As the Islamic Republic, following its 12-day war with Israel, becomes entangled in a multifaceted crisis—marked by structural collapse, weakened regional influence, and deepening domestic isolation—the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) is preparing for what it describes as a decisive phase in Iran’s political future.
In an exclusive interview with Firat News Agency (ANF), Fuad Berîtan, a member of PJAK’s Executive Council, emphasized that PJAK is currently in its most powerful position to date. Drawing on its historical role and its enduring legacy of resistance, he said the movement is fully prepared to confront any scenario that may arise.
What kind of crises has the Islamic Republic faced following the 12-day war, and what is the scale of those challenges? How does PJAK assess these developments?
Following the 12-day war between Israel and the Islamic Republic, the regime’s situation requires a comprehensive redefinition. We are now faced with a structure so deeply penetrated by vulnerability and dysfunction that its weaknesses have reached the very core of the state apparatus. The country’s airspace is effectively under Israeli control; its missile and air defense capabilities have been severely damaged and rendered ineffective. The so-called “Shia Crescent” is now nothing more than a mirage. Iran possesses no nuclear weapons, its nuclear program has suffered serious blows, and domestically, it is grappling with mega-crises—each one of which could explode like a ticking time bomb.
From a dire economic and livelihood crisis to worsening environmental collapse, from the growing gap between the state and the people to the complete absence of a tangible roadmap for recovery, all of it reflects the disastrous condition the Islamic Republic is in. Put more precisely, this is one more defeat added to a long list of setbacks the regime has suffered in recent years, both regionally and internationally. Today, it is drowning in the quicksand of its own failures and crises.
This situation poses extremely dangerous consequences for a regime that has long sought regional hegemony and absolute control. Its survival is more threatened now than at any other point. The voids and visible signs of structural breakdown across various sectors have cast a heavy shadow over the very existence of the regime and instilled a profound sense of fear at its core.
The Islamic Republic’s defeat is not confined to military, security, or regional dimensions—it is a paradigmatic and ideological collapse. The previous version of the regime has effectively fallen apart, and a new one has yet to emerge in its place. The threat of war still looms, and any potential agreement with the West will not come easily—it would require drinking the “poisoned chalice” and undergoing fundamental internal surgery.
This is the same regime that for years chanted “no negotiations, no war.” Now, it is incapable of military confrontation with Israel or the United States, yet at the same time, it cannot fully distance itself from negotiations—nor can it muster the courage to surrender. It stands at a crossroads, seeking a path that neither leads to full-scale war, nor activates the snapback mechanism and reimposition of UN sanctions; a path that neither appears as total capitulation to the West nor jeopardizes the regime’s own survival.
The reality is that any agreement with these characteristics cannot merely be a technical mechanism limited to the structure and content of a nuclear consortium. Following the recent war, the Islamic Republic’s bargaining power has drastically declined, and any agreement reached now would, in effect, constitute a step backward from previous milestones. In such a situation, the Islamic Republic is forced to undergo a transformation—an internal reckoning and fundamental political and structural changes. The previous model of governance has failed and no longer responds to the demands of society.
A moment has now arrived at which the ruling establishment finds itself compelled to carry out “surgical procedures” at various levels. It is highly likely that, in the near future, it will offer concessions in foreign policy. And to justify such moves, a new discourse will be introduced. Terms like “de-escalation,” “conflict management,” and “regional cooperation” are expected to increasingly appear in the regime’s official and propaganda rhetoric.
Can the situation improve meaningfully without real, strategic, and fundamental internal reforms? What are the structural and ideological roots of the Islamic Republic’s current crises, and why is the previous model of governance no longer viable?
Even elements within the establishment have concluded that without a major paradigm shift, there is no way out of this deadlock. The convergence of chronic military tensions and worsening internal crises is devouring the very core of the Islamic Republic’s existence.
