Following the call made by Abdullah Öcalan on 27 February, people across Kurdistan are discussing the new era and trying to understand its political implications. Citizens have shown great interest in meetings held by the DEM Party and are attentively following the related debates.
The process that began with Öcalan’s historic call and continued with the PKK’s decision to dissolve itself and end its armed struggle at its 12th Congress, and entered a new phase when a group of guerrillas laid down arms in Sulaymaniyah on 11 July, has had a profound impact on the Kurdish people. While some view the end of more than 40 years of guerrilla struggle with concern, others see it with hope.
In Dersim, a region where the Turkish state has long carried out special warfare tactics with particular intensity, people are closely following the developments since the PKK announced its decision to lay down arms. These decisions and the resulting events are being discussed in daily life, along with the fears, concerns, and hopes that come with them.
A city targeted by the Turkish State
Dersim stands out as a city in Kurdistan where the Turkish state has aggressively applied assimilation and military policies almost simultaneously with the foundation of the Republic. Particularly in Dersim, where a large population of Kurdish Alevis and Armenians live, the state has enforced comprehensive special warfare tactics since the late Ottoman era.
Since the Armenian Genocide, the city’s demographics have been targeted for change. The 1938 Dersim Massacre caused Dersim to lose both its name and a significant part of its cultural identity. The city’s name was changed to “Tunceli,” and the settlement of state officials and the implementation of intense pressure and warfare tactics transformed both its natural and social landscape.
Assimilation and special warfare policies seemed to have “succeeded” for a time, as Dersim disappeared from the Turkish state’s agenda. However, when the Kurdish Freedom Movement began to organize and resistance emerged within the Alevi Kurdish population, Dersim re-entered the state’s radar.
The Turkish state, determined to prevent the Kurdish Alevi community from aligning with the Kurdish Freedom Movement, employed a variety of psychological and military tactics in areas like Dersim and Elbistan to sever the people’s ties with the guerrillas and the PKK.
This phase also marked a renewed period of oppression and violence for the people of Dersim. Village burnings, forced displacements, environmental destruction, assimilation, and moral degradation were all part of the special warfare strategy inflicted on the region. Yet despite this, the guerrilla resistance and popular support for the Kurdish Freedom Movement have never fully disappeared.
Today, even after years of intense repression, popular support for the Kurdish Freedom Movement in Dersim, although it has fluctuated, persists.
A people turning back toward resistance
As the Kurdish Freedom Movement enters a new era, the people of Dersim, shaped not only by state oppression but also by decades of resistance, are once again turning toward the culture of resistance. Many Alevis, countering state narratives and claims by collaborators (referred to by Öcalan as “Judenrat” figures), say that without the Kurdish Freedom Movement, they wouldn’t even be able to express their Alevi identity.
Special warfare tactics in Dersim
One of the primary tools of special warfare in Dersim is propaganda that tries to drive a wedge between Alevi identity and the Kurdish Freedom Movement. The Turkish state pushes the narrative that Alevis and Kurds are distinct and that the Movement excludes Alevis.
While these tactics have waned in effectiveness over time, they still leave traces. The “Zaza-Kurd” divide previously promoted by the state has now shifted toward claims that Kirmanckî is not Kurdish. Similarly, propaganda suggesting that “Kurds aren’t Alevis” and that “Dersimliler are Kızılbaş, not Kurdish” still has some influence among segments of the population.
Some cemevis in Dersim amplify this propaganda by emphasizing Kızılbaş identity over Alevi beliefs and framing Alevism as merely a sect of Islam. While the “Kızılbaş Alevism” narrative gained traction in the 1990s, its influence has diminished. However, attempts to present Alevism as part of Islam continue. Practices like reciting non-Alevi prayers at cem ceremonies, glorifying Atatürk, the military, and the Republic, and excluding Dersim traditions are now being openly criticized by the community.
Demographic engineering: settling soldiers and police in the city
One of the state’s more recent strategies involves demographic manipulation. Soldiers and police officers are increasingly being stationed in Dersim, not in government housing, but in rented homes. They pay exorbitant rents, often several years in advance, and pass these homes on to their replacements instead of vacating them. This method establishes a semi-permanent state presence and alters the local demographic fabric.
A resident from Hozat recounted renting one of his homes to a soldier six years ago. When the soldier was reassigned, he handed the home over to another soldier. When the owner demanded the house be vacated, he was threatened.
These soldiers, often accompanied by their families, also impose their beliefs on the local population. One resident said a soldier’s family started multiple confrontations during Ramadan because neighbors weren’t fasting, even reporting them to the police.
Locals report that harassment of the Alevi faith continues in daily life, empowered by the state’s policy of impunity. They also speak of enduring public hostility and being stared at with open disdain.
Young people are a target of special warfare
A major element of special warfare in Dersim targets the youth. With almost no employment opportunities, many young people are either pushed to illegally emigrate or drawn into nightlife and alcohol-heavy environments.
One of the most striking features of the city is the abundance of alcohol-serving establishments. In both city centers and districts, the number of liquor stores and bars is unusually high, and they are packed every evening. For example, in Hozat, a district with a population of just 6,000, there are over ten liquor stores and multiple bars.
Dersim’s rates of alcohol consumption exceed the national average, and over the last 15 years, drug use has sharply increased as well. It’s now a common sight to see young people using drugs in mountainous areas at night.
Despite protests and campaigns against drugs and prostitution by the people of Dersim, the Turkish state, through its own security forces, continues to allow and even facilitate their spread.
Desperation as a tool for recruitment
Another tactic involves turning already impoverished individuals into informants. As hopelessness and lack of prospects grow, the appeal of quick money becomes more tempting for the youth.
Local political leaders and parties have done little to address this despair. The lack of any real initiative or solution pushes more young people toward desperate ways to secure their futures.
Through a combination of financial incentives and exploitation of youth despair, the Turkish state’s special warfare apparatus is expanding its informant network across every region of Dersim. This is not a secret: people openly discuss who the informants are and socially exclude them from their communities.