to be global, but could be constructed territorially and nationally, confined solely to Syria. In that split, there was initially a question of allegiance to one another, and then the separation became definitive. This was the point at which Al-Nusra emerged.”
Turning to the capture of Idlib, Çelebi underlined the role of regional and international actors: “In 2015, an operation was carried out in the Idlib region. When we look at the main organizers of this operation, we see actors such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Turkey. Idlib was seized and turned into HTS’s stronghold, because Al-Nusra transformed into HTS. This process was carried out particularly with the support of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT).”
Çelebi also emphasized the role played by British intelligence: “British intelligence also played a very significant role. Historically, the United Kingdom was involved in organizing the mujahideen in Afghanistan. Peshawar in Pakistan was a key hub where fighters were organized and sent into Afghanistan. Ultimately, a structure emerged in Turkey that was, in a sense, transformed into a new Peshawar, and actors such as the United Kingdom and Turkey invested in Al-Nusra.”
He added that after rival groups were suppressed, tensions escalated in several regions: “Serious tensions then unfolded in Eastern Ghouta, in parts of Lebanon, and in the Foa–Kefarya area. Near Afrin (Efrîn), in northern Aleppo, there is a Shiite region known as Nubul and al-Zahraa, which was placed under siege by jihadist forces. Negotiations followed, and Russia launched intense bombardments of Aleppo, leaving the city almost entirely destroyed. The remaining jihadist elements were then transferred to Idlib under an agreement.”
Assad was now seen as a burden
Çelebi said this process also paved the way for HTS to advance on Damascus and described how the capture of the capital unfolded: “In reality, this period created the conditions for HTS to march toward Damascus via Hama and Homs after Aleppo, because the Astana process was in effect at the time. Who were the main actors of the Astana process? Turkey, Russia, and Iran.
One striking aspect of the Astana process was this: Al-Nusra and HTS were classified as terrorist organizations, and one of Russia’s key conditions, also one of the core conditions of the Astana process, was the complete elimination of HTS and Al-Nusra from Idlib and their removal from the area. However, the Astana process turned into a trap for the peoples of Syria. At the same time, it became a trap for Iran and for Russia as well. Because after this operation, as HTS moved from Idlib toward Aleppo and then Damascus, Russia suffered a major blow.”
Çelebi continued by outlining the regional developments at the end of 2024: “By 27 November 2024, the picture looked like this: a very serious war was underway in Lebanon. From September onward, Israel transformed years of accumulated intelligence and information, gathered through its intelligence networks within Hezbollah, into direct operations, forcing Hezbollah into a ceasefire.
As soon as a ceasefire was signed with Hezbollah on 27 November, HTS launched its Aleppo operation. One of the main reasons for this was the fear that Hezbollah might return to Syria after the ceasefire. During this period, Israel had also bombed Hezbollah, while Syria’s mechanized forces were largely struck by Israel. At the same time, the Syrian army was severely worn down, facing financial difficulties and deep psychological trauma caused by the war. The prolonged conflict had exhausted the population. In such an environment, HTS was activated. It was decided that Bashar al-Assad had become a burden. HTS went on to seize Damascus.”
If Assad had reconciled with the Kurds, we would be reading a very different history of Syria
Çelebi said that fear of the Kurds was also a key factor behind Damascus being handed over to HTS, stressing that there was deep anxiety over the growing organizational model created by Kurds in North and East Syria. Çelebi continued: “Among the factors I have just listed, there was also a fear directed at the Kurdish dynamic. A system had been built in North and East Syria, and at that time negotiations were taking place with the Assad administration. Issues such as the constitution, how the mother tongue would be enshrined, and what status the Kurds would have were being discussed between the Baath administration and North and East Syria. Even in the final month, Assad was dragging his feet on granting rights to the Kurds, recognizing them as equals, giving Arabic and Kurdish equal status, and embracing equal rights for Armenians, Assyrians, Nestorians, Chaldeans, and other peoples living alongside Kurds in North and East Syria. He was saying that only a few lessons per week could be allowed.”
Çelebi said a historic turning point was missed: “If, at that time, the Assad administration had chosen democratization, had been able to read history and understand where the world was heading, how global and regional balances were evolving, where alliance-building efforts around the region’s energy equation might lead and had reconciled with the Kurds, we would be reading a completely different history of Syria today. But Assad resisted this.”
