As Iraq approaches its 6th parliamentary elections, influential Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, regarded as one of the key political actors in the country, has decided to boycott the vote. Meanwhile, political parties and alliances participating in the elections have begun their campaign efforts.
Iraq’s elections represent a complex process that directly reflects the country’s multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian composition. The three main groups (Kurds, Shias, and Sunnis) play decisive roles in both population distribution and political representation. This layered ethnic and sectarian structure is mirrored in the electoral system through quotas and coalitions, yet it also fuels ongoing political tensions and shifting alliances. The campaign period for the elections, scheduled for 11 November, officially began on 3 October. Under the supervision of the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq, political parties have started to present their promises to voters through digital media networks and campaign posters across cities.
21 million registered voters
Across Iraq, 709 polling centers will host 4,501 ballot boxes, where a total of 21,404,000 citizens are eligible to vote. The elections will feature 75 independent candidates, 31 alliances, and 38 political parties, with 7,768 candidates in total, 2,248 women and 5,520 men, competing for 329 parliamentary seats.
Quotas to ensure representation
To guarantee inclusive representation, 20% of seats are reserved for women and 75% for men. In addition, regional quotas are applied to maintain Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic balance and to ensure the participation of minority communities. Within the Iraqi Parliament, nine seats are reserved for minority components: five for Christians, and one each for the Shabak, Yazidi, Feyli Kurds, and Sabaean-Mandaeans.
Electoral system disadvantages Kurdish representation
The 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections are based on Law No. 4 of 2023, which builds upon the special provisions of Law No. 12 of 2017 concerning elections for the Council of Representatives and Provincial Councils. The legal framework for the electoral process was thus shaped by these two laws and officially enacted on 27 March 2023. Despite these updates, Iraq has reverted to the Sainte-Laguë method used in the 2014 elections. Although certain adjustments were made to representation ratios and the Sainte-Laguë formula, the system continues to disadvantage Kurdish voters, particularly in disputed territories such as Mosul, Kirkuk, and Diyala, which fall under Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution. The revised method has led to significant losses in Kurdish votes and representation.
The Sainte-Laguë system is a proportional representation method that allocates parliamentary seats based on the votes received by each party. Typically, votes are divided by sequential odd numbers (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, etc.) to determine seat distribution. However, in Iraq the divisor has been raised to 1.7, a change that dramatically reduces the influence of smaller parties. When votes are divided by such a high number, smaller parties fail to meet the threshold for representation, leaving only larger parties able to secure seats. This formula particularly harms Kurdish parties that participate separately rather than under a unified list. Their fragmented votes often fail to surpass the 1.7 ratio, rendering them effectively wasted. Consequently, Kurdish representation in parliament is weakened, while larger parties with higher vote shares win a disproportionate number of seats. Even local or regionally strong Kurdish parties that receive substantial support are unable to translate those votes into parliamentary representation.
In favor of Shia and Sunni blocs
As a result, under the 1.7 ratio system, the chances of Kurdish parties, particularly those running separately, securing parliamentary seats have decreased significantly. In this method, approximately 100,000 votes per seat are effectively wasted, posing a major risk for Kurdish representation. When Kurdish parties enter the Iraqi parliamentary elections in a fragmented manner, Shia and Sunni blocs benefit from this division, securing a greater number of seats. This imbalance not only undermines Kurdish political representation in Baghdad but also negatively affects the future of disputed territories, where Kurdish votes could otherwise play a decisive role in shaping regional stability and governance.
Kurdish parties participating in the elections
* Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP): Led by Masoud Barzani, the KDP holds strong influence in Erbil (Hewlêr) and Duhok. As one of the most powerful political and economic forces in the Kurdistan Region, the party maintains close ties with the Turkish state and several Gulf countries. Despite widespread criticism over poor governance and lack of public services, the KDP aims to preserve its current number of parliamentary seats.
* Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK): Under the leadership of Bafel Jalal Talabani, the PUK remains dominant in Sulaymaniyah (Silêmanî), Kirkuk, and Halabja (Helebce). Although the party faced internal challenges after the death of its former leader Mam Jalal Talabani, it has managed to maintain both its political influence and security power. Relations with other political forces in Iraq have also continued under Bafel Talabani’s leadership.
* New Generation Movement (Tevgera Nifşê Nû): Led by Shaswar Abdulwahid, the movement positions itself as an opposition force against the two dominant parties in the region. Its voter base is largely urban, with relatively weak support in rural areas.
* People’s Front (Eniya Gel): Founded by Lahur Sheikh Jangi after splitting from the PUK, this party has a dispersed electorate and won two seats in the last elections in the Kurdistan Region. The arrest of Lahur Sheikh Jangi on 22 August is expected to have a direct impact on the party’s future.
* Stance Front (Eniya Helwêst): Led by Ali Mohammed Salih, the Stance Front is composed of former parliamentarians and activists from Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. The party won four seats in the last regional elections, though one member later resigned from the party.
