Abdullah Öcalan emphasized during his most recent meetings that the coup mechanism and its new practices would not resemble the classical form of a coup. At the point reached today, opponents of the process have openly and brazenly accelerated their attempts to sabotage it.
In his meeting with the Imralı Delegation on 2 December, Öcalan drew attention to the organization of those opposing the process, pointing out that a “habitus coup mechanism” was in operation. In his previous meeting with the delegation, he had also warned about this mechanism, stating that the process was being deliberately undermined. He stressed that what is unfolding today is not a conventional coup, but rather a situation moving forward through the disruption of the process itself.
The concept of the coup mechanism was clearly articulated by Öcalan as early as the 2013 process, a warning that was met with resistance at the time; some even claimed he was misreading the situation. Yet the events of 15 July 2016 proved Öcalan right.
As pro-war factions openly intensify their efforts to sabotage the process and particularly after the Republican People’s Party (CHP) refused to join the delegation visiting Imralı, opponents of the peace process have begun voicing their objections more loudly, accelerating their work to prevent a peaceful life in Turkey and Kurdistan.
After CHP declined to participate in the delegation that would listen to Abdullah Öcalan, process opponents, emboldened by this stance, began expressing their views more forcefully. Since 27 February, they had already been using the media to articulate their positions and demonstrating through their actions that they were seeking to derail the process. However, because CHP had remained in the commission and because the majority of society supported the process, these opponents had struggled to make themselves fully visible.
With CHP’s latest decision, they have not only attempted to pull the party into the camp opposing the process but have also begun speaking even louder to create the public impression that “many do not want the process.”
The media’s test with the process and its convergence around opposition to peace
In Turkey, the media began revealing its true face openly after Abdullah Öcalan’s historic call on 27 February. Caught between contributing to the proper advancement of the process and insisting on a discourse that could sabotage it, media outlets gradually made clear where they stood.
Pro-government media organizations, although showing small shifts, largely maintained a cautious stance for a considerable period. Yet what was particularly striking was how some outlets that define themselves as “oppositional” continued to cling insistently to the language of war, reinforcing it rather than moving toward a discourse that supports the process.
Following the Parliament Commission’s decision to visit Abdullah Öcalan and the CHP vote against this decision, these same media outlets began openly articulating their anti-Kurdish positions, another notable development in how they positioned themselves in opposition to peace.
The first moments of the historic announcement
Sözcü, a newspaper known for its coverage critical of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and with a significant readership within the CHP base, positioned itself in open opposition to the process from the very first day. Immediately after the call, the newspaper’s headline on 28 February read: “A new trap is being set for the nation.” In doing so, Sözcü clearly signalled that it would continue using the language of the war period.
The newspaper’s 1 March 2025 headline, “Many questions, no answers in the opening!”, made its anti-process stance explicit. On the same front page, the paper also published a piece praising mafia leader Sedat Peker. It further gave prominent space to articles claiming that Abdullah Öcalan’s call was made to secure an election victory for the AKP.
Sözcü continued its anti-process coverage with determination. The paper regularly published fabricated stories about the process, giving a platform almost daily to opponents of the process and elevating these interviews to front-page prominence.
Another outlet opposing the process was Cumhuriyet, which also has a substantial readership among CHP supporters and the broader left. On 28 February, the newspaper ran the headline: “Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan makes the expected announcement.” Its front-page opinion columns contained assessments that placed Kurds under the shadow of the AKP, framing them as political auxiliaries.
On 1 March, the newspaper behaved as though Turkey were not experiencing a historic turning point and relegated stories about the process to the inner pages.
Yeni Akit also adopted an openly anti-process tone. The newspaper chose to present the historic call with the headline “The end of the road for the PKK” and attempted to fabricate the impression of a rift between Abdullah Öcalan and the Kurdistan Freedom Movement. Insisting on the language of war, it continued to publish phrases such as “From Öcalan to the Kandil barons.”
Another oppositional narrative was promoted through the nationalist Aydınlık newspaper. Aydınlık published its first-day headline as “The Turkish army defeated the PKK; Öcalan surrendered to this reality.” The headline included statements by Doğu Perinçek, framed as part of a heroic narrative.
When a group from the Kurdistan Freedom Movement burned their weapons on 11 July, the same newspapers used this moment as an opportunity for anti-process propaganda and to reinforce the language of war. Nefes insisted on using the label “terrorist organization,” while Sözcü ran the headline “A half-hour show after 47 years of betrayal,” openly declaring its opposition to the process.
Cumhuriyet, also known for its stance against the process, mentioned the historic ceremony only as a small item on its front page.
CHP’s Imralı decision emboldens opponents of the process
One striking development was the convergence of process-opposing narratives across diverse media outlets such as Cumhuriyet, Yeni Şafak, Sözcü, Yeni Akit and Halk TV.
Although some newspapers and journalists, particularly those hesitant because the process was initiated under the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and because the CHP had signalled support, had refrained from openly declaring their opposition, this changed sharply after CHP announced it would not participate in the visit to Abdullah Öcalan on Imralı. Encouraged by this stance, they began expressing their opposition to the process in explicit terms.
Following CHP’s Imralı decision, opponents of the process started revealing themselves openly. What stood out was the participation of figures widely perceived as “oppositional” in the public sphere. These groups, openly mobilizing anti-Kurdish sentiment around CHP’s refusal to visit Abdullah Öcalan, not only launched attacks on the DEM Party but also engaged in media efforts aimed at distorting Öcalan’s views.
Opponents of the process are provoking society through the media
Selman Çiçek, Co-Chair of the Dicle Fırat Journalists Association (DFG), emphasized that governments often use the media for their own benefit. He noted that opponents of the process have been relying heavily on the media during this period and stated:
“Media is one of the most effective tools for reaching society directly. If your goal is to reach the public, the most effective way to do this is through the media. For this reason, media is often described as a form of power; it holds significant influence, and everyone is aware of this. Unfortunately, governments use this power not for the benefit of society, but mostly for their own advantage. That is why they focus on monopolizing the media.
There has been an ongoing process since 27 February. The Democratic Society and Peace process, initiated by the call of Kurdish People’s Leader Abdullah Öcalan, is progressing, even if not at the desired level. One of the key aspects of this process is the presence of public support. Unlike previous processes, we see almost no social backlash. Opponents of the process, or groups that profit from war, are well aware of this, and because they know it, they are provoking society through the media. We call this ‘war journalism.’”
We must strengthen the front of peace journalism
Selman Çiçek noted that war journalism “feeds on bloodshed” and added: “War journalism conceals the truth; it lies. This is exactly like the perception being created today through the media by opponents of the process. You may oppose the process; you may not embrace it. But a journalist is obligated to tell the truth. If someone hides or distorts it, we cannot call that person a journalist.
For example, Sözcü is one such case. A journalist named Özgür Cebe from Sözcü targets people who spent 30 years in prison, completed their sentences and even spent an extra two or three years unlawfully due to the decisions of administrative observation boards. Allegedly, these individuals were released because of the process; this is a lie. A journalist does not fabricate. A journalist reports the truth as it is. We could multiply such examples.
Those who do not stand for peace today will bear the moral burden of war tomorrow. A journalist has responsibilities toward society, and one of those responsibilities is to convey the truth to the public exactly as it is.
Selman Çiçek warned that such attacks will increase as the process advances, concluded: “The aim here is to misinform society and reduce public support for the process. Despite all efforts, there is still significant support among the public. As the process progresses, these attacks will intensify. As journalists who stand for peace, we must strengthen the front of peace journalism even further.”