The Colombian peace process began in 2012 in Cuba with negotiations between the Government under President Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC–EP) aimed at ending the decades-long conflict. These talks culminated in the Final Peace Agreement between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP, signed in November 2016.
Professor Alejo Vargas Velásquez, an expert on peace processes and political science, talked with ANF about the Colombian peace process and the lessons to be learned from the negotiations.
The first part of this interview can be read here.
Peace was signed with FARC, but other armed groups in the country continue to exist. How does this situation challenge the process? Can we call this the “unfinished part” of peace?
It is necessary to understand the long armed conflict in Colombia. There were many actors involved: both insurgents and counter-insurgents, yet they never united. That is why we have had around nine peace agreements, but each of them was signed with only one actor; no other groups were ever included. The reasons are all there: ideological and political differences, the egos of group leaders. But that is how history unfolded. First, there was an agreement with the 19th of April Movement (M-19), then in the 1990s with the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), followed by the Revolutionary Workers’ Party (PRT), then with Quintín Lame, and finally with the Indigenous Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FAC). Today, only two major dissident groups remain.
The National Liberation Army (ELN) now considers itself the only historical insurgent movement and to some extent, they are right. They would not join an agreement in which they were not the main actor of the peace process, and thus they would not accept being added to another agreement. No, such a thing never happens in Colombia, every group wants to stand out on its own. Theoretically, this could have happened under the current government as well, but this administration decided to negotiate with everyone under its policy of “total peace.” As a result, around nine negotiating tables were created with urban gangs, dissident factions, and others. Thus, a group like the ELN says: “No, do not equate us with those groups; we are a historic insurgent movement. Those others are organized crime and paramilitary groups, that is something else entirely.”
The government, however, is not concerned about this distinction, because what it ultimately cares about is reducing crime rates: fewer murders, less extortion, and fewer other crimes. But for the insurgent movements, this is not the point. They will not leave the struggle because they are neither defeated nor tired of war. Eight or nine governments have come and gone, and they see no problem waiting for two or three more if necessary.
This dynamic has a very significant impact. For example, the ELN has always been in a kind of competition with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP), and if the process is not handled in an equal way, they will not participate, which is exactly what happened. Today, each group has its own negotiation table, and none of them has reached any result.
In addition, the government of Gustavo Petro, I believe, at one point tried to negotiate the disarmament of one of the ELN’s southern fronts in the Nariño region. This front called itself Comuneros del Sur. The ELN saw this as a violation of the existing agreements, and that became the core reason for the crisis. Furthermore, from their perspective, the failure to implement earlier agreements justified suspending this negotiating table.
Last week, President Petro said that the negotiation table with the ELN should be reopened. They might manage to do it, and the ELN will probably be willing, but these talks will not lead anywhere or, as we say in Colombia, “they will not reach Pereira.” Why? Because the ELN’s logic is this: if the negotiation with the FARC took five years, ours will not take any less. Every government must understand that this will be a long negotiation and that is the situation of prominence we are in.
That is why the ELN says that even though an agreement was signed. For example, a 370-page document, they were not included from the beginning. And this is true, because at that time, people close to the government of Juan Manuel Santos used to say that it would be impossible to reach the kind of agreement they wanted with the ELN. Their plan was to make an agreement with the FARC, because if they had included the ELN, it would have completely derailed the process.
So, this element, unfortunately, will continue to accompany us in our political history for quite some time.
Looking back today, is there anything you would say, “If we had done this differently, peace would have been stronger”? Which steps appear most critical for the coming years?
In my view, unless governments, regardless of who they are take seriously the idea of establishing a permanent state presence in the regions, in other words, unless they ensure real state-building in those areas, this problem will persist.
Why is it that today Colombia has the largest area of coca cultivation? Mr. President, you may not like to discuss this, but this is the country’s reality today: Colombia has the most extensive coca-growing territory. The reason is simple, there is no state presence in those regions. In areas where the state does exist, no one cultivates coca or marijuana, because the security forces would not allow it.
So, what happened after the disarmament of the FARC-EP? The fronts were disarmed, and certain areas were abandoned, but the state did not step in to establish its presence. As a result, other illegal groups filled those vacuums. This led to the expansion of the ELN and the emergence of new dissident factions.
If this issue is not addressed seriously and that must be done not with words but with concrete action, it is essential to strengthen the security forces and ensure a lasting state presence. Of course, this cannot be limited to a military dimension; it must also include a civilian one: schools, doctors, judges, and so on. But this must be permanent, not in the form of temporary visits to the regions. Until this happens, the problem will persist, because there is effectively no one exercising real control there. As a result, armed groups take over that role, they provide control, they resolve conflicts: if there is a dispute between neighbors, they solve it; even issues between spouses, between husband and wife, are handled by the armed group.
In other words, they perform the functions of the state. And unless this is resolved, we will continue to face the same problem.
