The first part of this in-depth article by Sinan Cûdî can be read here.
Communalism as socialism: The social construction of freedom
In classical socialist theory, socialism is defined through the socialization of the means of production and the abolition of class domination. Within this framework, socialism represents a historical stage that emerges after the overcoming of capitalism. The state assumes a central role during this transitional process, with planning, distribution, and the coordination of production carried out through the state apparatus. Social emancipation is thus largely tied to the success of this centralized transformation.
While this approach produced a powerful alternative to the destructive effects of capitalism, over time it also generated its own limitations. Socialism came to be perceived less as a living reconstruction of social relations and more as an economic and administrative model. Society ceased to be a subject and instead became an object on whose behalf decisions were made. As a result, freedom was treated not as a social question, but as a managerial one.
At this point, Abdullah Öcalan’s conception of socialism marks a clear rupture. For Öcalan, socialism is прежде all about revealing society’s capacity for self-organization and collective decision-making. Socialism is therefore understood not as a form of state or merely an economic system, but as a mode of social life. It is here that the concept of communalism becomes decisive, framing socialism as a practical process through which society reconstructs itself.
Within this perspective, freedom does not emerge automatically through the retreat of central power. It takes concrete form in communes, assemblies, and the organizational patterns of everyday life. Economy, politics, and culture cannot acquire an emancipatory function without the direct participation of society itself. Communalism is neither a collectivism that erases the individual nor a form of atomized individualism; it is a relational mode in which individuals are strengthened through social bonds.
Öcalan’s understanding of socialism grounds the critique of state-centered socialism not only in historical experience, but also on ontological and sociological foundations. When the human being is understood as fundamentally relational, freedom too is constructed within relations. For this reason, freedom cannot be distributed from a single center. If forms of social organization do not produce freedom, transformation in property relations alone remains insufficient.
This conception of communalism does not invalidate class struggle; rather, it situates it within a broader field of social struggle. The labor–capital contradiction, gender inequality, ecological destruction, and cultural domination are treated as different manifestations of the same social crisis. Socialism thus claims to generate social-level responses to each of these crises.
In conclusion, socialism in Öcalan’s thought is not a goal confined to the seizure of power. It is a process through which society continually reconstructs itself, requiring ongoing practice and action. Communalism does not treat freedom as a final destination but understands it as a lived experience. In this sense, Öcalan’s socialism offers a perspective of social emancipation that moves beyond the state- and power-centered horizon of the classical left.
Updating dialectical materialism: Process, relationality, and subjectivity
Dialectical materialism is a powerful mode of thought that understands historical change through contradictions. This is well established. The reciprocal interaction between material conditions and social consciousness constitutes its core assumption. Yet this framework has often been confined to the sphere of production. Dialectics has been identified with the laws of motion of the economic base. This narrowing is not a flaw inherent to dialectics itself, but the result of a particular historical interpretation.
The intervention of Abdullah Öcalan compels a rethinking of dialectics around process and relationality. Social change cannot occur solely through the resolution of contradictions between classes. It also unfolds through the transformation of the relations human beings establish with themselves, with the community, and with nature. Within this approach, dialectics ceases to be a closed historical schema advancing through fixed stages and instead becomes a continuous process of becoming.
In classical dialectical materialism, the subject is often conceived as the bearer of historical necessities, with class positioned as the primary actor on the stage of history. While this emphasis is meaningful in underscoring the importance of collective action, it addresses individual and social processes of subject formation within a limited framework. Öcalan’s approach does not define the subject solely by class position. The subject is understood as a mode of existence constituted and transformed through practice.
This update does not render material reality secondary; on the contrary, it expands the scope of the material. Relations of economic production remain a crucial dimension of social life, but they are not its only one. Language, culture, gender relations, ecological bonds, and forms of political participation are also treated as components of material reality. In this way, dialectics is no longer restricted to the labor–capital contradiction, but becomes capable of analyzing the integrated contradictions of social existence as a whole.
At this point, updating dialectical materialism does not mean drawing it closer to idealism. Quite the opposite, it seeks to move beyond idealist abstractions in order to grasp the concrete, multi-layered structure of social life. The material is not limited to what is measurable. Social relations, habits, and shared practices of living also possess material reality. This recognition deepens the social reach of dialectics.
In Öcalan’s approach, dialectics shifts from a strategy focused on the seizure of power to a method for understanding society’s ongoing capacity for self-reproduction. Contradiction is not an obstacle to be eliminated, but a dynamic that contains the possibility of transformation. This makes it possible to conceive revolution not as a singular moment of rupture, but as a long-term process of social construction.
