The visit carried out by the parliamentary commission to Imralı brought discussions on the resolution process back onto the public agenda. The positive statement issued by the Office of the Speaker of Parliament after the visit signaled a new stage in the trajectory of the process. Prof. Dr. Mesut Yeğen talked to ANF about both the shift in the Speaker’s tone and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Chair Devlet Bahçeli’s remark that “the most serious interlocutor is Imralı,” interpreting it as evidence of a transformation in the state’s and political actors’ discourse.
Yeğen underlined that the process has not been fully embraced by the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Even so, he said the political language is increasingly moving toward seeking a legitimate interlocutor, adding that the opposition is shaping its stance in accordance with the government’s attitude. He pointed to developments in Syria and said these dynamics are compelling Turkey to shift its approach. He also noted that the Republican People’s Party (CHP) decision not to send a representative to Imralı stems from President Erdoğan’s hesitancy toward the process.
The Speaker of Parliament announced that the commission’s meeting on Imralı had gone well. The statement notably emphasized the 10 March Agreement in Syria and its call for peace and social cohesion. The tone used by the Office of the Speaker was also markedly different from the previous “terror-free Turkey” discourse. Do you think it was different, and how do you interpret this shift?
There is indeed a change of tone not only in the Office of the Speaker but among other actors as well. It appears that this began some time ago, perhaps first with regard to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Turkey has started using a more accommodating language toward the SDF, and its bureaucracy has shifted, especially among government members. Devlet Bahçeli also changed his tone in his parliamentary group speech, beginning to emphasize peace. And as you mentioned, for the first time, the parliamentary group showed that it might be receptive to the idea of a democratic society or at least able to consider these discussions within such a framework.
As the process advances, the state is updating its language. It is moving away from the “terror” discourse and the “Imralı butcher” rhetoric toward the language of a legitimate interlocutor, treating this as a social, political and legal matter that must be addressed. In this sense, there is a positive direction.
But this does not mean the matter is settled. There may still be reversals. Even more radical statements were made during the previous resolution process. Still, this shift should be noted as a positive development. At the same time, it must be said that actors within the governing AKP, particularly the Speaker of Parliament and AKP officials, remain reluctant to use a language that would help legitimize talks with Imralı in the eyes of society. More precisely, they do not want to be seen as participating in this legitimization. They see where this is heading, yet they do not want to appear as part of a process that could later be reversed or that could lead to Abdullah Öcalan being recognized politically.
This creates a dual picture. On one hand, there is progress. On the other, there is a lingering lack of courage, which draws serious criticism. Ultimately, while the state conducts the process, its political executor is the government. And if this process succeeds, the success will be attributed to the government and especially to the AKP. However, the AKP does not want to bear the political risks that arise along the way. This is why other actors criticize them, and I find that criticism justified.
Take Hüseyin Yayman’s recent behavior, for example. When journalists asked him whether he went to Imralı, he said, “I did not go, I wasn’t there,” but it later became clear that he had gone. If the issue were security, as some claim, that would be difficult to accept, because many delegations have gone there and returned safely. We often learned of these visits through journalists anyway.
If there truly were a security concern, one could accept it, but the likelihood seems low. More likely, Yayman himself was not convinced and wondered whether having his name associated with the process could cause problems for him later. This shows that an important issue remains unresolved.
The point is this: Erdoğan and AKP officials must now fully embrace the process, accept that they are its political drivers, and explain it to society. They must make clear why this process matters and why the disarmament of the PKK, and the reintegration of PKK members into society, is important. This must be communicated clearly.
Look at the poll published this morning. Society strongly supports the process, but it does not support going to Imralı. This is largely because the government has not instilled enough confidence, and because people sense hesitation even in Erdoğan’s statements. As a result, they are not yet ready for such steps.
Consequently, actors such as the CHP, the New Road Party and the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) naturally feel less confident about participating in the process.
Bahçeli’s statement after the meeting that “the most serious interlocutor is Imralı” is striking. As you said, radical statements were also made during the previous process, but now the question of political will also comes into play. You argue that the AKP still does not fully embrace the process. Recently, some have said Bahçeli has even taken on a kind of icebreaker or path-opening role. Should it be read that way?
If Bahçeli were the head of government or the president, things would be much better. I am speaking specifically about this process. If the president, for example, had said what Bahçeli is saying, then we would feel much more confident about the future of the process, and I assume that society would also have felt more reassured by now.
But as things progressed, we understood something important. When the process first began, many felt a sense of comfort. The thinking was: If Bahçeli, who opposed this more than anyone for years, and his MHP say this should happen, then surely it will. The AKP had already conducted such a process in the past, with Erdoğan at the helm. That gave us confidence.
Yet as the process moved forward, we saw that there are points where Bahçeli’s perspective and Erdoğan’s perspective do not align, and that the two partners disagree on the form and pace of the process. More troubling is that Bahçeli’s influence is not as great as many assumed when disagreements arise.
There was an expectation, especially in some commentary, that if Bahçeli did not get what he wanted, he would push for early elections, and early elections would be a risk Erdoğan could not take. Therefore Erdoğan would inevitably align himself with Bahçeli’s perspective. But this did not happen, and the process did not unfold in that way.
We now see that while the continuation of the process matters to Bahçeli, he is not a figure who will destroy everything and push the country into early elections if things do not proceed exactly as he wishes. We are not facing a Bahçeli willing to take such a risk, whether rightly or wrongly.
