With the reactivation of UN sanctions against Iran—for the first time in a decade—the domestic and foreign policy conditions of the Islamic Republic have changed fundamentally. The crisis is not limited to economic restrictions: Iran is on the brink of economic collapse, is increasingly isolated internationally, and faces massive security challenges. ANF spoke with Fuad Beritan, member of the Executive Council of the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), about the dimensions of this change and possible future scenarios.
Following the entry into force of the so-called snapback mechanism, all UN sanctions against Iran have been reinstated. How do you assess the impact of this development on the situation in the country?
The return of UN sanctions after the snapback mechanism’s activation is not merely an economic or diplomatic event; it must be seen as a turning point in the structural erosion of the Islamic Republic. This transformation signals the regime’s entry into a phase where international isolation is no longer a gradual process but has become a solidified and compulsory state. Today, the Islamic Republic neither has the capacity needed to reach an agreement with the West nor enjoys the support it previously imagined China and Russia could provide. Now, tensions are not limited to the US and Israel; most governments worldwide, from the European Union to Moscow and Beijing, have been placed in a position of obligation to implement these sanctions. This is the worst situation a regime can fall into within the international system.
From the perspective of international law, the return of sanctions carries a deeper meaning. The Islamic Republic is practically on the verge of falling under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; a status in which a state is considered a threat to global peace and security. If this path remains active, it could proceed similarly to the experiences of Iraq or Libya. However, it is clear that the level of seriousness in the West’s implementation and oversight of these sanctions will be decisive. The Islamic Republic may try to create obstacles to full implementation through concessions or tactical maneuvers, but even in the softest scenario, the blow to the structure will be inevitable.
The key point is this: If these sanctions become operational, Iran’s oil sales to China—the regime’s largest source of revenue—will be severely restricted. A government already grappling with chronic budget deficits will have no alternative once other financial bottlenecks tighten. Existing statistics indicate that Iran’s daily oil exports are around one and a half million barrels, with the majority going to China. Estimates show that the return of sanctions will reduce this figure to 700,000 barrels in the most optimistic case and to about 500,000 barrels in a stringent one. This isn’t just an economic number; it’s a systemic shock. A shock that will quickly echo in people’s lives and sweep through all levels like a tsunami: economy, politics, security, and even social relations.
When political power is in a state of symbolic weakness and chronic failure, every external pressure intensifies the security nature of the structure. From now on, decision-making in the Islamic Republic will become even more securitized. The structure will be forced to turn to new models in security, military, economic, and managerial domains. Previous models will not only be inefficient but utterly unusable.
However, designing and implementing new models will also face serious obstacles. The ruling mindset, public space, and the structure’s spirit are saturated with failure and erosion. Such a foundation offers no room for creativity or renewal.
In this phase, the Islamic Republic will experience deeper vulnerability. As external pressure intensifies, resources dwindle, and social discontent rises, the rate of errors in the system increases. This means any simple event can quickly turn into a security crisis. In parallel with this process, the regime’s reliance on security and military forces will grow. The government, as an executive and functional institution, will effectively collapse. A structure without a budget or resources can only preserve its own existence, not govern the country.
The horizon emerging from this situation is economic and structural collapse. Its speed and depth depend on several factors, including possible shifts in the regime’s behavior and choices different from past chronic patterns, such as opening up the internal political space or seeking new formulas for external agreements. But up to this moment, no will for these two paths is visible. The central mindset of the structure has lost its balance and is even in rupture with its previous versions.
In summary: Iran has entered a new phase, both in its political life and at the social level. The regime’s repeated mistakes have sharply raised the general cost, and continuing these errors could accelerate structural collapse, creating a situation where the Islamic Republic is practically paralyzed. The path taken so far has been exactly in this direction; a situation comparable to Venezuela or Iraq before the US invasion.
Alongside all these variables, the Islamic Republic’s tension with Israel cannot be overlooked. This level of hostility does not rule out the possibility of military attack or even the elimination of the leader. Such an event could propel the entire scenario into a completely new phase. In a clear summation: In the short term, no miracle is in sight. The Islamic Republic is merely cycling between three options: bad, worse, and worst.
