Will the path to democracy open in Syria?

Through U.S. mediation, meetings were held in Damascus between the provisional government, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and the Autonomous Administration. It was reported that these talks took place in a more positive atmosphere compared to previous meetings. The Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) government, however, withdrew at the last moment from the planned talks in Paris. This withdrawal occurred under the influence and intervention of the Turkish administration, as the United States, France, and the United Kingdom were expected to participate and act as guarantors of the agreement. The Turkish government strongly opposed this and pressured the Damascus administration to halt the process, seeking to prevent the Kurdish question from gaining an international dimension and formal guarantees. As a result, the negotiations between Damascus and the Autonomous Administration came to a standstill.

Later, the Damascus Foreign Minister met twice with Ilham Ahmed. The Turkish government, as it often does in Turkey, insisted on a “let’s solve this among ourselves” approach. (These meetings produced no results.) The Turkish government, both in talks with Imralı and with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) representatives, has always opposed the presence of a third party. They firmly reject external observers because, if such third parties or guarantors are involved, it becomes harder to deny agreements or backtrack on them at will. Turkey has extensive experience in this regard, it has held numerous negotiations with the PKK, but each time unilaterally broke ceasefires, halted talks, and resumed warfare. It seeks to preserve this advantage and freedom of maneuver to the end.

Now, the Turkish state is training and directing its allied HTS forces with the same objective: to prevent the Kurds from gaining political status and to block the Kurdish question from being recognized officially by both domestic and international actors.

Whenever officials in Damascus engage in talks with the SDF or the Autonomous Administration, all of Ankara’s alarm systems immediately activate. Either Turkish officials rush to Damascus or summon the Damascus authorities, as if they were their own provincial governors. Despite maintaining day-to-day relations, they still feel uneasy and distrustful, constantly on edge out of fear that Damascus might make certain promises to the Kurds. If they had the power, they would tell the United States and Europe, “Don’t greet the Kurds, don’t engage with them.”

They have made such statements many times, engaged in negotiations, and worked tirelessly to impose this position, but they have never managed to secure full acceptance. When they failed to stop these developments, they turned their pressure toward HTS, tightening their grip and keeping it under close control.

While the Turkish state plays a blocking and disruptive role in Syria, inside the country it simultaneously intensifies pressure on Imralı, seeking to extract support from there. The SDF and the Autonomous Administration remain under constant threat. Turkey aims to provoke conflict between Kurds and Arabs and continues every form of destructive and destabilizing activity, but this is not as easy to achieve as it hopes.

From this perspective, Turkey seeks to exploit Abdullah Öcalan’s efforts for peace and resolution, attempting to extend this process to include Syria. However, since  Öcalan does not act according to their expectations, no progress has been made toward peace and a political solution in Turkey. The government has not taken any concrete steps and continues to hold  Öcalan as a hostage.

The reason we repeat and emphasize these points is to caution against being overly swept up by the positive atmosphere coming from Damascus. There is still a spoiler power at play. Although Turkish officials sometimes use soft, diplomatic language for tactical purposes, such statements are always followed by venomous declarations and threats from the Ministry of National Defense.

The Turkish media is filled with war-mongering figures, monstrous personalities waving sticks on television screens. Many of these commentators, who glorify bloodshed and display provocative attitudes, appear with titles such as “professor” or “expert.” As long as these cheerleaders, who excite and march in front of the Turkish army, are allowed to act so recklessly in public, it is wise not to become overly hopeful or carried away. Their strings are being pulled from somewhere; they do not act on their own.

SDF and the Autonomous Administration have continually sought ways to implement the March 10 Agreement and have always been ready for dialogue; they have never avoided talks. However, all decisions from the other side have been unilateral. They have refused to include anyone else in governance or reconstruction efforts, instead designing a system that is monolithic and excessively centralized. The core of the problem lies in their mentality and worldview. They do not want a democratic Syria and insist that the SDF and the Autonomous Administration submit to this. The Turkish state supports and encourages them in this stance.

The United States has taken action regarding Gaza, leading to a ceasefire. Washington now aims to restore calm in the region and focus its attention on powers such as Iran. In Syria, although the Ba’ath regime was toppled, instability has continued, and massacres of Alawite and Druze communities have become a concern. For this reason, the U.S. seeks to bring Syria under control and draw it into its own orbit. From this perspective, it is showing persistence in encouraging dialogue with the SDF and implementing the existing agreement.

How consistent these efforts will remain or what outcomes they might produce is still uncertain. It is difficult to make definitive predictions, there is still a long road ahead.

As mentioned earlier, the recognition of the SDF remaining in its region and defending the local population is a positive development. However, no final agreement has yet been reached, and negotiations are still ongoing. Therefore, it would be premature to say “the agreement is done, the problem is solved.” The people and the relevant actors must remain cautious, vigilant, and not allow themselves to be carried away by optimism.