Tomorrow, 11 November, people in Iraq will go to the polls for yet another delicate election. Special voting has already begun. Parties, alliances, and candidates are appearing in the public arena under the supervision of the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission.
The elections, held under the shadow of Sadr’s boycott call despite his large voter base, have sparked debate over the influence of foreign powers.
Citizens in Iraq participate in the elections using biometric cards with an electronic voting system. Across Iraq, 21,404,000 people are eligible to vote in 709 election centers and 4,501 polling stations.
A total of 7,768 candidates (2,248 women and 5,520 men) are competing for 329 seats, representing 75 independent candidates, 31 alliances, and 38 parties.
The Independent High Electoral Commission announced that distribution of biometric cards continues in 1,079 registration centers, with over 2.5 million cards already distributed and nearly 1 million still pending delivery.
Special voting for Peshmerga, police, and security forces has begun. The elections are being monitored by 304 international observers and more than 1,500 journalists.
The rivalry among Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis is one of the clearest reflections of Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian diversity in political representation. Election campaigns largely lack concrete political programs; instead, Shiite groups rely on their demographic majority to maintain control of government, while Sunnis seek unity to regain influence in central politics.
The Kurds, meanwhile, aim to preserve their political influence and expand their economic and administrative gains both in the Kurdistan Region and in the so-called “disputed territories” such as Kirkuk (under Article 140 of the constitution).
The fragmented internal structure of the political blocs complicates forecasts. Competition among Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis continues to be shaped by regional and global powers.
The U.S. and some Western countries aim to weaken Iran’s influence, while Iran seeks to deepen its political foothold through Shiite parties. Israel, for its part, views Iran’s growing presence in Iraq as a threat to its own security. Neighboring Turkey tries to secure its position in this regional power struggle through both its ties with the Turkmen population and its political and economic relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
Kurds in the Iraqi elections
A year has passed since the 20 October 2024, elections in the Kurdistan Region, yet no government has been formed, a sign of a clear and deep political deadlock. Despite repeated meetings between the KDP and PUK, no agreement has been reached. As the Iraqi elections approach, the PUK has accused the KDP of being uncompromising.
PUK Politburo member Sedi Ahmed Pîre said: “If the KDP could form a government without us, it would have done so already. The KDP does not believe in genuine partnership and does not want to reach a serious agreement with the PUK.”
The prolonged absence of a functioning government has left major issues unresolved, from salary crises to oil and gas disputes. The lack of a legally and politically legitimate government weakens Kurdish bargaining power in Baghdad and exposes a visible governance gap at a time when public expectations are high.
During the campaign, Kurdish politics emphasized adherence to the Iraqi Constitution and redefinition of relations with Baghdad. PUK leader Bafel Talabani highlighted constitutional solutions throughout his campaign.
High voter turnout in the last Kurdistan elections has raised expectations for strong Kurdish participation in Iraq’s general elections as well. Under Iraq’s Sainte-Laguë electoral system, larger parties have an advantage, while smaller ones risk being marginalized.
Still, the KDP, PUK, and other Kurdish parties together are expected to secure between 60 and 70 seats in the Iraqi Parliament, indicating that Kurds will continue to serve as a key balancing force in Baghdad.
In the disputed areas, especially Kirkuk, Kurds are again fighting to regain power. The PUK is working to strengthen its influence there and retain the governorship by winning six parliamentary seats.
The Kurds’ multi-pronged strategy, both in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region, seeks internal reconciliation while maintaining political leverage within Iraq’s broader power balance.
Sunnis, Iranian influence and Shites
Under the 2005 Constitution, Iraq’s power-sharing system distributes the premiership to Shiites, the presidency to Kurds, and the speaker of parliament to Sunnis. Sunnis, who see this arrangement as sidelining them, frequently demand the presidency for their community to achieve a more balanced representation.
However, internal divisions among Sunni parties prevent progress on this demand. Despite organizing around four main blocs ahead of the elections, they have failed to agree on a common candidate or strategy, weakening Sunni influence in Baghdad.
This fragmentation has also fostered distrust and apathy among Sunni voters.
The Sovereignty Alliance (Siyada), led by Khamis al-Khanjar and once the largest Sunni coalition after the 2021 elections, lost significant power following the departure of former Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi. Halbousi, now leading the Taqaddum Party, seeks to maintain his influence by supporting different lists.
