The Colombian peace process began in 2012 in Cuba with negotiations between the Government under President Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC–EP) aimed at ending the decades-long conflict. These talks culminated in the Final Peace Agreement between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP, signed in November 2016.
The agreement aimed not only to end the fighting but also to build social justice and a renewed coexistence. However, this long and complex process has faced various challenges and political tensions.
So, how is the situation in Colombia today, nine years after the signing of the agreement? What have been its main obstacles? And how can this entire experience be useful to the ongoing efforts to resolve the Kurdish question?
We discussed these questions with one of the key figures of the Colombian peace process, Professor Alejo Vargas Velásquez, an expert on peace processes and political science.
Dear Professor, thank you for taking the time to speak with us. As someone who has been at the center of this process, I would like to begin with the agreement signed in 2016 between the FARC-EP guerrillas and the Colombian government. It has been nine years since this peace agreement was signed in Havana. Looking back from today, how would you describe the Colombian peace process? At what stage is the country currently in terms of peace?
It is not easy to talk about the stages because this is not a sequential issue. There are many changes and many transformations; therefore, today we face a situation as complex as the one before the agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). I believe that the policy the current government calls “total peace” has largely failed, I say this mildly to avoid using a harsher word. We can say that, so far, all the government has done is set up table after table and sign partial agreements, but it has not gone beyond that. And my impression is that by the time this government ends, no definitive agreement will have been reached with any of the involved actors.
Thus, even nine years after the agreement signed between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP), the situation remains quite complicated. The most significant armed opposition actor, the National Liberation Army (ELN), still refuses to engage in negotiations with the current government, which is meanwhile trying to establish dialogue with multiple groups. From the very beginning, the aim was to reduce the levels of violence, not to end the armed conflict completely. These are two very different things.
At the time the agreement was signed, there was great hope in society for change. In your opinion, to what extent have the expectations promised by the agreement, such as rural development, justice, and equality, been fulfilled? Have the outcomes of this agreement had a tangible impact on people’s daily lives?
The truth is that neither the previous government of Iván Duque nor the current government of Gustavo Petro has done much to fully implement the agreement reached with the FARC. Both governments have done certain things – that must be acknowledged – but these were partial steps and fell far short of what the agreement signed in Havana had envisioned.
The current government has tried to place more emphasis on land reform, but it has done very little regarding the reintegration and protection of former combatants and the same can be said for political participation. Therefore, the implementation of the agreement, as noted by the institutions monitoring it, remains at a very low level; overall, the implementation rate has not even reached 40 percent of the agreement.
This situation is partly related to the egos of each government, because every administration wants to highlight its own policy and the policies of the sitting president. Implementing the agreement, in a way, means helping the previous president. However, the current president, to put it in everyday terms, wants to make his own mark on history and therefore does not wish to contribute to fulfilling commitments made earlier. And this, to a large extent, is the situation we are living in Colombia today: the level of implementation and fulfillment of the Havana Agreement remains very low.
One of the most difficult aspects of the peace process, as you also mentioned, was the integration of FARC guerrillas. In other words, their transition to civilian life. How did (or does) this process work? What challenges were encountered during this process?
I believe there were several obstacles. The first and most important was ensuring safety: the fact that more than 500 former combatants of the FARC-EP have been killed is clearly a deeply alarming figure. It is true that there has been a declining trend in these killings, which is a positive development, but the number remains very high.
The second issue and this is a criticism that should be directed at the agreement itself is that it did not explicitly foresee the allocation of land to former combatants. Yet many of them, in fact most of them were peasants. While the agreement broadly envisioned land redistribution to peasants, it did not specifically include those who had been part of the FARC-EP. In my view, this was one of the factors that made the process more difficult. I think there has been some progress in this area, but it remains a complex and unresolved matter.
The third issue is related to political participation. The party founded as a result of the agreement, called Partido Comunes, was granted, so to speak the privilege of obtaining eight seats in Congress (four in the Senate and four in the House of Representatives). However, winning even a single seat on their own proved far from easy. This, in a way, reflects the expectations of former FARC members: they believed that once they laid down their arms and reintegrated into society, they would receive broad political support from the people, but that clearly did not happen.
