Professor Hamit Bozarslan said an ideology of domination and supremacy with a 150-year historical background continues to shape politics in Turkey, adding that this mindset has not been abandoned and that the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Republican People’s Party (CHP) represent different variants of it. He stressed that a serious rupture would only be possible through democratization but underlined that no such perspective is currently visible. Bozarslan said, “As far as we can see today, there is no democratic horizon, because democratization also carries, for these actors, the risk of the end of their power. Breaking away from the ‘habitus’ also means fully abandoning this issue of domination and accepting equality. At this moment, we are not at that point.”
Professor Hamit Bozarslan, known for his work on Middle East politics, the Kurdish question, violence, the state and social movements, spoke to ANF.
The Commission established in the Turkish Parliament has entered the stage of drafting its report. Within this framework, political parties are submitting their own reports. It appears that the reports of the AKP and the MHP adopt an approach that is detached from the core of the issue and continue to address the Kurdish question largely within the framework of security policies. How should this stance be assessed?
I think what matters most here is the role of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party). As you have also pointed out, the other currents, namely the Nationalist Movement Party and the Justice and Development Party, tend to frame the issue primarily as a security problem. Reducing the Kurdish question to a matter of terrorism and promoting Turkey’s perspective of a so-called “terror-free Turkey” are direct outcomes of this approach. Yet today, it is not possible to speak of a Turkey dominated by terrorism.
Looking back, the period in which terrorism was genuinely a determining factor was between 2014 and 2015- 2016. That period had certain specific characteristics. The terrorism in question was not Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorism, nor was it “Kurdish terrorism”; it was terrorism carried out by the ISIS. Moreover, this ISIS terrorism can also be explained in connection with Turkey’s domestic politics.
It should not be forgotten that in 2014 and 2015, there was almost a policy of tolerance between Turkey and ISIS. We should recall the Kobanê process and how the Syrian border was nearly turned into a jihadist corridor. Yes, there was a terrorism problem at that time; however, this terrorism had nothing to do with the Kurds. On the contrary, it was terrorism that targeted the Kurds.
Over the past ten years, it has not been possible to speak of terrorism in any real sense. Despite this, from the perspective of those in power, the core problem remains the refusal to acknowledge the Kurdish question and the failure to recognize it as a legitimate “national issue.”
DEM party’s proposals are extremely important
Significant developments are taking place within the DEM Party. The party approaches this issue both from the perspective of resolving the Kurdish question and from the standpoint of Turkey’s democratization. In this sense, the proposals put forward by the DEM Party and the perspectives it offers are extremely important.
There are signs of a possible shift within the CHP
Secondly, developments within the CHP need to be examined. The CHP’s decision not to visit Imralı was a major misstep for the party. I believe they have now come to realize this themselves. Going to Imralı would have been a very small step for the CHP. Two years ago, no one could have imagined or dared to consider such a perspective. Even so, that step would have been quite limited, yet it could have brought the CHP significant gains. It is highly likely that the CHP has recognized that it made a mistake in this regard. Perhaps the party may show some degree of progress on this issue. However, what we see very clearly is that, for the CHP, the Kurdish question is not at the top of the agenda. In fact, even the issue of democracy does not occupy a central place. The CHP has so far been unable to present a comprehensive perspective on democratization. That said, recent statements by Özgür Özel point, albeit in a limited way, to the possibility of some progress on the Kurdish question.
Imrali visit could be a turning point
Members of the Commission established within the Turkish Parliament visiting Imrali and holding talks with Abdullah Öcalan is described by some as a threshold moment for the process. Do you share this view?
Meeting with Öcalan is a matter of legitimacy. Ultimately, it means recognizing Öcalan as a leader of the Kurdish Movement, treating him as a legitimate interlocutor and turning to him as an authority. Two years ago, no one would have been able to address such a possibility, dare to take such a step, or even consider developing such a perspective. In that sense, we may perhaps speak of a certain turning point. However, it is still necessary to wait and see.
There is an ideology of domination and supremacy
You repeatedly stress that the legitimacy of the Kurdish question is still not recognized. When we look at developments to date in a holistic way, what are the main obstacles to recognizing this legitimacy? Is it solely due to the state’s reliance on a security-based approach?
