Abdullah Öcalan has spent months pushing for momentum toward a second stage in what he calls the “Peace and Democratic Society Process.” He describes the first stage as a set of unilateral goodwill gestures undertaken by the Kurdish side. That phase is now considered complete: it began with the “Peace and Democratic Society Call” on 27 February, continued through the Twelfth Congress decisions of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and culminated in the 11 July action in which thirty guerrillas burned their weapons. Together, these steps were meant to clear the path and build the political ground for Turkey to move toward peace and democratic change.
The next stage is about law. It is about legally anchoring this process, establishing a transitional legal framework, adopting the legislation needed to secure peace and democratization, or rewriting and restructuring existing statutes where required. Öcalan refers to these as “Democratic Integration Laws” and “Freedom Laws.”
The Solidarity, Fraternity and Democracy Commission formed in Parliament is, in essence, tasked with identifying what legal steps this second stage will require and how they should be implemented. After three months of work, the expectation now is that it must begin taking those steps. That, inevitably, also means meeting Abdullah Öcalan listening to his thinking, and weighing his proposals.
Everyone recognises that the second stage is heavier, more layered, more complex. Which is why the living and working conditions of Abdullah Öcalan, the central driving force behind the process, cannot remain as they are. He needs to be able to live and work freely. The fact that he struggles even to breathe under current conditions shows the limits of what is possible in this state. If this process is to move into a second stage and be meaningful once it gets there, his conditions must be improved. He must be able to communicate, and he must have a functioning environment in which to work.
In this context, the statement delivered on 26 October by Sabri Ok, a member of the Executive Council of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), on behalf of the Kurdish Freedom Movement, carried particular weight. His declaration, that guerrilla units whose presence could have triggered renewed clashes have now been withdrawn from within Turkey’s borders, and that the necessary adjustments have been made along the frontier, generated wide reaction. Throughout the past week, the separate statement by the twenty–five guerrillas who returned to the Media Defence Areas was also debated extensively. And every indication suggests that this discussion will continue to widen and deepen.
The point on which almost all commentators converge is clear: this move has unlocked the process, it has made a genuine transition into a new phase conceivable. And because the withdrawal happened with Öcalan’s approval, there is a noticeable release of tension, a sense that people, across the spectrum, are breathing a little easier. That shift in mood is not confined to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Devlet Bahçeli; it is visible in Tuncer Bakırhan and across the opposition as well.
The optimism is also tied to this week’s meetings on Imralı. After the family visit, it emerged in the press that the Imralı delegation of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) held a lengthy and substantive discussion with Abdullah Öcalan. What matters is not simply that a meeting occurred, but the statements that followed and the serious, constructive messages Öcalan conveyed, which clearly shaped the mood. The delegation’s prior consultation with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan before travelling to Imralı was another factor reinforcing confidence in the prospect of moving into the next phase.
At the same time, this is not a moment for emotional highs when things look good, nor despair the moment pressure rises. That oscillation belongs to mercurial temperaments in sociological terms, a petty-bourgeois reflex. There is not even a trace of that in Abdullah Öcalan’s words or conduct. He consistently holds to the process and orients his language and actions toward its success. That stance was unchanged in the week’s meetings: he cautioned all actors to approach the process with seriousness and constructive intent, and highlighted the historic significance, for Turkey, of adopting the legal framework required for peace and democratization. He also urged working-class communities, especially women and young people, to educate and organize themselves.
We cannot afford the mood swings of petty-bourgeois reflexes. What is needed now is deliberate, creative work toward the kind of transformation that can actually deliver what Turkey and the Kurds urgently need peace, and a democratic opening. That means staying focused on the meaning and stakes of the “Peace and Democratic Society Process,” and investing real effort in explaining these realities to the wider public in Turkey. This is precisely the area where the weakness has been most visible. And yet, the past year has produced developments, arguments, and gestures that have broken old certainties, disrupted entrenched mentalities, and pushed racist–chauvinist narratives into the realm of public debate. In short, the conditions for telling people something new and telling them the truth are better than they have ever been. This is not the moment to withdraw into a shell. It is the moment to mobilise, to speak with clarity, and to communicate reality with precision and the right tone.
No one has the luxury of standing idle. Moving into a second stage of the process, adopting the legal measures that peace and democratisation require, is not simply in the interest of the Kurds. It is, above all, in the interest of Turkey and of everyone who lives in this region. The danger encircling Turkey is not speculative; it is visible. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s trips to the White House and to Sharm El Sheikh, and his meeting with United States President Donald Trump, changed nothing. The United States has followed a consistent strategic line since 1990, and every administration has executed that strategy according to the priorities of global capital. That is what Trump is doing as well. Within that framework, the framework of the Third World War strategy, the role assigned to Turkey is obvious. And unless the unity and power foreseen by Abdullah Öcalan, through peace and democratisation, is actually brought into being, the dangers awaiting Turkey are not theoretical; they are close enough to see.
Democratisation in Turkey would not benefit only the Kurds; it would benefit everyone who lives in this country. Yes, the small caste that profits from war might lose its rent-extraction channels and would no longer be able to enrich itself through conflict. But ninety-five percent of society would gain, from peace and democratic change. Which is to say: advancing into the second stage of the “Peace and Democratic Society Process,” and actually delivering results, is not merely a Kurdish concern it affects, and would positively shape, the lives of the entire population. For that reason, one of the central tasks is to make this process intelligible to society in Turkey, to socialise the “Peace and Democratic Society Process” itself, and to expand that work inside Turkey so it reaches every sphere of public life. That is where effort must intensify.