And beyond that, we are not facing a Bahçeli who can make Erdoğan do whatever he wants at critical moments. Leaving aside even more significant issues, consider the delegation’s visit to Imralı. For example, regarding the release of Selahattin Demirtaş, statements were made repeatedly. It is clear that Erdoğan either wants to use this as a bargaining chip or frame it as a technical matter and release him as though he were an ordinary prisoner under an adjustment to the execution law. This shows that we overestimated Bahçeli’s power, capacity and influence within the ruling bloc at the beginning of the process.
You previously said that the process in Turkey would be shaped by the integration process in Syria. After the visit to Imralı, the Speaker highlighted the 10 March Agreement. Journalist Sedat Bozkurt also reported on the closed parliamentary session, where he wrote about remarks by National Intelligence Organization (MIT) Chief İbrahim Kalın. There has been no confirmation or denial, but according to this account, Kalın seems to have a different view of the SDF compared to Hakan Fidan. As you noted earlier, we are indeed seeing a shift in the government’s perspective toward the SDF. Yes, the government does not embrace the process as firmly as Bahçeli does, but is there a slow change underway? And as the framework in Syria shifts, might we see more concrete steps?
At the beginning of the process, the situation regarding Syria, meaning the SDF and Rojava, was this: Rojava was the most difficult area to reach an agreement on. We already knew that the PKK had been calling for disarmament or peace since 1999, even 1993. We knew that the Kurds in Turkey were long prepared for such a process, that there was already a strong political party here, and that the process could be advanced through that party.
So, in Turkey, an agreement between the state and the Kurds seemed more achievable. That is why many said, “Let us hope the process does not get stuck, but if it does, it will get stuck in Rojava.” In Rojava, the gap between Turkey’s expectations and the realities on the ground, and between what the SDF wanted, was enormous.
Could this gap be closed? Many analysts were concerned. What I now see is this: Over the past 14 to 15 months, the gap did not close through direct talks between the SDF or Öcalan and the state. Rather, the realities of life itself narrowed the gap and pulled Turkey toward a more reasonable position, even against its will.
Because Syria cannot be managed solely through disputes or agreements between Turkey, the SDF and the Damascus regime. There are other actors: Israel, the United States, the Druze, the Nusayris, the Gulf states. Each is involved with different methods, instruments and concerns, and each has some capacity to influence developments on the ground.
Therefore, any solution must include all these actors and reconcile their demands. I think Turkey has gradually begun to recognize this.
This brings us here: When the process began, you may remember what Turkey was saying. The SDF fighters would disarm and, if they wished, join the Syrian army individually. All administrative structures governed by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) would be dismantled. The Damascus regime would return. And Kurds would be recognized as equal citizens, but only at the individual level. In other words, Turkey’s own perspective would simply be applied there.
But the past 15 months have shown that it is not possible for SDF fighters to disarm and join the army one by one. It is not possible to dismantle the administrative structures built by the PYD. And it is not possible to integrate Kurds into the Syrian state solely through individual-level equal citizenship. What is needed is a form of decentralization, a security apparatus that guarantees Kurdish safety, and a political status that goes beyond individual equality. Without this, no agreement between the regime and the SDF is possible. Turkey has slowly realized this too.
Thus, life has forced Turkey to change its view of Rojava. As a result, the gap between Turkey and the SDF has narrowed in practice. Otherwise, I do not believe this shift occurred through negotiations alone.
The recent decisions by CHP and the New Road Group not to send representatives to Imralı have been widely debated. You emphasized that the government’s positioning plays a decisive role. Going forward, do you think the opposition will shape its stance according to concrete steps taken by the government or according to the AKP’s attitude? What do you see in this picture?
What I see is this: CHP made it clear from the very beginning that it was ready to take part in the commission. When the process began and discussions about the commission started, CHP joined with unexpected initiative, contributed meaningfully, and ensured that the commission was formed and operated correctly.
You may remember that the commission was initially supposed to be named the “Terror-Free Turkey Commission.” It was changed partly due to CHP’s objections. The Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) also objected, but it was CHP’s firm stance that they would not participate under that name that shaped the commission’s character.
So first of all, CHP has been part of the process from the beginning. It has contributed significantly at key stages. It is essential that CHP be involved, as it represents nearly 35 percent of the electorate.
The second point is this: Some figures within Kurdish politics misinterpreted CHP’s decision not to send a representative to Imralı and offered unfair criticism. CHP has not withdrawn from the process. It simply chose not to send a representative. And the main reason is not, as some claimed, submitting to the sensitivities of its voter base. That may have had some influence, but the core reason is what Özgür Özel repeatedly said: “Let us first see Erdoğan’s stance. Then we will announce ours.”
This means they expect Erdoğan to embrace the process. But as we saw, despite pressure from Bahçeli and attempts by CHP to draw him in, Erdoğan resisted. In his most recent group speech, he avoided taking a clear position and referred everything to the commission. In other words, he did not want to assume political responsibility.
Now, the person politically responsible for this process is the President of Turkey. And as I said, if this process ends positively, which we hope it will, the actor who will benefit most is the government, especially the AKP. But if that actor does not embrace the process with full enthusiasm, this confuses others and raises questions such as: “What is happening here? What is Erdoğan hesitant about? Why is he not championing this process more strongly?”
Therefore, Erdoğan’s attitude lies behind CHP’s decision not to send a representative to Imralı. If Erdoğan had clearly embraced the process, I believe that at least one CHP representative, perhaps even without an official party decision, would likely have gone to Imralı and met with Abdullah Öcalan.
Thus, all these factors should be considered when evaluating CHP’s stance. Ultimately, the process still needs CHP. The DEM Party also needs CHP. For this reason, statements such as “CHP does not actually want a resolution,” “CHP created the Kurdish question,” or “CHP has returned to its old codes” may work rhetorically or polemically, but they do not reflect the deeper reality of the situation.