The reality of armed struggle, the force that made party formation possible, lies beneath all ideological, organizational, and political developments. In resisting the fascist military regime of 12 September, the guerrilla war launched with the August 15 offensive played a decisive role in the success of the Kurdish people’s national resurrection revolution, in their courageous resistance to the regime, and in becoming a people who, by the early 1990s, rose up in serhildans. This is a truth that no one can deny or overlook. No form of struggle other than the guerrilla could have produced these developments, raised the consciousness of the Kurdish people against the fascist military regime of 12 September, organized them, and led them into serhildan. In this way, in carrying the party’s ideological line to the people, educating and organizing the masses, and striking blows to achieve the national resurrection revolution, the armed resistance conducted on the basis of the guerrilla played a decisive role.
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) defined its “People’s War Strategy” at its First Party Conference, held in the Lebanon–Palestine arena in July 1981. In both the political report presented to the conference and in his speeches, President Öcalan explained in detail the People’s War Strategy as the fundamental method for reorganizing the party and waging the national resistance struggle against the fascist military regime of 12 September. This explanation, and the First Party Conference realized on this basis, essentially ensured the movement’s decision and initiation of a march in the direction of armed resistance against the 12 September regime. Later, in his book The Role of Force in Kurdistan, President Öcalan elaborated on this armed struggle strategy in all its aspects and in great detail, instilling within the entire cadre and fighter structure a strong strategic and tactical understanding.
Second congress and the return to the country movement
The PKK line of armed struggle against the 12 September regime is explained and expressed in the book The Role of Force in Kurdistan. In this book, the ideological leadership of the armed struggle, its organizational leadership, mass base, strategic stages, tactical methods, principles of command, and forms of action are set out in the most comprehensive way. For this reason, when the PKK moved toward armed resistance against the fascist military regime of 12 September, it possessed a strong theoretical understanding and a systematic concept of struggle. The August 15 offensive later became the practical implementation of such a comprehensive and systematic intellectual power. It was the PKK’s Second Congress, held in August 1982, that initiated the return of its cadres to the country and the beginning of the armed resistance struggle process.
Based primarily on The Role of Force in Kurdistan and other books by President Öcalan that explain the political, organizational, and military line the PKK should follow against the 12 September regime, the cadres educated themselves and prepared for this process. The Second Congress both adopted these books as the official line of the PKK and, to ensure their implementation, decided on the return to the country, thus starting such a process. There were several factors that led the PKK to embark on such a process. Undoubtedly, the most decisive factor was the level reached after more than two years of training and preparation carried out abroad in the Lebanon–Palestine arena. In addition, the oppression, subjugation, and persecution experienced by the Kurdish people continuously called upon the PKK to take up the struggle and demand accountability for these injustices.
The main factor behind such a call was the great prison resistance in Diyarbakır (Amed) Prison, led by Mazlum, Kemal, and Hayri. Ideologically victorious against the 12 September regime, this prison resistance called on the party to return to the country and to turn the ideological victory into a practical and political victory by developing concrete resistance against the regime. Developments in the Lebanon–Palestine arena and on the international stage also pushed the party to engage in such a struggle. Moreover, after more than two years, the previously intense attacks carried out by the 12 September regime had begun to lose momentum and enter a certain period of stagnation, creating the conditions and providing the ground for organizing a successful armed resistance against it.
Taking all these factors into account, the PKK Second Congress initiated the process of returning to Kurdistan from September 1982 onwards, with the aim of positioning the trained cadre force in appropriate strategic mountainous areas to organize the armed resistance. It is known that the return to the country took place under serious difficulties and obstacles. To survive against the 12 September regime, it had become a necessity to take up positions in strategic areas that were entirely unfamiliar and for which no preparation had been made. Until then, the PKK had been a movement that organized and struggled in large cities and towns, building relationships and organizations there, and recruiting cadres. However, the fact that the return to the country was being carried out along the borders dividing Kurdistan, areas where the PKK had no prior organizational presence was the main reason for these difficulties. No one was sufficiently familiar with the ground where they had taken positions, and the party had yet to form an organization in this area. Even more challenging was that none of the cadres prepared to conduct the struggle in these return areas had any prior knowledge of them.
The martyrdom of Şahin Kılavuz and his comrades
The return to the country took place in suitable strategic mountainous areas along the Turkey–Iraq and Turkey–Iran border lines. In these areas, there was a partial vacuum in political practice. The military dominance of the Republic of Turkey was not as strong here as it was in cities and towns. Furthermore, following the fascist military coup of 12 September, the Iran–Iraq war, which began within a week and became a continuous conflict, created a significant military vacuum along both the Turkey–Iraq and Turkey–Iran borders. Making use of this situation, the return aimed to take advantage of the gap, utilize the opportunities available, and organize the guerrilla forces there. Without such positioning, the guerrilla, as a force of freedom, could not have survived or defended itself against fascist colonial powers.