As you know, in Turkey, a resolution process is being carried out between the state and the Kurdish Freedom Movement, along with its leader Abdullah Öcalan, to address the Kurdish question. As an expert working on conflict resolution and peace processes, how do you think Colombia’s peace experience could contribute to these discussions in Turkey? In what ways can the Colombian example be instructive for the Kurdish peace process?
Yes, I believe there are many experiences that can be repeated, at least partially, because we know that every situation has its own particularities. I remember that after we finished our work, I was coordinating community participation efforts together with the university and the United Nations team; we had been chosen by the negotiating table for this task, we held a conference that lasted almost the entire morning. Among the participants, if I recall correctly, there were some ministers from the Taliban, representatives from the United States, and, also people from Qatar.
I believe this was toward the end of Donald Trump’s first term, and the purpose was to identify which experiences could be useful or applicable in the future.
Let me summarize this briefly: it is very important to have a concrete agenda jointly defined by both sides. I think this was one of the achievements: the FARC-EP had a specific and concise agenda consisting of only six points. Two of them were fundamental, land and political participation; another, of course, concerned victims and justice; one dealt with defining the conflict itself; and finally, implementation and social participation.
Secondly, it is essential that the negotiating table be composed of good negotiators who ensure that discussions do not deviate from the agenda agreed upon by both parties. This is crucial: the agenda must be mutually agreed upon, not imposed by one side, because otherwise the negotiation loses its meaning.
Thirdly, the presence of international observers is of great importance, whether they are mediators, moderators, or known by some other title. They must be firm and capable of exerting pressure on both sides, when necessary, because we know how critical that can be.
The role of society is also significant and very useful, but it must be managed carefully, because at some point it can spiral out of control and become unmanageable for the negotiating tables, assemblies, or meetings. Therefore, organizing and regulating social participation properly is essential. Moreover, different sectors, the media, universities, political parties, and others, must commit to supporting the agreement and following the process closely.
The issue of justice is also vital. In the Colombian case, when we spoke with former President Juan Manuel Santos and other government negotiators, we saw that the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) played a very important role in Colombia’s peace process. However, so many elements were added to it that, in practice, it became quite complex. The first ruling concerning FARC commanders and some members of the military was delivered only a month or two ago. Transitional justice was supposed to be swift and able to resolve cases quickly, but that did not happen. It became difficult because numerous procedural complications were added, and I believe that made the system overly complex.
Even so, there are always lessons to be learned and many of them are valuable for future possibilities.
Abdullah Öcalan, the Kurdish People’s Leader and one of the main actors in the process in Turkey, is still imprisoned. What are the challenges of leading such a process from prison? Another point is that Turkey repeatedly emphasizes the complete disarmament of the PKK as a prerequisite for providing legal guarantees to the process. Is such a demand realistic in resolving such a deep-rooted issue?
Yes, I believe that in the case of the imprisoned leader of the Workers’ Party of Turkey, there are similarities to our own experience with the ELN, where two of the leaders involved in the negotiations were also in prison. In fact, for more than four years, we conducted discussions with them while they were incarcerated. Of course, they were not the highest-ranking leaders; they were part of the national leadership, but at a secondary level.
The first thing we did was to ensure very suitable conditions for holding these meetings in prison. At that time, I do not know if it is still used today, we frequently relied on radio telephony at their request, because it was a method that made eavesdropping by other parties much more difficult.
This is a technical matter, and I do not know all its details, but that was the justification given by the ELN leaders, and it remained in place throughout the talks. It was a means for them to communicate with their leaders outside the prison.
Secondly, we established constant communication channels with the other leaders outside, to receive guidance and directives, and to hold respectful internal discussion sessions within the prison. Their incarceration did not mean any limitation: everyone participated in the meetings, international mediators, observers and all the negotiation protocols were implemented in full.
I believe that a state, in this case, the Turkish state will always demand complete disarmament. But this is a matter of planning within the process: clearly, that is the destination point, not the starting one. Probably, as is done in many peace processes, there can be partial disarmament phases at the beginning: some insurgent groups first surrender their weapons, settle in specific areas, or destroy explosives and other materials. This demonstrates goodwill and commitment.
The control of fire, when properly managed is another mechanism, and as the process advances, it becomes possible to reach the point of total disarmament. It is evident that an insurgent organization wishing to transition into legal political life cannot retain weapons; this is entirely clear and should be a fundamental point in any agreement. However, that does not mean that weapons must be handed over on the first day; the process must be built gradually. This is part of confidence-building between both sides, and it is a very common practice in many processes. The same happened during our Havana process. But as I mentioned, the process is not linear, sometimes there are setbacks. It happened to me several times: when I arrived in Havana to carry out my duties, I was told at the airport that everything had collapsed; it lasted two, three, or five days, and then the talks resumed. At such moments, the role of international mediators and facilitators becomes crucial.
Therefore, the fact that an insurgent leader is imprisoned should not be seen as an insurmountable obstacle. The key is to adapt the conditions and ensure that the leader can maintain constant communication with those outside, other leaders and comrades, so that decisions can be made reflecting the will of the organization as a whole.