* Kurdistan Islamic Union (Yekgirtûya Îslamî): Headed by Salahaddin Bahadin, the Kurdistan Islamic Union is an established political party with its strongest support bases in Duhok and Halabja.
* Justice Society (Komeleya Dadgerî): Led by Ali Bapir, this Islamic political party has supporters spread across all regions of the Kurdistan Region.
Beyond the Kurdistan Region, several Kurdish political parties are also active in other Kurdish-majority areas, supporting Kurdish candidates in the upcoming elections. Most of these are located in Gulala, Khurmatu (Xurmatû), Maxmur, Shengal, and Mosul (Mûsil).
Prominent Shia parties
* Coordination Framework: The Coordination Framework stands as the largest Shia bloc in the Iraqi Parliament, comprising eight major alliances and holding 140 out of 329 seats. It is also the largest parliamentary group overall. The coalition has announced that it will participate in the upcoming elections through multiple lists.
* Construction and Development Alliance: Led by current Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, this alliance includes his party, the Furatayn Current, alongside the National Charter Alliance (headed by Popular Mobilization Forces leader Falih al-Fayyadh), the Wataniya Coalition (led by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi), the Creativity Alliance (led by Karbala Governor Nusaif al-Khatabi), the Land of Sumer Community (headed by Minister of Labor Ahmed al-Asadi), the Generations Community, and the National Solutions Alliance.
* State of Law Coalition: Headed by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the State of Law Coalition is one of Iraq’s main Shia alliances. Composed of 11 political movements, one of its primary goals is to pave the way for al-Maliki’s return to the premiership.
* National State Forces Alliance: Initially formed by the Victory Alliance and the National Wisdom Movement led by Ammar al-Hakim, this bloc underwent changes after former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, leader of the Victory Alliance, withdrew his party from the elections, citing electoral corruption. Instead, his movement declared support for “qualified and competent candidates” within the National State Forces list.
* Badr List: Led by Hadi al-Amiri, this list represents the political wing of the Badr Brigades, a militia force supported by Iran. The group has been the subject of widespread criticism for its close ties with armed factions.
* Sadikun List: Headed by Qais al-Khazali, leader of the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Movement, this list represents one of the pro-Iranian Shia factions in Iraq. It also includes tribal elements and independent candidates from various regions.
* Ibshir Ya Iraq Alliance (Good News for Iraq): Formed under the leadership of Humam Hamoudi, this alliance brings together several Shia parties and draws from the political legacy of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. Although it lacks a strong organizational base, the alliance maintains small pockets of support in certain areas and has nominated Abdul-Hussein Abtan, a known political figure, as its candidate for prime minister.
* Sadrist Movement: Led by Muqtada al-Sadr, the Sadrist Movement has announced a boycott of the elections. Al-Sadr’s decision to withdraw is seen as a major void within the Shia political arena. Given his movement’s strong grassroots organization and extensive support network, observers suggest the boycott could also serve as a calculated political maneuver.
Sunni alliances contesting the elections
* Sovereignty Alliance (Siyade): Led by Khamis al-Khanjar, the bloc was considered the largest Sunni alliance after the 2021 elections but suffered a major setback following former Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi’s departure. As leader of the Taqaddum Party, al-Halbousi now aims to retain influence by backing different lists. Sunni votes are concentrated in Anbar, Salahaddin, Nineveh (Ninova), parts of Diyala, as well as Baghdad and Kirkuk (Kerkûk).
* Azm Alliance: Headed by Muthanna al-Samarrai, Azm brings together several smaller parties and emerged as an alternative after tensions between Khamis al-Khanjar and Mohammed al-Halbousi.
* Hasm Alliance: Led by Thabit al-Abbasi, Hasm comprises five political parties. Its electoral footprint is modest, focusing mainly on endorsing local figures in specific constituencies.
Civil movements outside the main blocs
* Badil Alliance: Headed by Adnan al-Zurfi, this alliance includes several civil groups advocating for a civilian state and a firm stance against corruption.
* Civil Democratic Alliance: Led by Ali Rafi, the alliance consists of various civil movements and labor unions emphasizing freedom, justice, and human rights. Its influence is particularly visible in major urban centers and among academic circles.
Regional influences on the elections
The Iraqi elections are significantly shaped by the involvement of neighboring states, primarily Turkey and Iran. Iran wields strong influence over Shia militias and political parties in Iraq, particularly through the Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi) and other affiliated groups. Tehran aims to secure a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad, curb U.S. influence in the region, and expand its strategic depth against Sunni Arab states. Turkey, on the other hand, seeks to increase its influence in both the Kurdistan Region and wider Iraq, largely through cooperation with the KDP. Ankara also maintains strong political and economic ties with Sunni Arab factions and Turkmen communities, leveraging these relationships to advance its regional and economic interests.