In this context, a series of efforts were carried out to realize the return. On one hand, there was limited reliance on an alliance developed with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), while on the other, the return was based on practical preparations in Eastern and Southern Kurdistan, developed under the leadership of comrade Mehmet Karasungur from the mid-1980s onwards. The guerrilla faced difficulties during the return to the country. Courier route problems caused major challenges, while enemy obstacles and agent activities created further complications. Despite all this, a sensitive and well-coordinated effort ensured a successful return. During this phased return, only one group, led by comrade Şahin Kılavuz, suffered casualties, as they were swept away by a flood while crossing the Hezil River, leading to their martyrdom. In this way, eight comrades fell as martyrs on the path of return to the country, revealing the difficult and obstacle-filled nature of the struggle.
The group’s commander was comrade Şahin Kılavuz. He was among those who joined the struggle at a young age from Tuzluçayır in Ankara and later took an active role in the Siverek struggle. His devotion to President Öcalan and his desire for armed struggle reached the level of passion. He had a strong command personality. He was the last of the comrades to be removed, by party decision and with some insistence from Siverek, a place he was reluctant to leave because he could not accept the idea of failure there. Eventually, through a special decision, he was withdrawn from Siverek and sent abroad. During his time abroad, he underwent ideological and military training, developing into a strong commander. He combined both consciousness and practical initiative. His first tasks were based on recognizing the terrain, establishing relationships with the local population, building ties with friendly circles, making infrastructure preparations, and creating shelters where the guerrilla could protect and defend itself. From the spring of 1983 onwards, the launch of practical guerrilla activities in the country was developed within such a planning framework. At that time, neither the area nor the people were known, no relationships or resources existed, and even the basic geography was unfamiliar. To take the first step into armed resistance, a minimum level of preparatory work was absolutely necessary. The initial steps were taken precisely on the basis of carrying out such preparations.
Preparation process for armed resistance
It is a well-known fact that these efforts took place under extremely difficult conditions and with severe shortages. From the smallest opportunity for contact, to making use of such contacts, to navigating with compasses and binoculars, to spending days, weeks, and months in certain areas to get to know specific circles and geographical environments, and to reach a certain level of knowledge, this was a struggle carried out under great hardship and deprivation. In the spring and summer of 1983, work was carried out on the basis of practical preparation, learning about the geography and people, and gathering certain information about the population and the enemy, starting from Şemdinli and extending to Eruh (Siirt), and from Gever (Yüksekova) to Ağrı along the eastern border. Subsequently, units were assigned to carry out similar work in more inland areas. Inexperience, the abstract nature of planning, the length of time required for practical preparations, and the lack of a system of contacts and connections meant that assessing the results of these efforts and re-planning them was drawn out over a long period. As a result, a swift transition to practical action could not be achieved. This delay extended the work into 1983 and caused a postponement in transforming preparations into action. Politically, this also placed our party movement under pressure against the 12 September regime. Indeed, this situation was assessed at the Party central meeting held in February 1984, leading to a party decision to respond more actively and effectively, both in defending and organizing the party movement against the provocative, liquidationist tendency led by Semir and in responding to the developing political environment. Organizational and operational activities were to be rapidly advanced, and the work of 1984 was organized to develop a more advanced process. After the leadership’s evaluations, particularly on the struggle against provocation and the development of a tactical line were conveyed in April 1984 to the leadership and cadre forces carrying out the practical work in the country, a more advanced level of planning was initiated.
Initially, tactical planning was carried out in areas such as Çukurca and Uludere to apply force against agent structures, and this was put into practice. However, when it became apparent that this did not produce significant developments, a new search began in the summer of 1984. It was practically observed that the tactic applied before 1980 did not produce significant political or military developments under the conditions of the fascist military regime in 1984. This revealed the need to adopt and implement tactical planning suited to the realities of the existing conditions.
Drawing the roadmap for returning to the country
Practical inexperience, the weight of the conditions, and the pressures of the regime made it necessary to discover and implement what needed to be done almost as if feeling one’s way in the dark. Our party practice could only develop on the basis of such a journey.
Regarding the next stage, the following can be said: At the end of June, a meeting was held in Lolan with six participants. Alongside comrades Abbas, Cuma, and Fuat, comrades Fatma, Selim, and Ebubekir also took part in this meeting. Its significance lies in the fact that it evaluated President Öcalan’s ideas on organizing units that would carry out both armed organization and mass work, leading to concrete organizational planning. The military organization responsible for armed action was separated from the armed units that would also carry out mass work, based on taking up arms and establishing bases in rural areas. In other words, it was envisaged that the party force would be organized into two main branches, according to two principal tasks. One branch would be responsible for waging armed resistance in the form of armed propaganda teams, while the other would be organized on the basis of guerrilla groups responsible for conducting mass work at the town level. It was decided to organize three teams as armed propaganda units and to give these three teams a new name. This was because a new process was about to begin, involving the use of armed force. A new military organization was needed to take responsibility for this armed force so that the PKK would not be held directly accountable or branded as “terrorist” for these actions.
