In the second part of this interview, Prof. Abdurrahman Gülbeyaz reaffirmed that the UN Report contributes to the tradition of impunity.
Part one of this interview can be read here.
Why does the pluralistic governance model and ethno-sectarian diversity of the SDF not receive sufficient support from the international community?
I believe that the reasons for this lack of support should be sought not within the SDF but within the very concept and phenomenon of what is called the ‘international community.’ As with many similar terms, the phrase ‘international community’ does not, as it suggests, represent a global community or the arithmetic average of the world’s population. In the end, it is the expression of the political and economic will of a few Western states. When we examine the composition of the so-called ‘international community,’ we see five main categories: states, international organizations (such as the UN, EU, NATO), transnational institutions (such as the IMF, World Bank), NGOs (such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace), and normative frameworks (such as human rights, the Geneva Conventions). One could also add ‘prominent figures’ (such as the UN Secretary-General, international special envoys, Nobel Peace Prize laureates).
There is no need to say much about the state category; when we look inside the second category of organizations, we once again find nothing but states. The same is true when we open the box of transnational institutions: we encounter nothing but the usual dominant states. For example, the IMF’s decision-making body, the Board of Governors, is composed of state representatives, but it carries little weight. Real power lies in the 24-member executive board, and as in all other ‘transnational’ institutions, the principle is the same: ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune, and the one who calls the tune takes the spoils.’ This board is composed entirely of states, and of course, not random states, but exclusively EU member states and the United States.
There is not much left, but if we look at the NGO category, even where we do not see states directly, they emerge indirectly, especially in the matter of financing. For instance, more than 50 percent of Amnesty International’s funding comes from states (and by states, let there be no misunderstanding, I mean the same handful of dominant states). If the state apparatus standing behind the curtain, providing the funds and having the final say in decision-making, were withdrawn, the organization would have to shut down. Its approximately 4,000 well-paid staff would be forced to apply for unemployment benefits and seek part-time work in law firms or social media companies.
So let us get to the point: the problem with the concept and phenomenon of the ‘international community’ is that it has nothing to do with an actual international community. Behind the façade of the international community, those who promise to rescue the dispossessed, the oppressed, the marginalized, the abused, and the violated from the systematic oppression of states are, in fact, none other than the states themselves, either directly or indirectly.
In Rojava, the budding alternative mode of social production and governance seems to be compelled to shoulder the difficult mission of creating its own alternative ‘international community.’
What problems can the preservation of ambiguity regarding perpetrators in the report create for the identification and prevention of sectarian violence in Syria?
Ambiguity about perpetrators is a significant obstacle to both the identification and prevention of sectarian violence. Investigations and reports that do not provide clear answers to the questions ‘who, where, how, and on whose behalf’ weaken deterrence. When the structures and connections of perpetrators, commanders, and instigators are not exposed, criminals are shielded by plausible denial strategies. This, in turn, activates and fuels the cycle of violence. Because victims’ expectations of justice are not met, local cooperation and information-sharing break down, and early warning systems become dysfunctional. Since ambiguity does not eliminate the crime itself, it results in responsibility for the acts being attributed either to ‘everyone’ or to ‘no one.’ Among many other complications, this creates space for the actual perpetrators and their supporters to deny responsibility and find protection.
Ambiguity on perpetrators paves the way for massacres and annihilation
From a legal perspective, if the perpetrator and chain of command are not clarified, criteria such as ‘effective control’ or ‘command responsibility’ cannot be applied. This makes criminal investigations and compensation mechanisms impossible, or at least severely obstructs them. It also prevents the obligations of other states under international law from becoming concrete.
Operationally, ambiguity about perpetrators means that victims of violence, individuals or communities, cannot be effectively protected. This, in turn, opens the way for the continuation of massacres and annihilation. International normative frameworks also lose their chance to be effective and accurate from the outset. Instead of targeted sanctions designed by taking into account the structures and distinctive parameters of perpetrators, the world is left with inflated, symbolic sanctions of the ‘window-dressing’ type, which are known in advance to have no meaningful impact.
In short, preserving ambiguity about perpetrators in the report amounts to destroying the very road and bridges that lead to the identification and prevention of sectarian violence in Syria. This has two directly connected and inevitable consequences:
* The protection of perpetrators and their reward with a kind of impunity,
* Continuation of massacres and annihilation.
According to the UN report, what concrete steps can the international community take to address sectarian violence and violations against civilians in Syria?
I have already stated that I do not think very highly of the structure, character, and function of what is called the ‘international community.’ Let me recall this as a note of caution. Nevertheless, since your question is clear and concrete, I will try to outline the concrete steps proposed in the report. The recommendations for putting an end to sectarian violence and violations against civilians in a lasting way can be grouped under three headings: accountability, protection of victims, and institutional reforms for building lasting peace.
In terms of accountability, the report stresses the necessity of establishing full cooperation with the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM), which was created to assist in the investigation and prosecution of the most serious international crimes committed in Syria since March 2011, in order to strengthen the chain of evidence collection. It calls for continued unhindered access for commission teams to crime scenes; forensic support for on-the-ground investigations; the exhumation and identification of mass graves, and dignified burials. For the clarification of the fate of the disappeared, it recommends securing permanent funding for the Independent Institution on Missing Persons, established by the UN General Assembly, and creating secure data-sharing channels with families.
Regarding the protection of victims, the report emphasizes the need to safeguard places of worship and threatened settlements, to establish and implement early warning and rapid response mechanisms against hate speech and reprisals, and to put in place safe evacuation plans. It also underlines the vital importance of ensuring humanitarian access and expanding the scale of aid. Drawing attention to the deepening funding gap, the report notes that millions of people are in urgent need of assistance, and stresses that quickly addressing these financial shortfalls is a prerequisite for the effectiveness of protection measures.
On the path of institutional reforms for lasting peace, the report points out that ensuring accountability in an effective and permanent manner, and preventing the recurrence of crimes, must be placed at the center of the process. This requires rigorous security sector reform in the integration of armed elements into security institutions, as well as comprehensive vetting programs.
Finally, it stresses the necessity of renewing the mandate and authority of the commission that prepared the report, guaranteeing its access to the field, and regularly transmitting its findings to UN bodies and national judiciaries. This, it argues, will increase local trust and break the prevailing perception of impunity.
The report contributed to the tradition of impunity
In short, these are the concrete steps proposed in the report. Finally, I must emphasize that the report itself, by making vague and ambiguous statements regarding the perpetrators, has both protected them and contributed to the continuation of the tradition of impunity in the Middle East. In the Syrian context, I believe that a lasting solution lies in the dialogue and active cooperation of Syrian Alawites, Druze, and other minorities, who, like the Kurds, have been subjected to systematic massacres and annihilation campaigns by the same socio-political and military systems and in seeking their long-term survival through acting together with the Kurds.