On the Shiite side, Muqtada al-Sadr’s position continues to shape the election process. His calls to cancel or boycott the elections have disrupted the Shiite political balance.
Whether Sadr participates or not is seen as crucial not only for the strength of the Shiite bloc but also for the overall legitimacy of the elections.
Since Sadr’s withdrawal from politics, Iran-backed Shiite groups have gained ground. These factions have warned voters that low turnout could lead to the resurgence of the Ba’ath regime.
Through its political and paramilitary influence, especially over the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the “Coordination Framework”, Iran remains a decisive actor in Baghdad politics. Tehran sees maintaining Shiite dominance as essential both for strategic depth in its regional conflicts with Israel and the U.S. and for sustaining control over Iraq’s internal dynamics.
Reports claim that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei recently sent a message via Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani urging Shiite leaders to prevent the fragmentation of the Coordination Framework.
Following the recent 12-day war with Israel, Iran has prioritized maintaining its influence in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq.
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s “Reconstruction and Development Alliance” has drawn attention for trying to balance ties between Iran and the U.S., as well as with Turkey and the Gulf states.
However, Iran’s potential use of Iraqi territory as a logistical or military corridor amid its tensions with Israel poses challenges for Baghdad. While reports that Sudani blocked an Israeli strike are seen as a balancing act, it remains unclear if such equilibrium can last.
U.S. indirect intervention
After pressuring Baghdad to veto amendments to the PMF (Popular Mobilization Forces) law, U.S. influence in Iraq has become more evident. Washington reportedly provides selective diplomatic support to certain figures and programs, while recently designating four Iran-linked Shiite militias, Harakat al-Nujaba, Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades, Ansarullah al-Awfiya, and Imam Ali Brigades, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
These groups, closely tied to Iran’s Quds Force, wield significant military and social influence in Iraq.
The U.S. is also said to be in contact with Sunni actors to counter Iranian influence. Washington envisions an Iraq where PMF power is reduced and Kurdish and Sunni forces support a U.S.-aligned prime minister, a scenario that would also curb Tehran’s dominance.
While the U.S. once sought to dissolve the PMF entirely, it now proposes integrating them into Iraq’s security structure.
Mark Savaya, appointed by President Donald Trump as U.S. Special Envoy to Iraq on October 20, has emphasized that armed groups must not operate outside state authority and has urged Baghdad to assert control.
Savaya, known to have close ties with Prime Minister Sudani, also led negotiations for the release of Israeli researcher Elizabeth Tsurkov, who was kidnapped by the Hezbollah Brigades. He is reportedly tasked with removing militias such as the Hezbollah Brigades, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, al-Nujaba, and Sayyid al-Shuhada from Iraq’s security field.
His remarks – “Iraq still needs support. There is no place for armed groups outside state authority. Iraq’s stability depends on a unified security force under one flag and one Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces” – were interpreted as an endorsement of integration.
Analysts argue that as Iran’s influence in Iraq wanes, U.S. power will expand — and the Kurds will become more visible in this shifting balance.
Turkey in the Iraqi election equation
In Kirkuk, the rivalry among Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen political groups reflects not only local power struggles but also the influence of regional powers. Turkey actively leverages both its ties with the Turkmen population and its relationship with the KDP to assert influence in Iraq.
By organizing politically along the Kirkuk–Mosul line through Turkmen channels, Ankara aims to limit Kurdish influence in local administrations.
At the same time, Turkey uses issues like water control, energy deals, and border security as leverage against Baghdad to expand its diplomatic dominance. Its control over water resources crucial to Iraq gives Ankara a potential tool of pressure during the elections.
The U.S.–Iran power struggle, coupled with Turkey’s strategy of expanding influence through the KDP, makes Iraq’s balance of power even more complex.
The results in disputed areas such as Kirkuk and Sinjar will not only shape Iraq’s domestic politics but could also affect the distribution of oil revenues and the gains of the Kurdistan Region.
The failure of Kurdish parties to run jointly in these areas could undermine their full representation.
Meanwhile, Turkey, by withholding water or leveraging its growing military presence and bases, seeks to make Baghdad more receptive to its demands in the post-election period.