Preparation of HRK’s declaration of establishment
Such was the thinking of our administration at the time. On this basis, the military organization composed of three armed propaganda teams was given the name Kurdistan Liberation Forces (HRK–Hêzên Rizgariya Kurdistan ). HRK would be publicly announced through a major action accompanied by the distribution of its declaration of establishment. Within this framework, HRK’s declaration and posters were prepared as propaganda material. Comrade Hozan Sefkan (Celal Ercan) had come from Europe and, in addition to being a bard, was also an excellent technical illustrator. He drew various images and reproduced them in a way that would promote the guerrilla. Meanwhile, this meeting also produced an initial framework for the assignment of these armed propaganda teams, named the teams, and appointed much of their command. At this meeting, comrade Agit was officially appointed commander of the 14 July Armed Propaganda Team. The completion of the remaining organizational arrangements, as well as the operational planning, was left to be finalized in a meeting with comrades experienced in practical matters. This meeting effectively marked the beginning of the August 15 offensive process. The outcomes of this meeting were later evaluated at a larger gathering in the Zap area, in the Şikefta Birîndara region, attended by guerrilla units operating in areas such as Çukurca, Gever, and Şemdinli (Şemzînan). There, the planning was finalized. The meeting in Şikefta Birîndara determined the full composition of the command and fighters of the armed propaganda teams and decided how the August 15 actions would be carried out. Since those present included comrades from the field, they brought with them information and documents about the practical terrain and towns, along with various sketches and diagrams. Discussion of these materials, particularly a sketch prepared for Şemdinli, led to the idea of whether a raid on a town could be conducted. Once this view gained general acceptance, the decision was made to carry out the HRK’s announcement in the form of town raids. The discussion then turned to which towns such raids could target, and in the end, Şemdinli, Eruh, and Çatak were selected. This was because we intended to launch an armed resistance struggle in the Botan–Hakkari region, in accordance with the party’s decision and planning. These three towns provided a practical basis for defining a field of resistance. By making this triangle the zone of action, even if the enemy attempted to suppress news of the operations through control of propaganda channels, each action would inevitably spread locally, ensuring that armed resistance in our chosen area would be known. In short, given the conditions of the time and the framework of armed resistance we intended to wage, raiding these towns was deemed appropriate. They were also the smallest towns in the region, which meant that a raid could be carried out with a single team in each, and the chances of success were greater. Their small size undoubtedly influenced the decision to target them for these raids.
Toward the August 15 offensive
The same meeting also set the framework for the operation. This would not be just a single action, but a series of interconnected operations. Accordingly, an operational plan was drawn up to include five to six targets. This plan envisaged, on one hand, raiding military outposts, neutralizing army forces, and striking them; and on the other, storming judicial depots to seize weapons and ammunition, distributing the HRK founding declaration in coffeehouses and on main streets, and posting the prepared posters, combining many military and political actions in an integrated manner.
What would happen after the raids was unclear. How would the army respond? If, out of fear, it pulled smaller outposts together into larger ones, the plan also included the possibility of striking some of these posts in succession.
The date of 15 August was chosen as the earliest feasible time for the operation. The decision to carry out such an operation had already been reached by mid-July, making it impossible to reach the operation zones of Eruh and Çatak by the end of July or the beginning of August. While the Şemdinli team, composed almost entirely of those who attended the meeting might have reached its target earlier, Eruh and Çatak could be reached no sooner than mid-August. Choosing another date was avoided, as no written documents would be prepared.
No written orders or instructions were produced throughout the preparations, out of fear they could be intercepted and exposed. Everything was done verbally, passed from ear to ear, in strict secrecy. Secrecy was considered the key to success, and under no circumstances could this operation fail. The armed struggle had been interrupted before, after the unsuccessful Siverek resistance and the failed attempt on M. Celal Bucak. A repeat of that outcome had to be avoided at all costs, and secrecy was seen as the only guarantee of success. In the covert work, to ensure the operations could be carried out on the same day without error, a known date had to be set. Fifteen August, as the middle of the month, was selected as the operation date. Division of labor was made, and those attending the meeting set out to organize the operations according to their assigned responsibilities.
The commanders for the Eruh and Çatak actions were not present at the meeting, they were in their own areas. Therefore, the operational instructions had to be delivered to them, along with the necessary materials for the operation, and they had to be directed into action.
(Compiled from the PKK’s Serxwebun 30th anniversary special issue)