Clashes have erupted at contact points between the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and areas controlled by forces of the Interim Syrian Government, while attacks by ISIS mercenaries are also on the rise.
Salih Muslim, a member of the co-presidential Council of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), spoke to ANF about the military and political situation in Syria and, in particular, in the autonomous administration’s territories, as well as the plans and calculations of international powers and regional states.
Muslim said the Turkish state and the Interim Syrian Government have been exerting pressure with demands such as “hand over your weapons, join the army, join the state,” and he made clear they will not accept capitulation and will resist any possible attacks. Muslim added that militias affiliated with the Syrian National Army (SNA) and forces loyal to Ahmed al-Sharaa (al-Jolani) have recently stepped up their assaults, and he accused Al-Jolani of failing to meet the obligations of the 10 March Agreement.
Muslim said an agreement with the Interim Syrian Government was due to be reached in Paris under the supervision of international powers such as the United States, France and the United Kingdom, but that al-Jolani refused to accept the deal under Turkish pressure. Warning about the Turkish state’s growing threats towards Rojava, Muslim reiterated that they will take the necessary measures to defend against any possible attacks.
Deir Hafir has seen attacks by Turkey-backed groups and by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and civilians, while ISIS mercenaries have stepped up assaults in Deir ez-Zor (Dêrazor) using areas under HTS control. More than twenty martyrs have fallen. Meanwhile, the Interim Government closed the Aleppo–Raqqa road, and clashes recently erupted in Aleppo between forces loyal to the Interim Government and security units. What are the causes and aims behind these attacks?
Salih Muslim said the Interim Government’s backers already have certain plans, and those who brought the Interim Government to power agreed on some measures, which is why they sought to give it legitimacy by promoting it at the United Nations. Their aim is to incorporate us into the Interim Government and to strengthen that administration. They insist on demands such as ‘surrender your weapons, join the army, join the state,’ and they apply pressure to that end. They have objectives that in some respects overlap with Turkey’s. Turkey is using this as a tool of pressure against us. There are Turkish-state-affiliated mercenaries, such as the SNA, and those mercenaries have taken part in attacks. The assaults continued without interruption for four months; they tried to advance eastward but failed. Eventually, the 10 March Agreement brought a ceasefire. From that point, the United States and the International Coalition acted through intermediaries and a ceasefire was secured.
However, after a while, they sought to sidestep that eight-point agreement for all of Syria: they postponed it, ignored it, and failed to fulfill its requirements. Together with Turkey, they pressure us and try to deceive us, but that will not work because we have our own system. A second issue is gas and oil: there are oil fields in Deir ez-Zor, and they are trying to seize those areas. Our people resist. The Turkish state continually issues threats, and then ISIS mercenaries carry out attacks. We are fighting all of this. Most recently they attacked Deir Hafir; some of our friends were wounded. They continue to pressure us to force our hand. Of course, the United States and other countries see this and remain silent, because one party to these pressures is Turkey. The United States and other states act according to their own interests and do not want to provoke Turkey. Their aim is to bring us to our knees, to make us retreat. But we will resist them.
What stage are the talks based on the 10 March Agreement between the Autonomous Administration and the Interim Syrian Government at, and which issues remain unresolved or blocked? What differences exist on decentralization and integration (military, economic, administrative, systemic), how could deadlocks be overcome, and might they turn into a conflict if they are not? What would be the consequences of the Interim Government’s approach that excludes the Kurds and the Autonomous Administration and of imposing a centralized system?
The 10 March Agreement consists of eight points. At the time, separate committees were to be formed for each of those eight points. For example, discussions were to take place on what kind of state Syria would be: a dictatorship, republic, or a democratic country, how governance would be shared, and how the SDF would participate. The important fact is this: when Mazlum Abdi signed the agreement, he did not do so on his own behalf. The Autonomous Administration exists here, the Democratic Syria Council exists, and the SDF exist. These bodies convened before the agreement and decided how they would reach an agreement and which path they would follow. The agreement was reached within that framework. People keep saying “SDF” but the matter is not only the SDF. The Autonomous Administration and all political parties participated in these discussions. Mazloum Abdi represented all of them. Yet, as soon as the agreement was signed, they began looking for ways to abandon it, because the committees were not formed, no proper discussions took place, and no substantial work was carried out.
Second, as is known, the accords were supposed to be confirmed in Paris under international supervision, with the Americans, the French and the British present, but that did not happen. I believe that was due to Turkish pressure. Because the issue would have been universalized, they refused and blocked it. They are still arguing and insisting on sitting in Damascus to talk. Turkey is the party obstructing this agreement. That is why we face difficulties. Even where talks take place, they remain at a technical level; there are no discussions on the core issues. It is as if they want to portray us as defeated and seek to accept us under the assumption that the government is backed by Turkey and the United States.
Another dimension is that there is a process in Turkey and Northern Kurdistan (Bakur) regarding the resolution of the Kurdish issue. There, everyone supports the process; recent surveys show some seventy-five percent of the public support. Both Kurdish and Turkish populations broadly back it. However, there are actors who want to sabotage this process, and their method is to create turmoil in Rojava. Kurdish politicians cannot both bomb Kobanê and claim to make peace in Diyarbakir (Amed); that cannot work. If there is going to be peace, it must be everywhere. Öcalan’s saying that “Rojava is our red line” is well known. For this reason, some parties are provoking Rojava to undermine the process in Northern Kurdistan. They intend to spark a war there. The discussions have not concluded and there has been no real progress. Some say it will take about a year, but at the current pace, it is likely that it will not be settled within a year. Unless a consensus is reached, the agreement cannot be implemented, because the agreement applies not only to our regions but to all of Syria. Therefore, there may be obstacles.