There is, of course, a security issue and a security-oriented approach at play. Years ago, Ahmet İnsel described the existence of a “national security regime” in Turkey. Beyond this, however, another dimension must also be taken into account. We can speak of a Turkish ideology in Turkey, one with an almost 150-year historical background, extending back to the era of Abdulhamid. It is an ideology of domination, an ideology of supremacy. We are confronted with an ideology that does not accept equality, citizenship, or freedom, and that, in one way or another, seeks to impose the superiority of Turkishness, or even if not Turkishness alone, the superiority of an Islamic-Turkish identity. This ideology has not been abandoned. The AKP represents one variant of it; the MHP represents another; and the CHP represents yet another. What is needed here is a serious rupture in the way the state thinks or rather, in the way those in power think. Such a rupture can only be possible through democratization. Yet, as far as we can see today, there is no perspective of democratization. There is none within the AKP, and none from the standpoint of the MHP either, because democratization also carries, for these actors, the risk of the end of their power. For this reason, taking such a step is not on the agenda at present. Therefore, we are dealing not only with a security issue, but also with an ideological continuity that spans nearly 150 years.
Does the fact that these negotiations are still not conducted directly with the PKK, and that even when there are talks with Abdullah Öcalan the process is presented as if it is advancing through the DEM Party, amount to a form of avoiding clear interlocution on the part of the state?
There are, in all likelihood certain forms of contact with the PKK in one way or another. However, we do not know the scope or depth of these contacts. When it comes to the question of interlocution, the DEM Party itself is not fully treated as a legitimate counterpart either. This is because recognizing the DEM Party as an interlocutor would also mean accepting the Kurdish question as a legitimate issue and acknowledging the DEM Party as a component of the Kurdish Movement. At present, we are not at that point.
What is at stake here is that the refusal to accept the Kurdish question also means refusing to accept Kurdish society, and even the existence of a Kurdish population. This situation inevitably brings the issue of interlocutors to the forefront.
You are entirely right on this point. Taking Öcalan as an interlocutor rests on a logic that says: “If the PKK is a terrorist organization, if there is no Kurdish question and only a terrorism problem, then let us try to resolve this terrorism by dealing with the person who initiated it.” Yet this logic inevitably ends up legitimizing the PKK, and likewise legitimizing Öcalan. Everyone knows that there is a Kurdish question underlying this situation, but at the same time, this question is deliberately left unnamed.
We are not at the point of breaking away from the habitus
As you often emphasize, this process carries many risks. Abdullah Öcalan also points to these risks by referring to Pierre Bourdieu and using the concept of “habitus.” How should the risks Öcalan refers to be understood in terms of the entrenched practices and reflexes of the state and political actors?
When it comes to this issue of “habitus,” we are again dealing with a history that goes back roughly 150 years. Consider the Committee of Union and Progress. It acknowledged the existence of Armenians, just as the Justice and Development Party today acknowledges the existence of Kurds. Yet for the Committee of Union and Progress, the Armenian question was not a “national issue,” nor was it a question of equality. It was framed as a matter of terrorism or security, and we know what the outcome of that was.
Take 1912, for example: the Balkan Wars. In the Balkans, there was a rising demand for equality. In response, Turkey, meaning the Ottoman Empire of that period, chose a war strategy. As a result, the Balkans were lost.
The same applies to 1916. In that year, there was a growing demand for equality among Arabs. Cemal Pasha’s response was to erect gallows.
So, we are dealing here with a very long-term issue of “habitus.” This can also be read as one of the defining names of Turkish ideology. The situation is similar when it comes to the Kurdish question. The Kurdish question is not accepted as a Kurdish question, nor is it approached as an issue of equality. It is primarily seen as a security issue. A security issue that is also defined as a threat to the domination of Turkishness. Of course, if Kurds are demanding equality, this is not to accept the domination of Turkishness, but rather to bring that domination to an end. Breaking away from the “habitus” therefore also means completely abandoning this question of domination and accepting equality. At this moment, however, we are not at that point.