The road ahead remains uncertain. But if any path to survival still remains for the Islamic Republic, it is none other than yielding to the people’s demands for freedom, democracy, and equality. A system built on repression and suffocation lacks not only the discourse needed to address its crises, but also the tools and the capacity to do so. That is because, at its core, it has been based on silencing and denying the voice of the people.
The Islamic Republic, after decades of suppressing broad segments of society, is devoid of governance rationality. Even the continued survival of such a system would require at least a minimum level of rationality. But governance rationality is different from survival rationality. The regime has never possessed the former—but it has always been careful to protect the latter, at any cost.
The well-known statement by Khomeini that “Preserving the system is the most sacred obligation” is the embodiment of this mentality. In practice, they drank the poison chalice when necessary, occupied embassies, severed diplomatic ties and later restored them. The “hardliner–moderate” dichotomy has always served as a tool for tactical advance or retreat.
But this situation can no longer continue in the same way. Khamenei—whose policies symbolize the failure of the Islamic Republic’s project—can no longer serve as the unchallenged center of decision-making. While he may still view himself as “the system,” the real holders of power, wealth, and influence will increasingly seek transition paths that bypass him in order to protect their own interests.
We are already witnessing signs of superficial changes within the power structure: the dismissal of Tehran’s Friday Prayer leader (Sedighi), changes within the Supreme National Security Council, the return of Ali Larijani to the political stage, and Masoud Pezeshkian’s remarks on dialogue with the opposition. But these are merely the tip of the iceberg. The Islamic Republic does not have much time left to prove whether these developments are genuine—or merely tactical and deceptive maneuvers.
The truth is something else: the people no longer trust the Islamic Republic’s statements or its policies. They view them with deep suspicion—because the prevailing public perception is that the regime’s sole priority is its own survival, not resolving crises or responding to the people’s demands.
Moreover, many now fundamentally believe that the Islamic Republic no longer possesses the capacity or the will to solve the country’s problems. From the very beginning, the people of Kurdistan demonstrated heroic resistance. But across other regions of Iran as well, society gave the Islamic Republic multiple opportunities over the decades to reform and change—from the reformist period and the Green Movement, to the uprisings of December 2017, November 2019, and the revolutionary wave of “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” (Woman, Life, Freedom).
At every one of these junctures, the regime chose not dialogue, but brutal repression and disregard for the will of the people. The survival of the regime has come at the cost of widespread bloodshed, environmental destruction, mass hunger, pervasive poverty, and the suppression of fundamental freedoms. These realities are deeply etched into the collective memory of the people—from Kurdistan to Baluchistan, from Azerbaijan to Shiraz, Tehran, and Khorasan.
It is evident that if such an approach had been capable of ensuring the regime’s long-term survival, the fate of the Iranian people would look very different today. Put more precisely: as long as the Islamic Republic and its decision-makers refuse to admit that they are on the wrong path—and that they have been defeated by the people—no new path forward will succeed.
A deal with the West might provide the Islamic Republic with artificial respiration, but it will not save it. Why? Because today’s crises are rooted in both the structure and the mindset of the regime. Without transformation in both areas, no sustainable outcome is possible. Empty slogans, rhetorical palliatives, and superficial gestures will not bring about real change.
If the Islamic Republic is truly seeking to survive, it has no choice but to take the following steps:
- The unconditional release of all political and ideological prisoners
- The initiation of strategic dialogue with the opposition, both inside and outside the country
- The full freedom of political and party activities
- An end to the militarized policy in Kurdistan and Baluchistan
- A complete halt to the suppression of women, ethnic groups, and advocates of freedom and democracy
The question is no longer “What must be done to preserve the Islamic Republic?”
Rather, it is: “What must be done to democratize Iran? To realize freedom? To end discrimination, repression, and environmental destruction? To secure bread, dignity, and human equality?”
As it stands, the policies of the Islamic Republic constitute a direct threat to the life and future of society. In addition to the crises already mentioned, the welfare situation has deteriorated further, and society is now deprived of even the most basic daily necessities. Most importantly, people have been stripped of a future.