Beyond the issue of sanctions and their impacts, what direction are the dimensions of other current crises in Iran heading? What events should people prepare for?
The simultaneity of crises in Iran is not just a bitter reality; it’s a determining and fateful variable. We are not dealing with a merely sanctioned government; we face a structure whose four decades of cross-border investments have failed, which has suffered heavy military defeats internally, whose nuclear program has been seriously damaged, and which is entangled in governance with corruption, inefficiency, and repression.
Now, all these accumulated crises are knotted with super-crises of economic, social, and environmental nature, pushing the country to the brink of explosion. Iran today is not only confronted with runaway inflation, the collapse of the national currency’s value, widespread unemployment, and structural corruption, but also with a society in which deep class divides, institutionalized religious and ethnic discriminations, fundamental clashes between citizens’ lifestyles and the regime, women’s confrontation with political power, a young population in conflict with the system’s values, elite migration, and multi-layered guild and labor protests are simultaneously active. In addition, climate change, water scarcity, air pollution, and the destruction of natural resources threaten the basis of collective life. More precisely, the natural life and biosecurity of society have been disrupted due to the Islamic Republic’s governance.
What makes this situation more dangerous is not just the volume of crises, but their simultaneity and interweaving. This is what transition theories refer to as “structural super-crisis”; the moment when the political system no longer has the capacity to reproduce itself, and every reaction breeds a new crisis.
In such conditions, the Islamic Republic tries to conceal these failures, inefficiencies, and structural erosion with displays of power internally. The unprecedented increase in executions, intensified repression, and governmental speech therapies are not signs of authority but indicators of an authority crisis. A power that resorts to naked violence for survival has actually lost its symbolic capital. This is the moment when the regime falls into the “illusion of authority”; it imagines that by representing harsh power, it can contain the crises, whereas this display itself is a document of weakness and decay.
Of course, it should not be assumed that the Islamic Republic has completely lost its repressive power; a more accurate description is that this power has been weakened and eroded. The Islamic Republic’s structure is fundamentally designed for internal repression, not confrontation with an external enemy. On the other hand, popular opposition has not yet fully detached from the logic of the ruling structure in many cases. The fundamental question remains unanswered: What is the model of collective struggle against a government whose main tool is violence? To what extent has this model disseminated in society?
In recent months, we are facing a phenomenon that can be called the “state of suspension and anticipation.” Part of society and political forces are waiting for a change from outside to displace the government for them. No one knows if external military intervention will occur or not, but from a political perspective, preparation for every scenario is necessary. Nevertheless, there is an unassailable reality: No intervention can substitute for the people’s agency and the society’s initiative on the transformation scene.
The most dangerous mistake is the policy of waiting; “Let the Islamic Republic collapse, then we build a new order.” This is a deadly illusion. Transition without social preparation leads not to freedom but to chaos or the reproduction of despotism. The alternative must take shape within this dying order, not after its death.
It is at this point that the fundamental question gains meaning: “What is my role? Where do I stand in the alternative order? What share do I have in building the future?” This simple question is the cornerstone of collective agency. If social agency is not pre-organized, the power vacuum will be seized in the moment. Therefore, the main issue today in Iran—and specifically in Kurdistan—is not just the collapse of the current order, but preparation for building the alternative order.
If society cannot influence conditions, act cohesively, and seize the initiative at the right moment, the Islamic Republic can continue its survival without resolving the crises and pass the cost onto the people again. The rule is clear: Society must seize the existing spaces and shrink the regime’s governance domain as much as possible. Collective will must become greater than the Islamic Republic’s will for survival. Achieving such a situation has prerequisites, and the most important is answering this key question: In the collapse process, what force will carry the new order?
Historical experience says: The fall of a political system does not lead to the establishment of democracy by itself. What determines what emerges from the collapse is the level of readiness of social forces to fill the power vacuum.