Like Turkey, Al-Jolani first claimed that the SDF and the Autonomous Administration did not represent the Arabs and other peoples living in the region; he later asserted that the Kurds did not represent them either. Meanwhile, he maintains contacts with the Kurdish National Council in Syria (KNCS). What is the purpose of these approaches?
They say the SDF does not represent the Kurds, some even claim that most of the SDF are Arab. That is partly true: perhaps half of the SDF are Arab, but the SDF as a whole is made up of Kurds, Arabs and Syriacs, and they have a project: autonomy. Not only Kurds but other peoples also want autonomy. Kurds lead the project, but, for example, in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa there are civil councils and military councils, and those serving on these councils are all children of the local communities. In the attacks in Deir ez-Zor the majority of the martyrs were Arab fighters from there. As I said, when Mazloum Abdi signed the agreement, it was not only an SDF issue: the Democratic Syria Assemblies and all political parties were part of it. All institutions of the Autonomous Administration are included in this agreement. Mazloum Abdi signed with their approval, so the SDF is part of it but not the whole of it. What does it mean to say ‘they do not represent the Kurds’? Once the united Kurdish congress granted that authority, no one could claim they do not represent (the people). Those are empty words. If they are looking for excuses, many excuses will be found.
How was the Syria issue handled at the United Nations meeting? Is Al-Jolani being legitimized internationally, and if so, what would be the UN meeting’s ramifications for Syria? Meanwhile, the Autonomous Administration’s Foreign Relations delegation continues its contacts in Europe. What are the key issues emerging from those meetings?
What problem has the United Nations solved so that it can solve the problems in Syria? Al-Jolani went there and carried out his own propaganda, saying ‘we want Syria to be like this or that, we want aid, we want sanctions lifted.’ But nothing has changed: they promoted Al-Jolani, and just as Erdoğan gave him legitimacy, they gave him legitimacy at the United Nations too. The legitimacy or power of a government can only come from its own people, not from foreign powers. Firstly, they must obtain legitimacy from their own people. Al-Jolani has no such legitimacy among the public because no one supports him. That is why nothing has changed. The United Nations’ decisions and statements are empty words.
After United States Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack’s remarks calling for “one nation, one language, one state,” he later said there could be forms close to autonomy and that everyone should be represented. How should Barrack’s team being removed be interpreted? Are there differences between the Pentagon’s and Congress’s policies on Rojava and Trump’s policies? What is the United States’ current approach and plan regarding Syria and the Kurds?
Tom Barrack is not a politician or a diplomat; he comes from the business sector. To appease certain constituencies, he used rhetoric such as “one nation, one language, one flag.” However, after strong reactions inside the United States and abroad, he changed his tone and began saying that “forms close to autonomy may be possible” and that “everyone should be represented.” There are people inside the United States who support us, not merely lobbyists but conscientious individuals who see our cause as just, and some lobbies also back us. Because of the backlash, Barrack altered his statements and began offering different formulations. We have been fighting alongside the Pentagon on the same front for more than ten years.
In practice and on the ground, a shared security has therefore been established, but this does not extend to the political and diplomatic level. One reason is the NATO question. This dynamic is not unique to our case; it is evident across the Middle East, in the Palestine issue and the Ukraine issue alike. No one can predict what Trump will do or say. Accordingly, we must take our own precautions. He could, as in 2019, suddenly tell Erdoğan to act in a particular way. That is not an implausible scenario, and so we are preparing defensive measures. This is a critical process and must be acknowledged.
What do Turkey’s threats of attack mean?
Turkey seeks to undertake actions abroad to cover up its domestic problems, aiming in that way to influence domestic public opinion. Turkey views al-Jolani’s government as an opportunity to carve out a sphere of influence in Syria, a competition that even involves Israel. Because threats from Turkey come from the highest-level officials, they must be taken seriously: if the President, the Minister of National Defense and the Chief of the General Staff repeatedly issue threats, those declarations require a serious response. Of course, it is preferable if such moves are prevented, but if they are not, attacks are possible. Therefore, we must take precautions.
What are the fundamentals for the democratic construction of a new Syria? How should the status of the Druze, the Alawites, the Kurds be determined, on what principles should the constitution be based, and what are the main parameters of a democratic Syria?
If one truly wants to do something proper, the first step will be a democratic constitution. It must be a constitution that accepts all formations and recognizes rights such as language, culture and coexistence. Expanding the same system we established in the autonomous regions across Syria would be one solution. For that, the starting point must be the constitution. Electoral laws, party laws and protections for freedoms must certainly be included in the constitution. Regarding the Alawites, the Druze, the Yazidis and the Syriacs, both their religious rights and their ethno-cultural status, if any of these is neglected, that community will become a source of serious problems for Syria. Therefore, everyone should be brought together for discussion and dialogue, and if there is truly no foreign intervention, a common point can be reached. But so far there has been nothing. From our perspective, decentralization is an acceptable system. I believe that seriously sitting down to discuss all of these matters would be in Syria’s interest.