Historian Namık Kemal Dinç, known for his research on Yazidi history and culture, spoke to ANF about the events Yazidis endured and the period that followed the 73rd Ferman.
The first part of this interview can be read here.
Attacks on Yazidis began in 2007
To understand the attack of 3 August 2014 correctly, Namık Dinç said it is essential to first examine the situation in Shengal leading up to it. He also pointed to the role of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in the failure to prevent the genocide: “To understand what happened, we need to closely follow two things: the issue of Shengal’s status and the step-by-step movements of ISIS. First, Shengal’s legal status. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, a new constitution was adopted. Article 140 of that constitution identified several ‘disputed territories’ whose future status would be determined through referendums and elections. Shengal was among these areas and it still is. Yet to this day, no steps have been taken to resolve its status. What was anticipated in 2003 has never materialized.
Second, we must look at the 2007 attack that preceded the one in 2014. Yazidis refer to it as the 2007 ‘firmān’, the decree of extermination. On 14 August 2007, the villages of Şêx Xidir and Til Ezer were bombed. Hundreds of Yazidis were killed. In the aftermath, KDP peshmerga forces entered the region and established control, saying: ‘We will protect the Yazidis.’
And from late 2007 onwards, we see that the KDP effectively consolidated its authority in the area, with peshmerga setting up checkpoints and bases throughout Shengal.
As we move from 2007 to 2014, the broader political context shifts, but by the early 2010s, Yazidis were already facing constant attacks from al-Qaeda-affiliated groups. We see the same actors rebranded under different names. Yazidis themselves recount how their women were abducted, how they were killed whenever militants had the chance, how they were forcibly dispossessed. Eventually, they could no longer even enter cities safely.
KDP promised to protect Yazidis but withdrew when the attacks began
ISIS grew in the vacuum created in Iraq. I will not go into the entire development history of ISIS, but a few dates are particularly important. One of them is June 9, 2014: the day Mosul was taken by ISIS. Without firing a single bullet, ISIS seized Iraq’s third-largest city after Basra and Baghdad.
Mosul, Tal Afar, and Shengal lie along the same corridor, along the same highway line. Thus, after capturing Mosul on June 9, ISIS took Tal Afar on June 16. After that, it was clear to everyone that Shengal was next. This is clearly reflected in the accounts of the Yazidis themselves.
During this period, Yazidis began organizing their own self-defense. Every Yazidi I spoke with told me the same thing: “We dug trenches.” Trenches were dug on the borders, at the entrances of the villages, and they started to stand guard 24 hours a day.
ISIS attacked Tal Afar on June 16. Tal Afar is a city mostly inhabited by Turkmens. Many of them are Shiite, and some belong to the Alevi faith. A large part of the population fled. Those who did not leave were not spared either, as in the eyes of ISIS they too were deviant groups that had strayed from the faith. Some of them sought refuge in Shengal. Many Yazidi families I spoke with said they hosted these people in their homes, helped them, and listened to their stories. So, Yazidis were already uneasy. After these attacks, some even wanted to leave. However, when they tried to do so, the KDP peshmerga told them: “Do not leave, there is no need, we will protect you, we are with you until the end.”
There are varying reports about the number of KDP forces present, some say six thousand, others fifteen thousand. But there was clearly a significant peshmerga presence in Shengal. Tension was high. ISIS was positioned opposite the trenches, and provocations were already occurring. Based on the KDP’s promise of protection, there was no mass evacuation or departure from the town. When I say “town,” I refer to the clustered villages around the mountain, known as “mucemmes”, they are somewhere between towns and large villages. A few older villages also existed.
Eventually, the date of August 3, 2014, arrived. In the early morning hours, an attack began on the village of Şêx Xidir, followed by an attack on Girêzer. These are large Yazidi villages located in the southern part of Shengal. The attack started from there, because all the surrounding villages were Arab villages. With the participation of civilians from these Arab villages, ISIS launched the attack. The resistance continued until morning. These two villages were attacked first before others, and the Yazidis engaged in clashes in the trenches they had dug on the borders. In this sense, they were already an armed community. Knowing that the only way to survive was through armed resistance, they fought until around six or seven in the morning.
However, the help they expected from the peshmerga never came. They made contact with the peshmerga commander. He said, “We will come to your aid; we’ll be there in the morning.” But instead of help arriving, around six o’clock in the morning, they began to see peshmerga forces withdrawing from the region. They began to retreat from the villages and outposts along the border because a command had been issued from headquarters. All KDP peshmerga forces abandoned Shengal. The peshmerga forces followed the central order and pulled back. Some Yazidi peshmerga members, whose families were there, chose not to retreat and joined the fight.
However, after the decision to withdraw, Yazidis felt it would be very difficult to sustain their resistance. Some Yazidis remained in their positions, but women and children began fleeing either to the mountains or, if they had the means, toward Southern Kurdistan (Başur) or Rojava. What followed was a state of panic and chaos. And in that chaos, many people who fell into the hands of ISIS would later become victims of the massacres we now know all too well. Still, some people managed to reach safety in the Shengal Mountains.’’