In conclusion, this update neither invalidates dialectical materialism nor abandons it; rather, it reworks it in line with historical experience and theoretical necessity. Öcalan’s contribution lies in removing dialectics from a state-, party-, and class-centered framework and transforming it into a mode of thought centered on society and life itself. This transformation shifts freedom from a deferred objective to a practice of the present.
Conclusion and discussion: The constitutive relationship between ontology, society, and freedom
The central argument advanced here is that social freedom cannot be established solely through the transformation of relations of production. It has been clearly emphasized that without a transformation in human conceptions of being, social bonds, and modes of subject formation, emancipation cannot become lasting. This framework does not reject the foundational intuitions of classical left thought; rather, it seeks to render visible the domains that it was historically unable to open.
Classical dialectical materialism remains a powerful theoretical tool for explaining capitalist exploitation and class-based inequalities. However, its tendency to treat freedom as a goal deferred to the future has created a structural distance between freedom and social practice. State-centered socialist experiences have demonstrated that this distance has produced not only theoretical but also historical consequences. When relations of production changed without a corresponding transformation in social relations, new forms of domination emerged alongside them.
At this point, the ontological dimension has been placed at the center of the analysis. Human beings exist in the world not only within economic relations, but also through meaning, relationships, and practice. Being is not a fixed condition; it is a process continuously unfolding through becoming. This understanding makes it possible to conceive freedom not as a completed objective, but as a form of relation that is constantly reproduced within social life. Ontology, in this sense, ceases to be an abstract domain of political theory and becomes one of the material grounds of freedom.
The sociological discussion presented here preserves the indispensability of class analysis while also demonstrating that social domination cannot be reduced to a single axis. Male domination, cultural hierarchies, centralization, and relations of representation are historical phenomena intertwined with class structures. Social emancipation requires confronting each of these forms of domination. This transforms sociology into not merely an explanatory tool, but a constitutive component of the practice of liberation.
Abdullah Öcalan’s understanding of socialism brings this ontological and sociological expansion together around the concept of communalism. Socialism is no longer treated as a project limited to the seizure of power, but as the process of revealing society’s capacity for self-organization. Communes, assemblies, and local forms of organization are redefined not as instrumental administrative structures, but as spaces in which freedom itself is produced. Within this framework, society ceases to be a passive object and becomes the primary subject of emancipation.
This approach inevitably invites a number of critiques. The most common objection is that it sidelines class struggle. Yet what is undertaken here is not the exclusion of class, but the refusal to treat it as the sole explanatory axis. The labor–capital contradiction remains central to modern capitalism; however, social domination cannot be comprehensively understood without taking into account hierarchies and forms of power that historically predate class formation.
Another criticism holds that this perspective represents a break with Marxism, suggesting that its emphasis on ontology and society moves it closer to idealism. However, material reality is not abandoned here; rather, the scope of the material is expanded. Social relations, everyday practices, forms of organization, and shared spaces of life are also part of the material world. This approach seeks to make visible the suppressed ontological dimension within Marxism itself.
Critiques concerning the state and power are likewise significant. The emphasis on communalism may be questioned on the grounds that it renders the problem of central power ambiguous. Yet such criticism reduces power solely to the state apparatus. In modern societies, power permeates the entirety of everyday life. The seizure of the state does not automatically dismantle these dispersed networks of power. Communalism does not obscure power; on the contrary, it renders it visible at local and plural levels.
The notion of society as the subject of emancipation may also be criticized for romanticizing society itself. Internal inequalities, reactionary tendencies, and conflicts within society may appear to be overlooked. Here, however, society is not idealized; it is approached as a field of struggle. Freedom does not develop through the suppression of tensions, but becomes possible through their open and visible articulation.
Finally, the practical applicability of this approach may be questioned. Particularly under conditions of crisis, war, and authoritarianism, the sustainability of society-centered models may be challenged. Yet this objection reflects the limits of the existing political order rather than those of the theory itself. Historical experience demonstrates that social self-organization can emerge even under the most difficult conditions. The experience of Rojava offers a clear illustration of this reality.
In conclusion, when ontology, sociology, and socialism are considered together, freedom ceases to be an abstract ideal or a deferred promise and becomes a lived social practice. The contribution of Abdullah Öcalan gains significance precisely in this effort to reconstitute this unity, offering a substantive theoretical update for contemporary left thought.