The HDP Honorary Chair, Ertuğrul Kürkçü, spoke to ANF and said the government is not so much aiming to outlaw CHP as it is pursuing a deeper strategy of division. He explained that the reason is CHP’s historic roots as the founder of the republic, its widespread influence, and its growing social and political support. Entering into a direct “war” with CHP is seen as extremely “costly” for the ruling bloc, he added.
Confronting every opposition
Kürkçü stressed that the real plan is to divide the CHP, thus eliminating potential alliances and synergy with other opposition forces, and to confront each opposition dynamic separately.
He underlined that a strategy has been put in place to weaken the CHP with judiciary-based attacks until the 2028 elections: “With Akın Gürlek appointed as Istanbul’s Chief Prosecutor, we see that Istanbul has been designated as the headquarters of this assault. Istanbul has become the center of struggle; while other cities are also important, Istanbul is the frontline. According to the plan, CHP is to be dragged into internal war and conflict.”
Collaboration with AKP and counter-guerrilla
Drawing attention to a wing of the CHP collaborating with AKP and counter-guerrilla networks, Kürkçü said: “Gürsel Tekin plays the lead role, the former mayor of Hatay is second, and there are groups gathered around them. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, though he lost the leadership to Özgür Özel, remains active in the background. While he appears to support Özel for the party’s survival, developments suggest the opposite. The regime is playing on these fault lines. As with the example of Aydın’s mayor, I see the possibility of other prearranged actors being activated inside the party. I don’t know who else might exist, but if there are such elements, AKP and Erdoğan may use them strategically when needed. For now, these dynamics are being used to drag CHP into its own internal troubles and weaken its unity.”
Kürkçü also warned that, like landmines waiting to explode, there may be other risks or surprises. The aim, he said, is to prevent the party from consolidating its strength while continuously drawing it into legal conflicts—keeping it in a climate of conflict, chaos, prisons, violence, police raids, and tear gas, and thereby stripping it of its appeal.
CHP’s response
According to Kürkçü, CHP is responding wisely: “Essentially, instead of rejecting the perspective of a Democratic Society and Peace—which should be the top item on Turkey’s agenda—it adopted a solution-oriented stance, joined the commission, and anchored itself there. More importantly, it refused suggestions to withdraw its anchor due to the recent tensions. Özgür Özel’s statements are very important here. He said they will not abandon the solution perspective just because of confrontations with the government and the Palace. This shows that the main opposition understands the strategic importance of maintaining ties with Kurdish democratic political opposition and Turkey’s broader democratic forces.”
He added that CHP has responded correctly to the regime’s unlawful attacks by mobilizing the masses. Since March 19, rallies have been held almost daily across Turkey and in Istanbul districts, keeping morale high, defending prisoners, and taking the legal and political struggle to the streets while mobilizing youth, women, and rural areas. These moves have been effective: “With successful rallies even in AKP strongholds like Yozgat, Çorum, Trabzon, and Rize, CHP has shown itself to be the main political actor targeting power.”
CHP has not abandoned its claims, continued defending its positions, and neutralized the tools used by rival forces to weaken the party. In doing so, it proved it is not an easy target like the İYİ Party was in the hands of Bahçeli and Erdoğan. “Because CHP is guided by smart leadership, it has preserved its strength and initiative,” said Kürkçü.
CHP’s role is central
Kürkçü emphasized that CHP’s struggle holds great importance for Turkey’s democratic future: “It will be both a real necessity and the right thing for democratic opposition forces to support and stand in solidarity with CHP wherever it is right. Looking at the general picture, CHP’s role is critical and central for the opposition and civil society.”
The Kurdish question and the Commission
Kürkçü noted that the establishment of a parliamentary commission on the Kurdish question was not something the ruling alliance wanted, especially during intensified operations against CHP. He explained:”Both DEM Party and CHP, along with parties that entered parliament through CHP’s list but now exist under different names, demanded this. AKP had to accept formally. But the ruling bloc wanted to handle the issue narrowly within a security and intelligence framework, strictly as a matter of state-organization relations. The commission opened it up to society—that is the key point. Once the issue is made public through the commission, all speeches and actions must be linked to society’s general interests. This forces AKP to address it within a broad framework of democracy, equality, freedom, and civilization—too wide for its narrow security perspective. For the Kurdish people, this is a significant achievement, because it opens a door of dialogue with the rest of society’s forces and dynamics. Abdullah Öcalan and Kurdish parties can then declare their theses to the public from a legitimate platform within the Parliament.”
The Commission’s role
Kürkçü reminded that the commission cannot pass binding decisions or laws: “To adopt decisions, a qualified majority is required—so without at least some opposition, nothing can pass. In parliament, however, bills are voted by simple majority, and the president’s veto remains in place. Ultimately, the Palace will have the final say. But before that, it will be encircled by the public support that the commission has mobilized. The most important function of the commission is to narrow the distance between state and society and to bring a discourse into politics that encourages public support.”
He added that while the state tried to undermine this function by holding the first meeting secretly, the effect was limited as society understood the situation correctly. In fact, he said, there was no need for the General Staff or MIT to be present in the commission. Ministers or the Speaker could have conveyed the necessary information. Kürkçü said: “By turning it into a security and intelligence matter, the regime distorted the focus. The real issue was society’s basic needs. For 40 years, the war has been no secret: Kurdish youth were killed, millions displaced, Kurdistan emptied. Now the children of the displaced and the disappeared, educated professionals like lawyers, are carrying forward their fathers’ cases.”
The regime shifts the agenda
After decades, society now needs open politics, Kürkçü argued: “The commission creates a public link between state and society and must sustain this as much as possible. Especially the DEM Party, the CHP, Future Party, and DEVA can, drawing from the previous peace process, put forward a solution-oriented thesis through the commission. If they succeed, AKP will have a solution package on its table. Without the commission, these debates would never have entered the public agenda. Now, by targeting the CHP, the regime is trying to push the solution issue into second place, reshuffling the agenda and stirring chaos.”
Two possible scenarios
Kürkçü said that since the regime could not neutralize the Kurdish wing of the opposition, it planned to obstruct CHP. From here, he outlined two possible scenarios:
– The business groups around the AKP–MHP government and Turkey’s international allies may realize that crushing society and silencing the opposition cannot sustain the regime until 2028. This could push the ruling bloc toward steps of reconciliation and solution—practically meaning a future without Tayyip Erdoğan.
– The regime may continue its autocracy under Erdoğan and Bahçeli. But this is not a conflict the regime can win, since mechanisms of political and social consent no longer function. Since 2023, everyone—including some AKP supporters—has been losing under this regime, and with so many losers, it is impossible for the regime to generate consent.
The opposition must act with strategic foresight
Kürkçü emphasized that Turkey’s international position and NATO obligations make it nearly impossible for the regime to change its global stance in one stroke.
He concluded: “Therefore, if the opposition stands firm, acts with strategic foresight, and expands solidarity, the first scenario becomes more achievable. For all these reasons, it is wrong to view CHP’s struggle as just an ordinary government–opposition squabble limited to party interests. This is an important resistance for Turkey’s democratic future.”