The lowest-cost and most responsible course of action is for the regime to accept accountability—for the suffering, destruction, and repression it has imposed on the population over the years.
If meaningful change does not occur, more difficult days lie ahead. The failures will deepen, the costs will rise, and the remaining opportunities will vanish. Every moment of delay in responding to the people’s demands only widens the scope of the catastrophe and darkens the scenarios ahead. If proposing such a roadmap is seen as naïve optimism, then rejecting it is deadly folly. A regime facing military attacks and popular uprisings has no time left to waste—neither in deceiving its own people nor the world.
What role do Kurdistan and PJAK envision for themselves in Iran’s future? What is your policy toward other political forces?
The people of Iran—particularly in Kurdistan—despite all the repression and pressure, remain deeply committed to freedom. Across the country, and especially in Kurdistan, people are closely following the country’s political developments, and their hope for freedom is more alive than ever. Alongside their longstanding and dignified resistance, our people will, at the right moment and with full awareness, intervene in shaping the course of events.
It is only natural that Kurdish society is more prepared than ever to face all potential situations and future scenarios. PJAK is currently at its strongest—politically, organizationally, and in terms of field and defensive capacity.
We state this without hesitation: PJAK has become a decisive force in the political landscape of Kurdistan and Iran as a whole. No initiative—whether domestic or international—can succeed without PJAK’s involvement on one hand, and alignment with the will of the Kurdish people and the freedom- and democracy-seeking forces of Iran on the other. Any actor seeking to take meaningful steps must acknowledge this reality; otherwise, they are bound to fail.
PJAK remains committed to cooperating with all serious and resistance-oriented parties in Kurdistan and other regions of Iran. At the same time, we are deeply concerned about the fragmented state of the opposition. Unfortunately, various political factions and movements have not only failed to provide a clear and effective roadmap for Iran’s future, but they have also been unable to unify their own ranks. Many have either fully aligned themselves with foreign powers or have devolved into marginal groups issuing statements and hosting fruitless meetings.
This situation has many causes. But ultimately, it is the absence of will and organizational cohesion, their disconnection from society and Iran’s real conditions, repeated missed opportunities, and a shallow belief in democracy that have led large segments of the public to become disillusioned and disengaged from these groups. Mentally, structurally, and practically, many of these factions are in a dire and dysfunctional state.
Among them, the monarchist camp has descended into a tragicomic condition. In both rhetoric and behavior, they represent a mirror image of the Islamic Republic: authoritarian, anti-democratic, delusional, and aggressive toward dissent. Their constant reproduction of the Islamic Republic’s stereotypes and propaganda against Kurds and freedom-seeking forces proves that, if ever in power, they would continue the same cycle of repression and denial.
We, as PJAK and part of the revolutionary movement of the Kurdish people, warn that the future Iran will have no place for authoritarian discourse, totalitarianism, or the reproduction of dictatorship. These factions may not yet hold power, but in their fantasies, they are already mapping out plans to suppress the Kurdish people and collaborate with regional regimes to extinguish justice-driven movements.
We state clearly: While we find the actions and rhetoric of these delusional factions entirely lacking in credibility, we also issue this warning—any force that disrespects the people of Kurdistan or the freedom movements across Iran will face an appropriate and proportionate response from us, the Kurdish people, and other oppressed communities.
We possess the will, the strength, and the capability to respond—across all arenas. No one should have any doubt about that.
Any hand extended to us in friendship, respect, and recognition of the democratic, freedom-seeking, and collective rights of our people will be met in kind—and we are open to dialogue. But any hand raised in threat against the people of Kurdistan and other peoples of Iran will be broken without hesitation.
We are not a threatening force, and we do not act with hostility toward any democratic or freedom-seeking movement. But in the face of insult, repression, or humiliation, we will not remain silent.