This situation is also linked to another problem that I have often criticized: successive governments, neither the current one nor the previous, have ever given sufficient importance to reconciliation. On the contrary, a discourse still prevails that is based on feelings of revenge. Ensuring justice for victims is of course essential, but unless this discourse is supported by a genuine understanding of reconciliation, victims continue to see former combatants as perpetrators, even as enemies of the other side. Therefore, the idea of moving toward a more reconciled society remains, for now, nothing more than a dream.
The agreement also granted former FARC members the opportunity to participate in politics. Did this process unfold smoothly, or did it truly open a new chapter in Colombian politics?
No, unfortunately, I do not think the situation developed that way. Remember, a significant factor was that the agreement had been submitted to a referendum and that referendum was lost. In other words, those who voted against the agreement were in the majority by a small margin, yes, but still a majority. This clearly showed that there was deep polarization within society: at that time, even by a narrow difference, those opposing the agreement outnumbered those who supported it.
Moreover, the demand of that opposing segment and this is why I refer to the issue of reconciliation was that members of the FARC-EP should be imprisoned: sentenced to fifty years or whatever the term might be, and additionally, that they should be banned from participating in politics. This was, of course, a contradiction, because the foundation of a peace agreement, as you know, is that one party gives up armed struggle in exchange for the right to engage in politics legally and without weapons. But if those conditions are not guaranteed, then naturally, the process cannot function.
That is why I say the mission of Partido Comunes during this period was extremely difficult. If those guaranteed congressional seats (curules) had not been included in the agreement, this party would have had almost no significance in Colombia’s political life.
As someone at the center of the process, you often say, “Peace is not only about disarmament; it is a social transformation.” In which aspects does Colombia still fall short in achieving this transformation?
I believe one of the major problems and this is my personal reading and interpretation is that throughout almost its entire history, Colombia has been a society profoundly shaped by violence carrying various political meanings. That is to say, even before the emergence of Marxist-influenced guerrilla movements in the 1960s, there were earlier periods of violence between the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties; and if we go further back, there were civil wars, and so on. Therefore, the perception of the opposing side as an enemy remains very strong, and this is why I emphasize that without a reconciliation policy, this cannot easily be resolved.
The transitional justice system adopted for this agreement, which is important for modern times, places great emphasis on the symbolic punishment of those responsible, because this is seen as an element that provides a degree of satisfaction to the victims. However, if it is not managed properly and I believe it has not been, it tends to perpetuate the logic of friend and enemy.
As a result, for a significant segment of Colombian society, the FARC party is still seen as a former guerrilla party. So much so that even the current president, who was once a member of an older guerrilla group, the 19th of April Movement (M-19), and who never held a major leadership role within it, continues to be labeled as a guerrilla. This perception remains deeply rooted in Colombian life. And unless this issue is addressed, built upon, and supported, it is difficult to advance toward the idea of a society in which armed struggle is replaced by political discussion and participation.
In addition, a faction of the FARC-EP, led by chief negotiator Iván Márquez, has returned to violence (the so-called reincidencias or dissidents). The message received by the public is this: FARC members did not keep their word; all they did was form a political party, while another group remains armed.
As we researchers know, the existence of dissident or residual groups is normal in many peace processes around the world. But for ordinary people, it does not feel normal. From the public’s perspective, due to deep-seated mistrust, this is seen as a violation, as proof that the process was useless. All of this, in my view, has contributed to the current situation.
And I must emphasize once again: governments have made no pedagogical effort to promote the idea of reconciliation. In my opinion, two factors explain this. First, the president who came to power immediately after the one who signed the agreement represented the political forces that had won the “no” vote in the referendum, so it was difficult to expect anything positive from a government that had opposed the agreement. Some factions within those forces even argued that the agreement should be “dismantled.”
Then came a progressive or center-left government, however one may call it and in a country like Colombia, where such a government had never existed before, this immediately generated another form of polarization. All of these dynamics have negatively affected both the implementation of the agreements and the way conflict-related issues are perceived.
Therefore, the broader context has been anything but favorable for advancing the idea of creating new political conditions under which former guerrillas could participate in political life without weapons.
To be continued