Of course, the collapse or transition process in Iran does not occur in a vacuum. Regional and global actors each pursue their own logic regarding Iran’s future. Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, the US, China, and Russia are not mere observers; each has its own project vis-à-vis Iran, and the continuation or collapse of the Islamic Republic holds different meanings for them. In such a scene, any collapse or transition without considering these variables will either be hijacked or derailed.
Therefore, the internal strategy must simultaneously be capable of “neutralizing destructive external interventions” and “smartly utilizing the balance of power.
“At the same time, one of the main challenges in the process leading to collapse is the competition to seize the power vacuum. If political, civil, and field forces, both inside and outside, cannot create a “minimum coordination framework,” the collapse could lead to civil war or the reproduction of despotism. Kurdish, Baloch, Arab, Azerbaijani, Turkmen movements, and central pro-democracy forces, if they do not reach a common definition of the future and internal alignment from now on, the scene may be hijacked in favor of reactionary forces. This danger should not be underestimated.
The opposition abroad, if it continues to be plagued by personal disputes, promotional rivalries, and disconnection from the social field, will not only be useless but become a deterrent factor.The new order is not the product of one narrative, one voice, and one center, but the result of alliances among multiple and diverse centers of social and political power that, without eliminating each other, make a new democratic structure possible.
Specifically, what is your suggestion at this juncture for society?
Concrete experiences in the Middle East and Europe have shown that in moments of historical rupture, alternative orders are born not from above but from below. In Kurdistan’s Rojava, people’s councils and self-organizing networks, amid field resistance and in the midst of war, were able to establish a parallel and effective order. In Eastern Europe as well, local councils and civil networks provided the ground for transition to relatively democratic structures. The clear message of these examples is that the model of collective struggle in current conditions must be redefined. The new alternative is neither exportable nor imposable from above; the alternative takes shape when it roots from below and in the heart of daily life.
This process can be called “practicing resistance and democracy on a micro scale.” The first unit is the family; the smallest social cell, its organization for survival, mutual aid, and resilience is the first step in building the alternative. One level higher are the street and neighborhood: Forming small committees, local councils, mutual aid networks, role division, and recording shared resources are basic but vital tools for reclaiming social power. This spirit and organization must expand from the micro scale to the regional and city level.
The importance of this model is now doubled, because the speed of the ruling structure’s collapse has increased, and the probability of war or major tensions exists at any moment. In such a phase, the appropriate response is not passive waiting or pinning hopes on external intervention. The fitting answer is for society to reclaim its collective life and domain—from the Islamic Republic’s control—not merely in a geographical sense, but in mental, institutional, and social meanings. This is not just a defensive project; it is the redefinition of social authority.
The Islamic Republic in this situation seeks to keep society fragmented, isolated, unmotivated, and devoid of will. The opposite of this strategy is creating solidarity, collective will, and organized action. For victory, distance must be taken from the fate the ruling structure seeks to impose, and the process of destroying society and the environment must be halted. The cost of delay in this will be much heavier in the future. Such a spirit is not just for overcoming the crisis; it is the foundation of a democratic order that derives its legitimacy from collective will.
Iran’s near future is full of unpredictable events: from the possibility of war to the leader’s death and internal power struggles. But this future is not necessarily dark. If society organizes itself, the power vacuum can become a bed for the birth of a democratic order. True victory is not summed up merely in the fall of a worn-out and repressive system; victory means society’s ability to recreate a new alternative that begins from below, is based on freedom and equality, and makes human dignity the foundation of its legitimacy.
This historical duty is now before the people of Iran: Building the future, not after the crisis, but at the heart of this crisis and from this very moment. The people of Kurdistan, due to their historical experience, capacity, and legacy of resistance, can play a vanguard role in this phase. We, too, as a force committed to our people’s will, are prepared for all scenarios ahead and will fulfill our responsibility in a manner worthy of our nation.
In a broad assessment, if social and political forces organize themselves from now on in multi-layered, regional, and interconnected frameworks, the moment of collapse can turn into a historical opportunity for rebuilding collective power and architecting a new order. What is happening today is not merely the decline of an order; it is the opening of the field for designing a new one.