The Kurdish people have proven—over decades—that they not only possess the capacity to defend themselves, but also to lead the broader struggle for freedom and democracy in Iran. They were among the first to stand against the tyranny of the Islamic Republic. They have paid the highest price. And the paradigm of “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” (Woman, Life, Freedom), which was born out of the Kurdish revolutionary movement, has become a source of inspiration for democratic movements across the country.
Kurdistan will be a decisive force in all future scenarios. Without the participation and coordination of the Kurdish people, no domestic project or foreign initiative will succeed.
As a leading force in the “Third Line,” we stress that this line will allow no space for authoritarian or exclusionary projects. At the same time, we see ourselves as holding real, viable, and practical alternative visions—and we are ready to realize them.
Let me reaffirm: we in PJAK are ready for dialogue and cooperation with all democratic, freedom-seeking, and egalitarian forces in Iran.
Our political, paradigmatic, and operational weight is clear to all. No actor can afford to ignore PJAK in the equations shaping Iran’s future.
And no initiative will succeed without working with us.
How do you respond to Masoud Pezeshkian’s recent comments on the need for dialogue with the opposition?
There is a deep-rooted skepticism toward the Islamic Republic’s intentions and actions in this regard. This mistrust stems from painful past experiences, as the regime has repeatedly used such rhetoric for tactical purposes. Pezeshkian’s statements, while vague and lacking clarity about the seriousness or depth of thought behind them, prompt us to reiterate a principle we have consistently upheld: If there is genuine and strategic political will to resolve the country’s crises through serious and foundational dialogue, we are ready to engage.
We believe dialogue is preferable to war, violence, destruction, and chaos—the very disasters that have been the result of the Islamic Republic’s disregard for public demands and its refusal to engage with society and opposition forces.
Of course, it must be made clear: what we mean by “dialogue” has nothing to do with past conspiratorial models that led to the assassination of Kurdish leaders, nor with deceptive mechanisms whose purpose was purely security-oriented, tactical, or propagandistic—not to democratize Iran, but to preserve and legitimize the regime.
Our movement has its own unique perspective and approach and will never be reduced to a tool in such schemes.
It goes without saying that, under current conditions, military confrontation benefits no one. At the same time, we emphasize: if the Islamic Republic initiates aggression against us or our people, we will unquestionably exercise our right to legitimate self-defense. We are ready—both for democratic dialogue and for defense. In every possible scenario, we are prepared, with the backing of the people.
PJAK fights to guarantee the rights of the Kurdish people within a democratic Iran and to end their long-standing and institutionalized oppression.
We not only reject the repressive narratives of the Islamic Republic, but actively combat them. We fight to build a new Iran—**democratic and equal—**where political, linguistic, national and ethnic, cultural, gender, and social diversity is recognized.
An Iran where the people’s democratic right to shape their political destiny is acknowledged. Where no one holds special privileges, no one claims to be the “father” or “owner” of the people, where there are no “superior” or “inferior” citizens, and where women are not only free from discrimination, but enjoy full and equal participation in all political and social spheres.
Kurdistan, Baluchistan, and other regions of Iran must not be treated as security threats.
The political will of the peoples of these regions must be recognized, and they must be guaranteed cultural, social, and political freedoms so that they may help lay the foundation for peace and democracy throughout Iran.
At the same time, the destructive view of the environment must be abandoned. The relationship between people and ecosystems must be redefined from the ground up.
In this context, I want to refer to a recent tragic incident in Sanandaj, where three heroic Kurdish youths lost their lives defending the Zagros Mountains. We honor their memory and state clearly: the Islamic Republic and its military-security mafias bear full responsibility for such tragedies—forces that, like occupiers, have attacked nature and pursued a scorched-earth policy.
In summary, PJAK is a people’s movement and firmly believes in the power of society. During decisive historical moments, we have stood with the people—and we always will.
We believe that a movement can only be strong if it is rooted in the people’s demands. That is why people have supported PJAK from the beginning, and that is why we assert: in defending the identity and demands of society, we will fight with all our strength.