He said this resistance was reinforced by Moscow:“Behind this stood the influence of Vladimir Putin, Sergey Lavrov, and Dmitry Medvedev. They believed that Assad could manage the process without granting too many rights to the Kurds. At that time, Putin aimed to loosen Turkey’s ties with the NATO and draw Ankara into his own orbit by expanding certain concessions. Projects such as the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, the S-400 missile system, water-related agreements, and fighter jet deals were on the table, and there were expectations from Turkey.”
Çelebi added that Iran also played a restraining role: “For this reason, the Syrian administration was trying to echo Turkey’s engagement against the Kurds at that time. The Iranian leadership was also a restraining force on Assad, as they, too, feared their own internal Kurdish dynamics. As a result, HTS, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia were concerned that if Assad became cornered, he might lean toward North and East Syria, and they wanted to act as quickly as possible.”
Turning to massacres against religious minorities, Çelebi said the violence carried out by HTS against Alawites and Druze also revealed how the Baath regime had left Alawites defenseless: “For example, when jihad was declared and attacks were launched between 6 and 10 March 2025 against areas where Alawites live in large numbers, such as Latakia and Tartus, and these regions were occupied, when raids were carried out in streets and homes and massacres took place, we saw something else as well: the Baath regime and the Assad administration had long relied on Alawite support, but their approach was limited to protecting Alawites from attacks by other groups.
No organizational mechanisms were created for Alawites. We saw that Alawites had almost no organizational structures, that they were fragmented, and beyond that, that they were not armed. Had the Assad administration allowed such organization, had social organization and institutionalization been developed among Alawites, jihadist elements would not have been able to enter these areas so easily.”
Çelebi said the same pattern was repeated with the Druze: “Another example is the July genocide: the genocide launched against the Druze in Sweida on 13 July 2025. There, too, jihad was declared, and they advanced as far as Sweida, passing through areas under Turkey’s control, carrying out massacres, storming hospitals, and committing murders.
In short, similar things had already happened in Damascus. Alawite homes were marked, pogroms were carried out against Druze communities, and most recently, a pogrom against Alawites took place in Homs.”
Summing up the HTS period, Çelebi said it represented a reconfigured version of the Baath regime: “When we assess the HTS period, we see that it appears as a different version of the Baath regime. We are talking about a structure defined by sectarianism, massacres, torture, murder, kidnappings, and ransom-taking. This should also be understood as a coalition within the framework of the Syrian National Army (SNA). HTS is itself a coalition; it is not a single, homogeneous structure. Between 8 December 2024 and 8 December 2025, now more than a year, the HTS administration has functioned as a coalition government.”
HTS is actually a small structure in Syria
Çelebi said Syria is home to dozens of factions and organizations, noting that the SNA stands out as the largest formation, while transitions between groups are widespread and frequent. He continued:
“There are dozens of organizations and dozens of factions in Syria. A large portion of them operate under the umbrella of the SNA. In fact, HTS is not a very large structure; it is relatively small. The largest formation is the SNA. The SNA was formed through a train-and-equip program implemented by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, with its financing provided by countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. This is where the system I referred to earlier, described as a ‘Peshawar model’, came into being. Jihadist elements arrived from cities such as Hatay, Antep, Urfa, and Istanbul, by sea and by air, and were transferred into Syria from different routes. These structures formed the core and the most hard-hitting elements of the SNA.”
Çelebi pointed to China’s concerns as an example of regional unease: “One of the reasons China keeps its distance from HTS is this: there exists an extremely radical jihadist structure known as the Khorasan Group. In addition, there are formations such as the Turkistan Islamic Party, composed largely of Uyghurs. China fears that these groups could return and destabilize the Xinjiang region.”
He said Russia initially pursued a containment strategy: “One reason Russia concentrated these mercenaries in Idlib was the belief that they could be eliminated more easily if gathered there. For a long time, acting on this assumption, Russia tolerated and effectively gave leeway to both Turkey and HTS. Ultimately, however, Russia was forced to withdraw. The world may yet witness these jihadists carrying out serious attacks if they return to the Caucasus, or attacks in Moscow if they head back there.”
Çelebi added that the consequences are already visible elsewhere: “The example of Pakistan is very clear, because Pakistan is now paying the price for these jihadist remnants. Iran has also faced this problem. Pakistan, for instance, is trying to deport Afghans. What we see here is that a very serious threat potential has been created, not only for China and Russia, but also for the peoples of Turkey.”