In June, the KDP told the PKK: There is no need for you to be here
Namık Dinç stated that the PKK had long foreseen the attack on Shengal and the Yazidis and had taken steps accordingly. He noted that the PKK sent a 12-person guerrilla unit to Shengal in June and met with both the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), but the KDP rejected the PKK’s proposal: ‘‘The PKK had a foresight here, after the fall of Mosul in June, they decided to send a guerrilla unit to the region. A 12-person group was dispatched. At that time, they held a meeting with the KDP and PUK forces. But the response was: ‘There is no need for you to be here,’ and the offer was turned down. After that, the 12-member guerrilla unit positioned itself on the mountain and maintained its presence. However, the KDP forces captured three of the guerrillas and imprisoned them. The remaining nine continued their activities there.
After the attack on August 3, the PKK then sent guerrillas from Qandil by bus. The first guerrilla units arrived in Shengal on August 5. Once there, a line of resistance was formed on Shengal Mountain. This is a crucial point because tens of thousands of people who had taken refuge on Shengal Mountain were facing hunger, thirst, and death. On August 8, a humanitarian corridor was established, from the northern side, opening toward the Ceza region, that is, into Rojava. This corridor allowed those trapped to survive.’’
Yazidis encountered the PKK and YPG through resistance
Namık Dinç stated that the Yazidis had mostly come to know the PKK and the Kurdish Freedom Movement through the anti-propaganda of Turkish media and Southern Kurdish forces. However, the arrival of PKK and YPG in Shengal and the fact that their first encounter occurred through active resistance had a profound impact, especially on Yazidi youth: “Many of the Yazidis we spoke with said they had heard of the PKK but had never seen or known them. So, they encountered the PKK and guerrilla forces for the first time during this genocide. Alongside them were also YPG forces arriving from Rojava. The fact that this initial contact happened in the form of solidarity and resistance naturally had a strong impact on them.
They themselves said that the image of the PKK was previously negative, formed through Turkish television and Southern (Kurdish) forces. But their attitude in the resistance sparked significant sympathy and interest toward the Kurdish Movement, the PKK, and the YPG within Yazidi society. Moreover, the guerrilla units that arrived were limited in number. Sustaining that resistance became possible only with the participation of Yazidi youth, which led to another development.
It was in this process that the Shengal Resistance Units (YBŞ) emerged. Thus, young people began to join the resistance, and a deep sympathy toward the PKK and YPG began to grow.”
No true reckoning has been made regarding what was done to the Yazidis
Namık Dinç stated that neither the peoples of the region nor the world at large had truly confronted what happened to the Yazidis. He emphasized that a genuine reckoning would be impossible without confronting the mindset that justifies killing: “There has not been a full reckoning. Many states have recognized what happened as genocide, which can be considered a step. However, there is no sense of responsibility or concrete action toward addressing the destruction and trauma caused by the genocide. From this perspective, it is not possible to speak of a genuine reckoning on a global scale.
The situation is even more dire among local populations. Under the guise of the modern state, a process still continues that is guided by religious references. This shows that non-Islamic faith groups remain under threat. If a true reckoning had taken place, one that questioned why these acts were committed against the Yazidis and examined their historical background, the situation today could have been very different.
Unfortunately, the tendency to label Yazidis with derogatory terms, to criminalize them, and to justify what was done to them still persists. This mindset continues to make such violence appear acceptable. That is why much ground remains to be covered before we can speak of a true reckoning.
To return to the example of the Druze, they too represent one of the oldest religious communities in the Middle East, and the attacks they have faced are well known. The same applies to Arab Alawites. All of these reflect a long-standing jurisprudence, a thought system that deems their killing permissible. Only when we break away from this jurisprudence, this system of thought, can we speak of a genuine reckoning.”
Yazidis must establish self-defense and self-governance
Namık Dinç emphasized the significance of Abdullah Öcalan’s message to the Yazidis and the need for their resistance to continue, stating that Yazidis must establish their own self-governance: “This was also present in Abdullah Öcalan’s most recent message: it was a call to recognize the historical value of the Yazidis, to understand how deep the roots of their culture and faith go, and to support the continuation of their existence and resistance as one of the most ancient beliefs of this land. This is also highly significant for the enlightenment of the Middle East, for breaking a vicious circle.
We know that many other faith communities, like the Yazidis, remain under similar threats. In this sense, Yazidi resistance occupies a crucial place, and what we witnessed during the 2014 genocide demonstrated that the only way Yazidis can sustain their existence today and carry it into the future is by building their own self-defense and self-governance.
Without establishing self-governance, without forming their own institutions, it is not possible for them to preserve their community, faith, and culture into the future. Unfortunately, when we consider what has happened to other religious groups, we see that the same fate could still befall the Yazidis, which shows us that this jurisprudence and mindset have not yet been broken.
The international system must recognize this and move away from monist policies. It is essential to develop a model of self-governance that respects the distinctiveness of the Yazidi faith and community.”